A Critical Reading of China's State Council White Paper
关于中美经贸磋商的中方立场
[China's Position on the China-US Economic and Trade Consultations] and China-Russian Relations

CPE-Working Group on Empire
Larry Catá Backer
Flora Sapio

Part 1: Introduction

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[中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于发展新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系的联合声明]
Part 1: Introduction

Every great state has several paths among which it can choose, each consistent with its governing ideology and culture. One might imagine, for example, that over the last several centuries in Russia, those paths tilted it east toward the Steppe cultures and Mongolia, or the south toward Central Asian Islam and the Ottoman Turks, or west toward (northern) Europe and the Prussians. The results are quite distinct. Russia’s now constantly in tension with each other and manifested in shifting strategies for identifying, valuing, and interacting with the non-Russian world (including the non-Russian world within Russia).

For the Americans the choice is quite different, between socio-racial hierarchies and isolation within a continent-sized nation, or toward the embrace of the ideal of the United States as the embodiment of the world and all of its cultures, in both cases providing a basis for global leadership. In the 20th and 21st centuries these tilts produced both the Washington Consensus and contemporary economic globalization and variations of America First, under the leadership of the United States as the global vanguard nation.

Ironically, China’s paths appear along lines similar to those facing the United States, though of course with Chinese characteristics. On the one hand, Chinese paths point inward toward a self referencing and self contained unit that deals with the rest of the world through carefully controlled entry and exit points and from which it develops paths toward relations of use to it. The current manifestation (and variation) of this path is the Belt and Road Initiative, perhaps. The other cluster of paths point outward toward a more robust integration in the world in which though relations are hierarchical, they tend to be open and interactions are deeply integrated. The ‘Go Out’ Policy and the process of Reform and Opening Up (at least practiced for a generation) might point in this direction.

For both China and the United States, then, their respective vanguard ‘leadership core’ [领导核心] have sought to manage the choice of paths grounded in a calculation of the respective interests of each state (within a global system in which isolation is no longer an object) and constrained by their respective governing ideologies. The choice on both sides had been stable until the time of the current ‘leadership core’ [领导核心]. Over the past several years both have sought to rethink the parameters of what had been a dynamic but relatively stable relationship as each embraced the idea that they both operated at the moment of the start of a great ‘New Era’ [新时代]. This New Era [新时代] was to be manifested in the most important sector of national engagement — its economic model within globalization.

It ought to come as no surprise (at least in retrospect), that the flash point for choosing the new path in the ‘new era’ [新时代] would find expression at the core of the framing relations that drives global economic activity — the China-US economic and trade negotiations. It is here that both states have been playing out the process (mostly internal and opaque except to the leadership and their servants) of choosing their respective paths consistent with their ideologies which in turn will define not just their bilateral relations, but also the way in which both states approach the world in the context of a globalization that cannot be avoided. China,
especially, appears to face a choice. Having spent the greater part of the time it had embraced
the ‘Reform and Opening Up’ period deeply integrating its economy with that of the world — a choice accelerated with China’s Accession to the WTO and its more robust engagement
in the institutions of then dominant global economic principles — China appears now to be
considering the value of a new path. That path would be grounded on the disentangling of its
generalized connection with an unstructured environment of production and substituting in
its stead a much more focused and directed set of streams of activity over which it will
preside. To that end, the principal task is to disentangle the Chinese and US economies. And
the trade negotiations provide the perfect cover for the development, articulation and
implementation of that choice (formally connected to the receding system but effectively
substituting another). In that respect, of course, the Chinese are also providing substantial
(and critically necessary) support to the leadership core of the United States who, within the
structures of their own governing ideology have also faced this choice and appear as well
willing to follow suit.

In this article the Working Group on Empire of the CPE examines the question of paths to
empire performed through the choices being made by the US and Chinese leadership cores
[领导核心] within the theater of the US-China bilateral trade negations. To that end it critically
examines China’s State Council White Paper, entitled China’s Position on the China-US
Economic and Trade Consultations [关于中美经贸磋商的中方立场]. 1 The White Paper was
distributed by the State Council Information Office on Sunday 2 June.

Part 2: A Critical Reading of China's State Council
White Paper "China’s Position on the China-US Economic
and Trade Consultations" [关于中美经贸磋商的中方立场]

CPE Working Group on Empire

What follows is a critical reading of the State Council White Paper. We avoid free standing
analysis in this Part I. Rather, in an effort at more systematic examination, analysis is
embedded into the structure and form of the White Paper itself. Part II, which follows, then
develops the bigger picture insights in more traditional essay form. The Working Group on
Empire analysis appears in RED, the original White Paper appears in black.

