

B.3 The Chinese Heartland and its Imaginaries: Essays

習思想滲各級教材 小學重「政治啟蒙」 革命傳統、國安、勞動教育 9 課題「融入」大中小學 [Xi's thought is embedded in teaching materials at all levels; primary schools to emphasize "political enlightenment," revolutionary traditions, national security, labor education, and a 9 topics curriculum are "integrated" into universities, middle schools and primary schools]

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It is with no great irony that even as I was posting a video discussion of Chapter 18² my book, *Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and*

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² Larry Catá Backer and Matthew McQuilla, Discussing Chapter 18 of Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and 'Two Systems' (26 August 2021), Coalition for Peace & Ethics YouTube Channel; available [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2HEuYtm9FY>].

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'Two Systems',³ about what became the increasingly problematic relationship between the Hong Kong education system and the central authorities, the repercussions of which would be felt with increasing singularity after 2020,⁴ the Chinese central authorities announced in 25 August 2021, a deepening of patriotic and ideological education starting from primary education and reaching up through university education. In the case of Hong Kong, the motivation force was the need to ensure that Hong Kong's youth become more closely aligned with the sensibilities and politics of the rest of the nation after a year of sometimes violent protest at the heart of which was an emphasis of difference between the people of Hong Kong and those of the rest of China.

Alarmed that so many young Hong Kongers showed hostility to the ruling Communist Party and its vision for a resurgent China, the leadership has turned to re-education--a tried and tested tactic of the Party through decades of extinguishing domestic opposition. The aim is to remake Hong Kong's youth into citizens loyal to China.⁵

The object is to implement the principle of prosperity and stability--at the heart of the central authority's discursive position since 2019, through the education systems of the Hong Kong and Macao SARs.⁶ This effort mimicked reforms within China after 1989.⁷ In the case of contemporary mainland education reform, however, the reform is meant as an update

³ Larry Catá Backer, *Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and 'Two Systems': Essays from the Year that Transformed the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region* (June 2019-June 2020) (Little Sir Press, 2021).

⁴ See, e.g., Canice Chao, "Hong Kong liberal studies to be renamed and reformed – more China content, less focus on current affairs," *Hong Kong Free Press* (27 November 2020); available [<https://hongkongfp.com/2020/11/27/hong-kong-liberal-studies-to-be-renamed-and-reformed-more-china-content-less-focus-on-current-affairs/>].

⁵ See, e.g., "China wields patriotic education to tame Hong Kong's rebellious youth," *The Asahi Shimbun* (via Reuters) (27 November 2020); available [<https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13967418>] ("Lau Siu-kai, the vice president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies, Beijing's top think tank on Hong Kong affairs, says the first order of business is to turn young Hong Kongers into law-abiding citizens, then instill them with national pride.").

⁶ See "Political advisors discuss strengthening patriotic education among HK, Macao youth," *Xinhua* (23 April 2021); available [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/23/c_139901763.htm]. (quoting Wang Yang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the CPPCC National Committee).

⁷ See, e.g., Wing Kuang, "How China's patriotic education became one of the 'longest successful propaganda campaigns', *ABC News* (4 July 2021; available [<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-05/ccp-patriotic-education-young-people-in-australia/100260298>] ("China has a long history of ideological teachings, but its compulsory patriotic education curriculum was systematically rolled out in 1994, after the 1989 student protests and the Tiananmen Square massacre.").

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of this now well established system of inculcating appropriate national values through education. That updating is meant to embed New Era principles into the curriculum.⁸ In both cases, then, the object is to ensure that appropriate patriotic sentiments and attitudes are cultivated in the young.

As it is only right, then, some of that reporting around Mainland patriotic educational reform is of special interest to and reporting would then originate in Hong Kong. Of particular interest is the coverage in the Online newspaper, Ming Pao (明報).⁹ The reporting centered on the announcement came from the National Textbook Committee. NTC used the announcement to issue a number of textbook guides. Most significant among them was the integration of "Xi Jinping New Era Socialism Thought with Chinese Characteristics" in the curriculum.¹⁰

On the eve of the autumn semester in the Mainland, the National Textbook Committee issued a number of textbook guides. Among them, the "Xi Jinping New Era Socialism Thought with Chinese Characteristics" (hereinafter referred to as "Xi Thought Guide") which is to be fully integrated into the curriculum and teaching materials of universities, middle schools and primary schools. The Textbook Bureau of the Ministry of Education stated yesterday that it will promote 9 "major themed courses" including "Xi Thought" and "National Security Education" (see table). The authorities stated that it is necessary to combine the characteristics of the disciplines and focus on organic integration to ensure that Xi's thoughts are "connected to each other and progressively advanced" in the curriculum and teaching materials of universities, middle

⁸ "China schools: 'Xi Jinping Thought' introduced into curriculum," BBC (25 August 2021); available [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58301575] ("Xi Jinping thought" will help "teenagers establish Marxist beliefs", said the Ministry of Education (MOE) in new guidelines. The ideology will be integrated from primary school up to university.").