1 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室 [INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA]. 关于中美经贸磋商的中方立场 [CHINA’S POSITION ON THE CHINA-US ECONOMIC AND TRADE
CONSULTATIONS] (2019).
“China’s Position on the China-US Economic and Trade Consultations”

“(June 2019)
The State Council Information Office of
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“Preface”

“The China-US commercial relationship serves as both the ballast and the propeller of the overall bilateral relationship. At stake are the fundamental interests of the two peoples, and the prosperity and stability of the world. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the US, bilateral trade and economic relations have come a long way, with expanding fields of cooperation at higher levels. A mutually beneficial and win-win relationship with strong complementarity and interlinked interests has been forged, benefiting not only the two countries but also the entire world.”

Commentary: It is always useful to place an argument — or an issue — in perspective. But here the perspective is not ideological but practical. Thus the White Paper starts with a practical ‘win-win’ imagery — the ballast and propeller images (though it is not clear who the Chinese meant to serve as the propeller and how the ballast. It is possible that the invitation was for each person to read that choice into the paragraph for herself (and to their detriment). This propeller and ballast imagery is then tied to the interests of the Chinese and American peoples, and to global prosperity and stability. The idea, of course, is that together the US and China are responsible, if only because of their size and power, for determining economic and political ordering and that it is a function of the bilateral relationship — and more particularly getting it ‘right’. This is then historically situated (bilateral relations "have come a long way"). Yet that ‘practical’ veils a number of principles through which China would manage the form and
parameters of discourse by grounding it in Chinese ideological principles and positions. First, the statement of the objective ('win-win', 'complementarity', and 'mutually beneficial') sit at the core of China's 'New Era' principles for economic relations. Second, it seeks to limit the extent of the relationship to economics — "commercial relationship," and "trade and economic relations" — veil the critical importance of the social and cultural elements which have also defined trade relations. Third, "complementarity" is meant to evoke images of a set of puzzle pieces that need only be fit together to make a nice and complete image with no elements of opposition or overlap. Fourth, the intimation is that complementarity is a key element not just in the arrangement of bilateral relations but in the way the two states will — as equals — reshape the world in their respective images. The principle notion advanced in the key opening paragraph, then, is one of Empire, or rather the arrangement of complementary but not overlapping Empire.

“Given the differences in stage of development and economic system, it is inevitable that the two countries will experience differences and friction in their commercial cooperation. The history of China-US trade and economic relations has seen twists and turns and difficult situations. By adopting a rational and cooperative attitude, the two countries have managed to resolve previous conflicts, bridge differences, and render the bilateral commercial relationship more mature through dialogue and consultation.”

**Commentary:** Certain elements of the Chinese vanguard have been using the ‘developing state’ discursive trope quite successfully for a generation. They continue to deploy it. Also lurking here is the aura of another quite useful trope — that of the need to undo the effects of unequal treaties of the 19th and early 20th century (at least to the extent that China appeared, by its own reckoning) to be on the wrong side of the unequal treaty. Both are deployed here as well to set the stage for the development of the frame of reference later used to justify Chinese negotiating positions. This is not a criticism but rather an acknowledgment that discursive tropes are at their most effective when they avoid the invitation to greater reflection. The addition of the "rational and cooperative attitude" principle will make it possible for a later building of the argument that China’s position is rational and cooperative and by definition the American position (being contrary to it) is not. Again, an excellent starting point for building a negotiating position but hardly one that can be understood as doing more than building a persuasive argument by seeking to control the parameters of argument making.

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“Since it took office in 2017, the new US administration has threatened additional tariffs and other measures and provoked frequent economic and trade friction with its major trading partners. In response to the economic and trade friction unilaterally initiated by the US since March 2018, China has had to take forceful measures to defend the interests of the nation and its people. At the same time, committed to resolving disputes through dialogue and consultation, China has engaged in multiple rounds of economic and trade consultations with the US in an effort to stabilize the bilateral commercial relationship. China’s position has been consistent and clear – that cooperation serves the interests of the two countries, that conflict can only hurt both, and that cooperation is the only correct choice for both sides. Concerning their differences and frictions on the economic and trade front, China is willing to work together with the US to find solutions, and to reach a mutually beneficial and win-win agreement. However, cooperation has to be based on principles. There are bottom lines in consultations. China will not compromise on major issues of principle. China does not want a trade war, but it is not afraid of one and it will fight one if necessary. China’s position on this has never changed."

Commentary: And here it is — the first objective of the first two paragraphs is here identified: the irrational and uncooperative (and unreasonable) position of the Americans by reference to a characterization of the tactics they have used in the course of negotiation. The position is even more deliciously effective through the ploy of appearing to separate the actions of the Obama from the Trump presidencies. To that extent, of course the, White Paper appeals to perceived prejudices among the American leadership elites (especially those out of office, and their media class confederates). There is irony here — the Chinese leadership core has long despised and feared the Obama Administration both for its relentless reminders of China's position with respect to Western human rights, but also for its almost successful efforts to implement a multilateral trade regime that would have put China at a severe disadvantage.3 But they have come to view the weakness of the Trump Administration (a perceived inability to control the outlets for mass mobilization) as a means to turn the tables on the Americans. And yet, to some large extent, there is no real break between the Obama and Trump Administrations with respect to core positions on critical issues of bilateral trade. Still, the White Paper, correctly from a strategic perspective, seeks to characterize the use of tariffs as aggressively imposed on an innocent developing state that then required (as national honor and sovereignty compel) the taking of countermeasures. Lastly, the White Paper uses this paragraph to help develop the discursive framework for positioning China on the warfare high ground — by asserting that the "trade war" was provoked by the irrational and unprincipled Americans and that the resulting conflict will from the Chinese side fall within Western notions of just war.

3 Larry Catá Backer, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Japan, China, the U.S., and the Emerging Shape of a New World Trade Regulatory Order, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 049 (2014),
But the real objective is to continue to develop the oppositional binaries that will propel the arguments and be filled in with the collection of facts that constitutes the bulk of the White Paper. The first one has already been noted: American aggression versus Chinese defensive measures (apparently detached form negotiation and oblivious to the characterization of differences between objectives and tactics toward an end — but this is fair in creating negotiating positions). The second one is the rationality versus brute force binary — Chinese leaders are "committed to resolving disputes through dialogue and consultation"; their counterparts are committed to unilateral diktat. This is measured by the Chinese willingness to talk versus the American lust to act. The third is that of consistent and clear China versus an inconsistent and ambiguous US (of course this is belied by the strategic missteps of the parties that led to the break down of negotiations in May, but inconvenient facts might be recharacterized or moved to the side when it suits — again fair in negotiation but dangerous for analysis).

All of this, of course, to get to the position that was formulated to justify Chinese actions that provoked the breakdown of trade talks that were apparently on the cusp of completion: the quite interesting and to some extent singular definition of cooperation. The White Paper stresses "cooperation has to be based on principles (...) [with] bottom lines in consultations (...) [but also grounded in normative positions "major issues of principle" with respect to which] China will not compromise." As a logical proposition the statement may not be as glorious as the sound it makes when read aloud. Still, it is a glorious mellifluous statement with a cloudy context (what principles? What is cooperation if it means that the US is invited to compromise on its principles so that those of its negotiating partner may be preserved?). Still one might welcome the White Paper if only to provide the principles against which negotiating stances can be measured.

“To provide a comprehensive picture of the China-US economic and trade consultations, and present China’s policy position on these consultations, the Chinese government hereby issues this White Paper.”

**Commentary:** With this critical foundation, of course, it is now possible for the White Paper to build its argument. To that end the White Paper itself serves to fill in with facts the discursive and normative structures built in the Preface. Indeed, the remainder of the White Paper can be understood as one long footnote to the Preface. Let's test that hypothesis next. An important aspect of the White Paper is directed outward to the global stakeholders who may judge the legitimacy of the negotiations (and intervene to protect their own interests, or to choose sides). Certainly if the United States must negotiate against the Chinese state apparatus and with its own allies and internal opposing factions, then others will do China's work for it. A good strategy to use an opponent's weakness against it. At the same time, the White Paper must also be
prepared with a mind to internal conversations in China. First, it must make the case that the choices the Chinese position takes represents positions that are wholly consistent with the Chinese Communist Party line. Second, it must use the opportunity to align that reading of the CPC Basic Line with New Era ideology as it is being developed. And lastly, it must make the case for alignment between the Chinese position and core policy respecting the Belt and Road Initiative, the program of Yuan internationalization, and China’s position respecting the policy goals for Chinese leadership in the global order. It is to those ends — internal and external, that the White Paper is crafted. For those purposes the Americans must appeal to be selfish, while their opponents are selfless; the Americans must appear to be aggressive while their opponents appear defensive; the Americans must appear to be unprincipled with their opponents appear to uphold the new era version of the great principles of a global order; the Americans must appear to be unreasonable and uncooperative while their opponents appear to be constant and cooperative and pacific but strong in defense. But ultimately the Chinese position must appear to develop the international elements of Socialism with Chinese characteristics whose developments will be possible only under the leadership of China (just as the development of the pre-2016 global order was necessarily driven by the Americans).

“I. Economic and trade friction provoked by the US damages the interests of both countries and of the wider world”

“Trumpeting “America First”, the current US administration has adopted a series of unilateral and protectionist measures, regularly wielded tariffs as a “big stick” and coerced other countries into accepting its demands. The US has initiated frequent investigations under the long-unused Sections 201 and 232 against its main trading partners, causing disruption to the global economic and trade landscape. Specifically targeting China, in August 2017 it launched a unilateral investigation under Section 301. Turning a blind eye to China’s unremitting efforts and remarkable progress in protecting intellectual property and improving the business environment for foreign investors, the US issued a myriad of slanted and negative observations, and imposed additional tariffs and investment restrictions on China, provoking economic and trade friction between the two countries.”