⁹ 習思想滲各級教材 小學重「政治啟蒙」 革命傳統、國安、勞動教育 9 課題「融入」大中小學, 明報 [Ming Pao, "Xi's thought is embedded in teaching materials at all levels; primary schools to emphasize "political enlightenment," revolutionary traditions, national security, labor education 9 topics curriculum are "integrated" into universities, middle schools and primary schools"] (hereafter Ming Pao, "Xi's Thought,").

¹⁰ Reuters reported at the time:

China will incorporate "Xi Jinping Thought" into its national curriculum to help "establish Marxist belief" in the country's youth, the education ministry said in new guidelines published on Tuesday. The Ministry of Education said Chinese President Xi Jinping's "thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era" would be taught from primary school level all the way to university.

"China to add 'Xi Jinping Thought' to national school curriculum: The move is aimed at strengthening "resolve to listen to and follow the Party," the Ministry of Education guidelines say," NBC News (via Reuters); available [https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-add-xi-jinping-thought-national-school-curriculum-n1277577].

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schools and primary schools. As for whether it will increase the burden on students, which is contrary to the "burden reduction" policy, the bureau said, the nine topics mentioned above cannot be taught individually.¹¹

At the press conference announcing the changes, Tian Huisheng, the director of the Teaching Materials Bureau of the Chinese Education Ministry explained that changes in the global order made it necessary to better ensure the cultural and national identity of the nation's youth.¹² "Therefore, it is necessary to cultivate students with a global perspective, 'It is even more important to cultivate students' Chinese cultural heritage, strengthen students' ambition, backbone, and confidence to be Chinese, unswervingly listen to and follow the party, and establish a continuous struggle for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Ideals and beliefs.'" ¹³

The inculcation of political values will continue to be focused differently throughout the academic career of students, but now centered on New Era Thought and its contemporary application. Primary school students are to be focused on elementary political ideology and moral standards. Moral training continues at the junior high school level along with a greater focus on political awareness. High School students focus more on the formation of political identity. University students concentrate on the formation of proper theoretical thinking and citizen responsibility, while graduate students then focus "on in-depth exploration, forming the quality and ability of propaganda, interpretation, and research of new ideas, so as to achieve integration" ¹⁴

The inclusion of New Era materials is meant to be integrated into the current curriculum, rather than adding to it. The object is to "ensure that Xi thought is 'connected to each other and progressively advanced' in the curriculum materials of universities, middle schools and primary schools." ¹⁵ It was suggested in the reporting that the New Era integration appeared to be modeled on the integration of the Thought of

¹¹ Ming Pao, "Xi's Thought," *supra* ("內地秋季開學前夕，國家教材委員會發布多份教材指南，其中《習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想進課程教材指南》（下稱《習思想指南》）明確要求把「習思想」全面融入大中小學課程教材。教育部教材局昨表示，將推動包括《習思想》、《國家安全教育》等9個「重大主題課程」（見表）。當局表示，要結合學科特點，以有機融入為主，確保習思想在大中小學課程教材中「相互銜接、層層遞進」。至於會否增加學生負擔、與「減負」政策相悖，局方則表示，上述九大課題暫不能一一獨立成課。").

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.* ("因此要培育學生具有全球視野，「更要厚植學生中華文化底蘊，增強學生做中國人的志氣、骨氣、底氣，堅定不移聽黨話、跟黨走，樹立為中國特色社會主義事業接續奮鬥的理想信念」。").

¹⁴ *Ibid.* ("研究生階段重在深度探究，形成宣傳、闡釋、研究新思想的質素和能力，做到融會貫通。")

¹⁵ *Ibid.* ("確保習思想在大中小學課程教材中「相互銜接、層層遞進」。") (quoting Han Zhen, a member of the National Textbook Committee).