Commentary: The White Paper is quick to take advantage of some mindlessness that its authors correctly extract from what passes for the discussion among Western elites and their mechanisms for mass education (the press and social media including specifically its opinion sections). That mindlessness centers on the demonization of the America First Initiative and its depiction as the bad opposite to the benignly multilateral Belt and Road Initiative (as the transformational New Era version of the Reform and Opening Up Initiative of prior leadership cores for an era that is now said to have passed). The White Paper is right to do this. One ought to press all advantages against an opponent in negotiation. Lamentably this is only a negotiating stance —rigorous analysis would
question the space that separates — conceptually and operationally — the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the America First Initiative (AFI). The paragraph required little more than cherry picking some of the more outlandish claims among the Western ruling classes, repackaging them and throwing them back into the faces of the American negotiators. Bravo! But as reality it has certain strong weaknesses that the US might eventually exploit. The American impatience and willingness to speak about Chinese implementation of its intellectual property obligations is longer than that of the Chinese negotiating trade relations since 2016. Indeed this was as much an Obama era issue as a Trump Administration one. Yet that history is nicely reordered for purposes of the White Paper’s argument. And, of course, though they make for effective rhetorical J’accuse, the unsupported reference to "slanted and negative observations" does little to advance progress — but then it is not meant to.

Box 1: China’s technological innovation is based on self-reliance. Accusing China of intellectual property theft and forced technology transfer is utterly unfounded.

China is an innovative and diligent nation. It has created a highly-sophisticated civilization and contributed significantly to human progress over the course of 5,000 years. Since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, and in particular since the beginning of reform and opening up in 1978, China’s scientific and technological undertakings have passed through a series of phases. They started from a difficult beginning, forged ahead in the course of reform, and have now achieved multiple breakthroughs featuring a variety of innovations. These achievements have won worldwide recognition. Historical records confirm that China’s achievements in scientific and technological innovation are not something we stole or forcibly took from others; they were earned through self-reliance and hard work. Accusing China of stealing intellectual property to support its own development is an unfounded fabrication.

China is fully committed to intellectual property protection. It has established a legal system for the protection of intellectual property that is consistent with prevailing international rules and adapted to China’s domestic conditions. China values the leading role of judicial measures in protecting intellectual property, and has achieved impressive results. The understanding of the importance of intellectual property among the general public and business community in China has increased, the value of royalties paid to foreign rights-holders has risen significantly, and the number of intellectual property applications and registrations has surged.

The effective impact of China’s intellectual property protection has won broad international recognition. Former WIPO Director General Arpad Bogsch spoke highly of China’s legal framework for intellectual property protection, noting that China’s achievements are "unmatched in the history
of intellectual property protection”. The US Chamber of Commerce recognized that China is making concrete progress in creating an intellectual property environment appropriate to the 21st century. In its 2018 China Business Climate Survey Report, the American Chamber of Commerce in China noted that among the main challenges facing its member companies operating in China, concern over intellectual property dropped from 5th place in 2011 to 12th place in 2018. An article in The Diplomat predicted that China will become a leader in global intellectual property. Many of the concerns raised by foreign firms doing business in China have already been addressed through judicial reform and a strengthened enforcement mechanism.

Respecting the laws of the market economy, China has been actively improving the policy system for innovation, continuously increasing investment in research and development, accelerating the development of innovators, and strengthening international cooperation on technological innovation in an all-round way. In terms of some key innovation indices, China is already among the world’s leading players. As China continues to witness a series of major scientific and technological achievements, its industries are gravitating toward the middle and high end, and the country’s international influence is markedly increasing. In 2017, total R&D investment in China reached RMB1.76 trillion, ranking second in the world. The number of patent applications reached 1.382 million, ranking No. 1 in the world for the seventh consecutive year. The number of invention patents granted reached 327,000, up by 8.2 percent year-on-year. China ranks third in the world in terms of valid invention patents held.

China has always pursued international technical cooperation with mutual benefit and win-win as the basic value orientation. China’s economic development has benefited from international technology transfer and dissemination. International holders of technology have also reaped enormous benefits from this process. China encourages and respects voluntary technical cooperation between Chinese and foreign firms based on market principles. It strongly opposes forced technology transfer and takes resolute action against intellectual property infringement. Accusations against China of forced technology transfer are baseless and untenable.

Commentary: Text boxes have become an essential tool of business and state elements in drawing attention to a small thing that can then stand for something more universal. All self-respecting institutional actors now use this device — and use it to death, it seems. This is not a criticism of this White Paper so much as an observation that both Chinese and US administrators cannot resist this device...and that is a pity. This text box is meant to make the case against the now decades old argument from Western nations that Chinese enterprises have sticky fingers with respect to intellectual property. The claim
is a reasonable one — that having invested a generation of students studying in the West, that China is quite capable of developing its own intellectual property and need not engage in activities that so irritate western competitor entities (and the states in which they reside). Moreover, the White Paper suggests that Chinese history itself suggests that Chinese culture has always been a technology driver (of course this is an argument that then is impossible to align with the "we are a developing state and need to play by different rules" argument) but that is for negotiation opponents to sort out. The text box is used as well to again underline the "win-win" principle now in context and to declare that forced technology transfers are not in China’s toolkit — an odd argument since forced technology transfers were in all developed states’ toolkits for at least a generation. The temptation to over argue a point does not serve this text box or the White Paper well — though there is a bit too much of it here. On the other hand, over-argument may be necessary to send the appropriate signals to perceived reader stakeholders. So, it is not clear who whom which portions of the text box (and the White Paper) are written.