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Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution.¹⁶ For example, it was reported that "In the currently implemented 'Xi Jinping New Era Socialism Thoughts with Chinese Characteristics Student Reader (Junior High School)', quotations and pictures of Xi Jinping appear in each chapter."¹⁷ The changes, then, represent a quite interesting refocusing of education to better align with the political training of the young in ways that more fully conform to the New Era realities of the vanguards political work and its policies.

The control of education is, again, a central concern of state authorities throughout the world.¹⁸ Its manifestation, though, is deeply aligned with national characteristics. The current manifestation of Chinese characteristics is now becoming much more transparent. But it shapes a similar conversation in liberal democratic states as well.¹⁹ It has again become common knowledge that those who control the inculcation of baseline principles, ideologies and ways of viewing the world on the young can then control authoritatively all that flows from it--from politics, to economics, to cultural and societal ordering.²⁰ Education, then, serves as an important political space which serves the state (or other authoritative drivers of collective cultural discipline) in its inter-generational management (and more importantly) preservation of "correct" thinking about the orthodox collective political-economic-societal model.²¹ While it is necessary to ensure the proper socialization

¹⁶ Ibid. ("文化大革命時期，毛澤東思想也曾全面融入包括語文、數學、歷史等各科課程教材。" ["During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong Thought was also fully integrated into the course materials of various subjects including Chinese, mathematics, and history."])

¹⁷ Ibid. (在目前已推行的《習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想學生讀本（初中）》，習近平的語錄與圖片在各章節均有出現。).

¹⁸ Glenn C. Savage and Kate O'Connor, "National Agendas in Global Times: Curriculum Reforms in Australia and the USA since the 1980s," *Journal of Education Policy* 30(5):609-630 (2015). Cf., Nel Noddings, *Philosophy of Education* (4th ed., Routledge, 216).

¹⁹ Cf., *New Framings on Anti-Racism and Resistance Volume 1 – Anti-Racism and Transgressive Pedagogies* (Ayan Abdulle and Anne Nelun Obeyesekere (eds); Sense Publishers, 2017); .

²⁰ See, e.g., Susanne Wiborg, "Political and cultural nationalism in education. The ideas of Rousseau and Herder concerning national education," *Comparative Education* 36(2):235-243 (2000) ("More than two hundred years ago Jean Jacques Rousseau claimed that not only could patriotism be created but indeed moulded. The task of governments was to carve the mould-the education institution-in which the children of nations should be shaped.").

²¹ The issue is contentious and the stakes can be high. For an example, see, e.g., Elizabeth Todd-Breland, *A Political Education: Black Politics and Education Reform in Chicago since the 1960s* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018); Gordon P. Andrews and Wilson J. Warren, "How the politicization of history education led to Michigan's fall: Are nonexperts with political agendas being given too much power in state-level educational decision making?," *The Kappan* (May 2018); available [https://web-p-ebshost-com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=135be944-925c-41c3-b346-49da6fa27182%40redis]; Jack Jennings, Presidents,

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of a population subject to collective orthodoxy in appropriate values and perspectives, the naturalization of those values and perspectives in the young is critical.²²

This is not merely a Leninist preoccupation.²³ In that respect every vibrant (that is not decaying) culture is ruthlessly "woke", and quite strategically so, in its relation to the education of its masses, but especially the young.²⁴ The only real issue (again in a living culture) touches on the mechanics and allocation of that power to determine the content of normative transmission--who gets to be the priestly caste of political-economic-culture in a society. Catholic education in 19th Century America, the form in which 19th and 20th century history is taught in Korea and Japan, and the battles over the inclusion of "Critical Race Theory" in the curricula of American public school along with contemporary social justice or equality education in the United States in the third decade of the 21st century²⁵ are merely the tips of a very large

Congress, and the public schools: the Politics of Education Reform (Harvard Education Press, 2015).

²² This has been said to have a specific manifestation with respect to education in Marxist Leninist states:

Ideologically, education in the Marxist state must be seen as an extension of the dominant (revolutionary) political forces seeking to mobilise the masses to their cause. It is expected to raise political consciousness; disseminate 'correct' values and information; fight the remnants of 'bourgeois' and/or feudal cultural-ideological attitudes and mentality; help educate the new 'Socialist Man' or, more inclusively, human being; promote equality between the sexes; develop the skills and capacities needed to transform and develop the economic and cultural systems of society; and, concomitantly, provide for the defence of 'socialism' against 'imperialism' in all its modalities-militarily, economically as well as politically and psychologically.

Alexander J. Groth, "Third World Marxism-Leninism: The Case of Education," *Comparative education* 23(3):329-344 (1987), at p. 330.

²³ John Dewey noted in 1938:

"It is because the conditions of life change, that the problem of maintaining a democracy becomes new, and the burden that is put upon the school, upon the educational system is not that of stating merely the ideas of the men who made this country, their hopes and their intentions, but of teaching what a democratic society means under existing conditions.

John Dewey, "Education and Democracy in the World Today (1938)," *Schools: Studies in Education* 9(1):96-100(2012).

²⁴ Cf., Edna Lomsky-Feder, "Competing Models of Nationalism: An Analysis of Memorial Ceremonies in Schools." *Nations and Nationalism* 17(3): 581-603 (2011).

²⁵ See, e.g., David Gillborn, "Critical Race Theory and Education: Racism and anti-racism in educational theory and praxis," *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 27(1):11-32 (2006); Brenda Alvarez, "Teaching with an Anti-Racist Lens: Educators are committed to helping students build a better future for everyone," *NEA News* (21 September 2021); available [<https://www.nea.org/advocating-for-change/new-from-nea/teaching-anti-racist-lens>].

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iceberg of the politics not merely of culture, but of control of the lens through which all knowledge may be given "correct" or "approved" meaning.

In a sense, these movements in the instrumentalization of education in the service collective identity brings its practices back "home."²⁶ This represents a much more public and structured effort to develop a formal institutional framework for the naturalization of a specific *episteme* (the premises through which knowledge is understood and meaning made) within China that guides the development of the *doxa* of the masses (their common knowledge) and that informs *techné* of the applied sciences and of vocational aspects of education (STEM etc.). The trend was already quite visible in Germany in the 1860s and prompted Friedrich Nietzsche's most insightful work on education.

Two seemingly antagonistic forces, equally deleterious in their actions and ultimately combining to produce their results, are at present ruling over our educational institutions, although these were based originally upon very different principles. These forces are: a striving to achieve the greatest possible extension of education on the one hand, and a tendency to minimise and to weaken it on the other. The first-named would fain spread learning among the greatest possible number of people, the second would compel education to renounce its highest and most independent claims in order to subordinate itself to the service of the State.²⁷

Nietzsche, of course, was highly critical of the trajectories of higher education and sought to be limit access and to preserve the independence of this most elite system from the more banal obligation to manage *doxa* to protect a national political and ideological *episteme*. But he appears to have been at least on part on the wrong end of history in that respect²⁸--

²⁶ See, e.g., Louis Brenner, *Controlling Knowledge: Religion, Power and Schooling in a West African Muslim Society* (Hurst & Co., 2000); Marcos Fernandez Ruiz, *The future of [higher] education. An analysis between doxa and episteme*, *Educación* 22(42):7-27 (2013).

²⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Future of Our Educational Institutions," in *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche Vol. III* (J.M. Kennedy (trans), T.N. Foulès, 1910); available Project Gutenberg EBook #28146 (20 February 2009); available [<https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/28146/pg28146-images.html>]. For an interesting commentary, see, Paul Reitter and Chad Wellmon, "How the Philologist Became a Physician of Modernity: Nietzsche's Lectures on German Education," *Representations* 131(1):68-104 (2015).

²⁸ Elite education remains an important element of the education of youth sorting out those selected for positions of responsibility. See, e.g., Osmo Kivinen, Juha Hedman and Päivi Kaipainen, "From Elite University to Mass Higher Education: Educational Expansion, Equality of Opportunity and Returns to University Education," *Acta Sociologica* 50(3):231-247 (2007); Stan C. Weber, "Elite versus mass sociology: An elaboration on Sociology's Academic Caste System," *The American Sociologist*.