“Turning a blind eye to the nature of the economic structure and the stage of development in China and the US, as well as the reality of the international industrial division of labor, the US insists that China’s “unfair” and “non-reciprocal” trade policies have created a trade deficit in bilateral commercial exchanges that constitutes “being taken advantage of”, leading to unilateral imposition of additional tariffs on China. In fact, in today’s globalized world, the Chinese and American economies are highly integrated and together constitute an entire industrial chain. The two economies are bound in a union that is mutually beneficial and win-win in nature. Equating a trade deficit to being taken advantage of is an error. The restrictive measures the US has imposed on China are not good for China or the US, and still worse for the rest of the world.”

Commentary: Here again the "poor China" argument is deployed. It probably has more traction within China than outside of it. This argument certainly would not garner much sympathy in Africa or Latin America. But still, it has a long and distinguished history among the Chinese vanguard and those sorts of things are difficult to abandon — just ask the Americans who also tend to find it hard to drop arguments that no longer serve a purpose and are at odds with reality. The Americans rightly turn a blind eye to the economic structure and stage of development in China precisely because they believe that both are in an advanced stage. Of course, the White Paper has a problem — the Chinese Communist Basic Line — as well as the General Program of the Chinese Communist Party: continuing to advance the line of development in terms of Chinese development having a long way to go. That the Basic Line constrains the discursive tropes of the White Paper is especially apparent here. That Basic Line, though, is dynamic, and part of the underlying argument is meant to suggest the way that the New
Era recasting of the Basic Line itself strengthens and changes the Chinese position (and thus explains the invocation of principle as the cause of the rejection of the tentative agreement reached in May 2019). One is reminded of an old text:

Certain propositions advanced by a Marxist-Leninist Party during a certain period and under certain conditions have to be replaced by new propositions, because of changed circumstances and times. Failure to do so will result in the error of dogmatism and losses to the cause of communism. But under no circumstances is a Marxist-Leninist Party allowed to use the pretext of certain new social phenomena to negate the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism, to substitute revisionism for Marxism-Leninism and to betray communism.4

But that also suggests that this is a paragraph with far more resonance within China than outside of it. As for the rest, there is much room for argument, and that is specifically the object to which it is deployed. It is for the Americans to counter much of the factual assertions made, and there is room for such arguments. But still, the Chinese make the best case they can within the logic of their ideological world view.

One last point — the assertion that the American and Chinese economies are "highly integrated and together constitute an entire industrial chain" is both true as a historical matter but also may be passing as the New Era comes into its own. The actions of both China and the United States has done much over the last 12 months to disintegrate the unitary production chain that marked the golden age of the Reform and Opening Up period. And that makes sense in the era of Belt and Road Initiative where, logically, such an integration and unitary production chain is both dangerous and irrelevant — to both states. Thus here one finds an argument form history meant to produce an aura of unity that in fact is quickly dissolving. To the extent that this misleads the American negotiators, it will be interesting to see in what direction.

Box 2: The Chinese and American economies are interlinked, and bilateral trade and investment are mutually beneficial

China and the US are each other’s largest trading partner and important source of investment. In 2018, bilateral trade in goods and services exceeded US$750 billion, and two-way direct investment approached US$160 billion. China-US commercial cooperation has brought substantial benefits to both countries and both peoples.

According to China Customs, the trade in goods between China and the US grew from less than US$2.5 billion in 1979 when the two countries forged diplomatic ties to US$633.5 billion in 2018, a 252-fold increase. In 2018, the

4 The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us, RENMIN RIBAO, December 31, 1962, available at https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/togliatti.htm
US was China's largest trading partner and export market, and the sixth largest source of imports. According to the US Department of Commerce, in 2018 China was the largest trading partner of the US, its third largest export market, and its largest source of imports. China is the key export market for US airplanes, soybeans, automobiles, integrated circuits and cotton. During the ten years from 2009 to 2018, China was one of the fastest growing export markets for American goods, with an annual average increase of 6.3 percent and an aggregate growth of 73.2 percent, higher than the average growth of 56.9 percent represented by other regions in the world.

Trade in services between China and the US is flourishing and highly complementary. The two countries have conducted extensive, in-depth, and mutually-beneficial cooperation in tourism, culture, and intellectual property. China is the largest destination for US tourists in the Asia-Pacific and the US is the largest overseas destination for Chinese students. According to Chinese figures, two-way trade in services rose from US$27.4 billion in 2006, the earliest year with available statistics, to US$125.3 billion in 2018, a 3.6-fold increase. In 2018, China’s services trade deficit with the US reached US$48.5 billion.

Over the past forty years, two-way investment between China and the US has grown from near zero to approximately US$160 billion, and this cooperation has proved fruitful. According to MOFCOM, by the end of 2018 accumulative Chinese business direct investment in the US exceeded US$73.17 billion. The rapid growth of Chinese business investment in the US has contributed to local economic growth, job creation, and tax revenues. According to MOFCOM, the paid-in investment by the US in China was US$85.19 billion by the end of 2018. In 2017, the total annual sales revenues of US-invested companies in China were US$700 billion, with profits exceeding US$50 billion.

Therefore, if trade in goods and services as well as two-way investment are taken into account, China-US trade and economic relations are mutually beneficial, rather than the US “being taken advantage of”.

**Commentary:** Yet another text box...what now? Yes, the historical argument about the interlocked economies of the US and China. To some extent that is and will remain true. It will remain true to the extent that both economies will continue to invest in the other and to own parts of the economic machinery of the other. But the long term arc of development now suggests a trajectory of disintegration. BRI will turn Chinese attentions toward its Silk Roads and the protection and enhancement of its economic production chains, with producers and consumers to development along these routes. America First suggests a need for US companies to hedge — with movement to South Asia (other than Pakistan now increasingly economically bound to China) and East and Southeast Asia. Americans are moving aggressively to strip Latin America of a too energetic encounter with the Belt and Road Initiative, though that strategy may
ultimately fail. Yet even as the two states disentangle it will be true enough that they will not become strangers. It is likely, though, that the character of their mutual inter-investment will likely change. It is to a determination of the character of that change that the leadership cores of both states appear to be devoting themselves.

But then, why the effort in the White Paper to make this case? One reason may be hinted at in the end of the text box — the White Paper may be seeking to make a fact based case for its principle of mutually beneficial relations at the heart of the Chinese framework of international trade and global production. Yet trade among these two states that is measurable in billions of dollars are not necessarily stable nor impervious to change.

“(I) The tariff measures the US imposed harm others and are of no benefit to itself ”

“The US administration has imposed additional tariffs on Chinese goods exported to the US, impeding two-way trade and investment cooperation and undermining market confidence and economic stability in the two countries and globally. The US tariff measures lead to a decrease in the volume of China’s export to the US, which fell by 9.7 percent year-on-year in the first four months of 2019, dropping for five months in a row. In addition, as China has to impose tariffs as a countermeasure to US tariff hikes, US exports to China have dropped for eight months in a row. The uncertainty brought by US-China economic and trade friction made companies in both countries more hesitant about investing. China’s investment in the US continues to fall and the growth rate of US investment in China has also slowed down. According to Chinese statistics, direct investment by Chinese companies in the US was US$5.79 billion in 2018, down by 10 percent year-on-year. In 2018, paid-in US investment in China was US$2.69 billion, up by only 1.5 percent year-on-year compared with an increase of 11 percent in 2017. With the outlook for China-US trade friction unclear, the WTO has lowered its forecast for global trade growth in 2019 from 3.7 percent to 2.6 percent.”

Commentary: This paragraph appears to appeal to the US allies and to those portions of the American leadership class who have devoted so much energy to undermining current negotiations in hopes, perhaps, that if they can be stretched out for four years a new (Democratic) administration will be able to "make things right". That is a dangerous calculus, assuming it is plausible. Again, the White Paper continues the discursive trope — American aggression followed by Chinese reluctant defense. And it continues the argument structure that tends to detach the tariffs from the negotiations themselves. That is, tariffs here are depicted as an objective rather than as a tool. And to the extent it is acknowledged as a tool, it is one that is viewed as disproportionate and
misdirected causing harm to the innocent. Here one is confronted with a fundamental difference (at least formally, it is less clear when one rigorously considers the actions of either leadership core) in approach to the way in which global trade regimes ought to be driven.

And yet, beyond the bilateral trade negotiations, there appears to be a substantial convergence around the aggressive use of markets as a tool for disciplining production within increasingly more visible divided global production chains. The White Paper continues to advance the line that China is using such techniques defensively rather than offensively. But first it is not clear that this distinction makes a difference, and second it is not clear where one can in principle draw the line between offense and defense. If nothing else, the US-Soviet arms race of the second half of the 20th century taught us all that lesson.

For all this, this is a brilliant tactic. It deploys in the economic context the same sort of cluster of arguments and principled overtones that have been refined in the context of Israeli actions against Palestinians and their defenders in the Palestine-Israel War(s). It combines (1) (dis)proportionality analysis (so dear to the hearts of factions of Western leaders); with (2) unequal bargaining partners (a point made throughout the White Paper, though one hard to square with the new fundamental contradiction announced in the 19th CPC Congress Report); and (3) an assessment of self harm and harm to innocents (children mostly in the Palestine Israel case — other countries that China has in its sights for its Belt and Road closed loop global production system in the present case). It suggests the way that the actions are disproportionate, cause more harm to the US than to the Chinese and have collateral effects that are negative. Worse, it appears to have global effect — thus the innocent suffer from the arrogance of the use of tariffs as a (mean spirited) tool. The numbers are interesting but ultimately not persuasive. While they suggest a change in the quantity of bilateral trade, they do little to suggest where the investment funds have gone. That, of course, is what ought to be worrisome for the White Paper authors. It is not, as they try to intimate, that a reduction of US-China trade inevitably produces a reduction in global trade; perhaps that reduction produces gains somewhere else that the numbers the White Paper offers its readers do not capture. But that is not the White Paper’s problem. It is again for the American negotiators to deal with this quite useful negotiating stance.