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mass education has been a driver of state education policy in the liberal democratic West as well as in Marxist Leninist states.²⁹ The former is markets driven, the later more overtly in the service of political ideology. The Chinese Communist Party has become increasingly preoccupied with this issue as the full ramifications of the infiltrations, and its challenges, from a generation of Reform and Opening Up, become both clear and consequential. It has sought to refine the instrumentalization of education in the service of its own political objectives with Chinese characteristics, and in the process resist the corruption of other episteme on its responsibility for shaping Chinese youth.³⁰

The authorities have responded both defensively and proactively. Defensive actions have included a much closer scrutiny and a tightening up of education arrangements with non-Chinese and Non-Marxist Leninist institutions within China, and a closer surveillance on non-STEM education for its citizens, especially when it focuses on trends, ideas, thinking and ideology from abroad.³¹ Proactively, the Chinese central authorities, starting well before the 2019 protests erupted in Hong Kong and almost from the start of the leadership of Xi Jinping, have sought to re-develop and reinvigorate the system of patriotic education that was established in its current form after 1989.³² This is not meant to displace the technical education already a strong component of Chinese educational pedagogy. Instead, it is meant to frame that study by contextualizing it within the political appropriate perspective—that of Chinese Marxist Leninism as it has developed from Mao Zedong through Xi Jinping. It thus seeks to apply the principle of episteme that "In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether

²⁹ See, e.g., Gustavo Guzman, and Luiz F. Trivelato, "Packaging and unpacking knowledge in mass higher education—a knowledge management perspective," *Higher Education* 62:451-465 (2011); Christopher Bischof, "Progress and the people: histories of mass education and conceptions of Britishness, 1870–1914," *History of Education* 49(2):160-183 (2020).

³⁰ Cf., Jin Jiang, "China's move to mass higher education since 1998: Analysis of higher education expansion policies," *Higher Education Quarterly* 75(3):418-437 (2021); Jun Li, "Fostering citizenship in China's move from elite to mass higher education: An analysis of students' political socialization and civic participation," *International Journal of Educational Development* 29:382-398 (2009).

³¹ See, e.g., Hongda Liu, Zhen Yu, Jijian Zhang, and Pinbo Yao, "The Transmutation Logic of China University Science and Technology Innovation System since the Founding of the Communist Party of China One Hundred Years Ago: Three-Chain Perspectives Led by Party-Building," *Education Research International* Article ID 3459401 (2021); available [https://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/edri/2021/3459401.pdf].

³² Suisheng Zhao, "A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31(3):287-302 (1998); Orna Naftali, "Youth military training in China: learning to 'love the army'," *Journal of Youth Studies* 24(10):1340-1357 (2020);

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expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice.”³³ That episteme for the moment, and now more formally elaborated, is encapsulated in New Era thinking and in the basic line of the CPC.

The alignment of episteme (the principles around the rationalized framing of knowledge) and doxa (popular belief or pinion) provides a quite interesting application of the mass line³⁴ in the constitution of education.³⁵ Or better put, the mass line principles are nicely evidenced in the formalization of mass line principles realized through education. This represents a widening of the instrumentalization of the Mass Line now revamped with “New Era” characteristics.³⁶

But it is one thing to develop the architecture of a robust episteme; it is quite another to see it operationalized.³⁷ No matter how important the central authorities think this is, no matter how much the affirming performance of pomp and symbolic ceremony is affixed to its articulation and presentation to the masses, such programs remain dead letter in the absence of a large, well educated, and enthusiastic cadre of teachers dedicated to taking the task seriously.³⁸ It also requires a set of metrics with bite.³⁹ The West has had its share of legislatively pronounced efforts at building episteme in specific areas. Sometimes they are successful--but usually when they are deeply embedded within the core texts of every field. It is when they are distilled and presented separately that, in its implementation, such projects tend to be observed strictly in form and mocked in execution. But when they are embedded

³³ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (NY: Vintage Books, 1966) p. 183. Cf., Matthew Charles, “Pedagogy as “Cryptic Politics”: Benjamin, Nietzsche, and the End of Education,” *Boundary 2* 45:2 (2018).

³⁴ Communist Party of China, Constitution (as amended); available [] General Program (“In its own work, the Party shall follow the mass line, seeing that everything is for the people and everything relies on the people, exercising the principle of “from the people, to the people,” and translating the correct ideas of the Party into the voluntary action of the people.”).

³⁵ Cf., from a historical perspective, Graham Young, “On the Mass Line,” *Modern China* 6(2):225-240 (1980).

³⁶ Cf. from a non-Chinese perspective though still quite useful, Shannon Tiezzi, “The Mass Line Campaign in the 21st Century: Xi Jinping’s “mass line” campaign reveals the Party’s convoluted relationship with China’s citizens,” *The Diplomat* (27 December 2013); available [<https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/the-mass-line-campaign-in-the-21st-century/>].