“(II) The trade war has not “made America great again””

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“The tariff measures have not boosted American economic growth. Instead, they have done serious harm to the US economy.”

Commentary: It is here that the White Paper takes up the argument made earlier that the tariffs are more harmful to the United States than to China. The facts produced are meant to drive home that point. It is also the place where the White Paper can make a more subtle claim about the value of the Reform and Opening Up Initiative and the inevitable strength of the Belt and Road Initiative. More importantly, perhaps, this section, for internal consumption, is meant to remind readers of the consequences of the "two vastly different kinds of class dictatorship, bourgeois dictatorship and proletarian dictatorship".6

“First, the tariff measures have significantly increased production costs for US companies. The Chinese and US manufacturing sectors are highly dependent on each other. Many American manufacturers depend on China’s raw materials and intermediary goods. As it is hard for them to find good alternative suppliers in the short term, they will have to bear the costs of the tariff hikes.”

“Second, the tariff measures lead to domestic price hikes in the US. The import of value-for-money consumer goods from China is a key factor behind the long-term low inflation in the US. After the additional tariffs were imposed, the final selling price of Chinese products increased, leaving American consumers effectively bearing some tariff costs. According to research by the US National Retail Federation, the 25 percent additional tariffs on furniture alone will cost the US consumer an additional US$4.6 billion per year.”

“Third, the tariff measures have an impact on US economic growth and people’s livelihood. A joint report by the US Chamber of Commerce and the Rhodium Group in March 2019 showed that, under the impact of China-US economic and trade friction, US GDP in 2019 and the next four years could decrease by US$64-91 billion per year, about 0.3-0.5 percent of total US GDP. If the US imposes 25 percent tariffs on all Chinese goods exported to the US, US GDP will decrease by US$1 trillion in the next ten years cumulatively. According to a research report in February 2019 by Trade Partnership, an American think-tank, if the US imposes 25 percent additional tariffs on all imported Chinese goods, US GDP will decrease by 1.01 percent, with 2.16 million job losses and an additional annual burden of US$2,294 on a family of four.”

6 The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us, supra.
“Fourth, the tariff measures lead to barriers to US exports to China. The 2019 State Export Report, published by the US-China Business Council on May 1, 2019, stated that in the ten years from 2009 to 2018, US exports to China supported over 1.1 million jobs. The Chinese market continues its importance to US economic growth. Forty-eight states of the US have increased their goods exports to China during the last decade – 44 of them by double digits – while in 2018, when economic and trade friction worsened, only 16 states increased their goods exports to China. Thirty-four states exported fewer goods to China, with 24 of them seeing a double-digit decrease. The Midwestern agricultural states were hit particularly hard. Under tariff measures, exports of American agricultural produce to China decreased by 33.1 percent year-on-year, including a 50 percent drop in soybeans. US businesses are worried that they might lose the Chinese market, which they have been cultivating for nearly 40 years.”

Commentary: The bulk of this section is devoted to an exposition of what might be called the "Four Self-Inflicted Harms." It is meant to make that case that the choice of bargaining tactic has hurt the Americans more than the Chinese. Of course, the only facts marshaled are those about the harm to the US. It is not clear what the harm has been to the Chinese side. But, of course that is an argument that the American side ought to make, if it is up to the task.

The assessments though true enough are easy enough to counter — but that is for the American side to do (and to disseminate its counter as successfully as the Chinese are attempting through the White Paper. On the other hand these also mark challenges to US industry that may trigger long term corrections that ultimately will pose challenges for China outside the area of the Belt and Road Initiative.

For example, the first point about the harm caused by China’s control of resources (a challenge that Western public officials merrily ignored for at least a decade) is already evident in the hysteria about Chinese control of rare earths. Yet even there the US is taking middle term countermeasures that may weaken the effect.7 The point isn’t that the White Paper is wrong,8 but that it leaves unspoken challenges and consequences that ought to cause worry on the Chinese side.