³⁷ See, e.g., Andrzej Bielecki, “The Systemic Concept of Contextual Truth,” *Foundations of Science* 26:807-824 (2021).

³⁸ Cf., Hongyan Liu, Chengfang Liu, Fang Chang, and Prashant Loyalka, “Implementation of Teacher Training in China and its Policy Implications,” *China and World Economy* 24(3):86-104 (2016).

³⁹ Panayiotis Antoniou and Mohan Lu, “Evaluating the measuring properties of the principal instructional management rating scale in the Chinese educational system: Implications for measuring school leadership,” *Educational Management Administration & Leadership* 46(4):624-641 (2018). Cf., Maria Repnikova, “Thought Work Contested: Ideology and Journalism Education in China,” *The China Quarterly* 230: 399-419 (2017).

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across the curriculum, they can be marginalized, parodied, or subtly criticized within the broader structures of presentation.

No one has bothered, at least since the crude and heavy handed efforts of the Cultural Revolution in China, to deeply embed the episteme of Chinese Marxist Leninism at a specific point in its evolution into the core texts of the curriculum. Likewise, it has been a long time since the CPC apparatus devoted as much attention to the instrumentalization of education. As before, the objectives are both plausible and ambitious: to produce and naturalize this quite specific baseline of and that path to the representation of a socio-political reality through which everything else is understood. Ultimately, this naturalization, and its embedding within curricular fields, is meant to make the project comprehensive and also substantially invisible and natural to the study of a field in which it appears. Nonetheless, it also appears that the state must still train (and discipline) a very large cadre of teachers enthusiastic and knowledgeable in the concepts and pedagogy of this episteme.⁴⁰ This is implied. Indeed, the task becomes harder when faculty must not merely instill appropriate political and moral values but also be prepared to identify and combat “false ideas and thoughts” in the classroom.⁴¹

If one is to believe the Ministry, though, that is precisely the project attempted now, a deep dive into catechistic education 2.0. These are large scale comprehensive culture changing projects that take a generation of unrelenting penitence and a commitment to the presentation of its premises and the comprehensive way in which it shapes the knowledge of fields and the world around us.⁴² These are the three factors that marked the success of the culture changing critical movement in the United States--the embedding of its premises across disciplines taught by a generation of educators instilled with the

⁴⁰ But see, Guang Li, “Research on the competency of teachers of ideological and political theory courses in undergraduate colleges,” *Journal of Physics: Conference Series* 1423(1) (2019) (2019 International Conference on Applied Machine Learning and Data Science).

⁴¹ See, “China’s Xi urges teachers of political courses to tackle ‘false ideas,’” *Reuters* (18 March 2019); available [https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-china-politics-education-idUKKCN1R0033] (“Beijing has campaigned against the spread of “Western values” in education, especially at universities, and the ruling Communist Party’s anti-corruption watchdog has sent inspectors to monitor teachers for “improper” remarks in class.” *Ibid.*). At a 2019 symposium for ideological and theory teachers in Beijing, Xi Jinping explained: “Ideological and political courses should deliver the country’s mainstream ideology and directly respond to false ideas and thoughts” Xi added.” *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.* (“Xi said the party must nurture generations of talent to support its leadership and China’s socialist system. . . ‘It is essential to gradually open and upgrade ideological and political theory courses in primary, secondary and tertiary schools, which is an important guarantee for training future generations who are well-prepared to join the socialist cause,’ media paraphrased Xi as saying.”). Cf., Sjaak Kroon, “Catechistic Teaching, National Canons, and the Regimentation of Students’ Voice,” *Anthropology and Education* 44(2):189-204 (2013).

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naturalness and need for this reality assessing perspective, teaching from a large body of materials created to support and develop these episteme. In the absence of that it is likely that the large gap between the elaboration of a theory of teaching and of its curriculum and its successful application will not shrink any time soon.

Where the project is not comprehensively and seamlessly applied, and where local culture is strong and indifferent, the risk that detached projects such as this, appended to the "real" curriculum, there is a real risk that the project at theological levels will be treated either as a joke, more subtly mocked in the teaching, or reduced to a necessary obligation producing resistance to its teachings rather than acceptance. That, certainly, points to the danger realized in the United States--and elsewhere. But the rewards of success may be worth the risk--and technology (assuming the state has enough interest to put sufficient resources behind the policy) could be effective in tying this approach to the nudging inherent in social credit systems.



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