The second point is also true in the short term, but the scope of its effects may be more limited than implied, and it may cause the same sort of self-harm that the White Paper argues is the primary effect of US tariffs. Thus, for example, if as suggested the two

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7 “China may dominate the rare earths market, but there are many unexplored sources – and it is Africa that geologists believe holds the most potential”. See Cate Reid, Africa’s Rare Earths Opportunity, Financial Times, June 13, 2019, available at https://www.ft.com/content/ba9ca12b-99b8-37b3-bd26-9ea5a3aaff
8 Its assessment is correct, see Rare Earths: China's Competitive Advantage In The U.S. Trade War, WBUR, June 3, 2019, available at https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2019/06/03/rare-earth-chinas-competitive-advantage-in-the-u-s-trade-war
Economies are intertwined and there is substantial reciprocal investment, then the effect will harm Chinese interest in the US as it harms US interest in China. Moreover, it does not touch on the incentives this creates not to move US operations out of China, but to redirect new investment and augmented production elsewhere. This can pose a problem in the middle and long term especially if the United States decides that it is a good idea to encourage investment in core Belt and Road countries on the peripheries of the Silk Roads.

The third provides the opening for a numbers game that the propaganda departments of both states are free to indulge for the purpose of managing opinion, though in both cases the arguments are likely to be curated in a way that serves a purpose other than the production of knowledge for outsiders. But that is the way of these things, even within liberal democratic orders, though with substantially different characteristics.

The last point is the most interesting. It suggests two things — the first is that China will continue to hold its own internal markets hostage to successful negotiation on its own terms — fair enough. But the second is that by making that claim it proves the American’s point about unequal relations at the heart of a portion of the negotiations. The White Paper might have framed this with more subtlety. On the other hand, it is buried deep within a document that will not be read carefully to this point. Yet to the extent this can be extracted it is possible to build nice out of context arguments that point in a direction opposite from the White Paper’s intent. Bravo.

“(III) US trade bullying harms the world”

“Economic globalization is a firmly-established trend of the times. Beggar-thy-neighbor unilateralism and protectionism are unpopular. The trade protectionist measures taken by the US go against the WTO rules, damage the multilateral trading system, seriously disrupt global industrial chains and supply chains, undermine market confidence, and pose a serious challenge to global economic recovery and a major threat to the trend of economic globalization.2

Commentary: This section takes up the argument, unveiled in the Preface, about the fundamental characteristic of the Americans as bullies, contrasting the more pacific and principled Chinese side. Nowhere mentioned here, of course, are Chinese countermeasures, including the quite brilliant new rules on punishing enterprises deemed hostile to China’s policies and objectiveness. That makes sense in this context since those would in accordance with the logic of the White Paper be deemed to be reluctantly undertaken measure so to preserve Chinese sovereignty.

“First, the US measures are undermining the authority of the multilateral trading system. The US has launched a series of unilateral investigations, including those under Sections 201, 232 and 301, and imposed tariff measures.
These are a serious breach of the most fundamental and central WTO rules, including most-favored-nation treatment and tariff binding. Such unilateralist and protectionist actions have harmed the interests of China and other WTO members. More importantly, they have undermined the authority of the WTO and its dispute settlement system, and exposed the multilateral trading system and international trade order to peril."

“Second, the US measures threaten global economic growth.” With the shadow of the international financial crisis still lingering over the global economy, the US government has escalated economic and trade friction and hiked additional tariffs, provoking corresponding measures by the countries involved. This disrupts global economic and trade order, dampens world economic recovery, and undermines the development of companies and the well-being of people in all countries, plunging the world economy into the “recession trap.”

“Global Economic Prospects released by the World Bank in January 2019 revised its forecast for global economic growth down further to 2.9 percent, citing continuous trade friction as a major downward risk. The International Monetary Fund also marked down its projection of world economic growth for 2019 to 3.3 percent from the 2018 estimate of 3.6 percent in its World Economic Outlook report published in April 2019, suggesting that economic and trade friction could further depress global economic growth and weaken already anemic investment.”

“Third, the US moves disrupt global industrial and supply chains.” China and the US are both key links in global industrial and supply chains. Given the large volume of intermediary goods and components from other countries in Chinese end-products exported to the US, US tariff hikes will hurt all the multinationals – not least those from the US – that work with Chinese companies. The tariff measures artificially drive up the costs of supply chains, and undermine their stability and security. As a result, some businesses are forced to readjust their global supply chains at the expense of optimal resource allocation.

It is foreseeable that the latest US tariff hikes on China, far from resolving issues, will only make things worse for all sides. China stands firm in opposition. Recently, the US administration imposed “long-arm jurisdiction” and sanctions against Huawei and other Chinese companies on the fabricated basis of national security, to which China is also firmly opposed.”

**Commentary:** Here the White Paper takes up the case for US isolation as a result of its unreasonable and uncivilized behaviors; behaviors for which it ought to be punished by isolation. The argument is well done and ironically enough turns the tables on the US.
inverting its Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) China isolation arguments. In a sense, then, the White Paper may evidence the way in which China learned from its unfortunate experience with the construction of a new global trading order based on a self-referencing network of interlinked economies bound together by a set of principles whose combined power might then drive the rest of the global economic system. The TPP was constructed against Chinese operational principles — and while China was cut out of negotiations (except the secret and discrete ones that in retrospect served as a warm up to the current bilateral negotiations) — the door was left open to China joining TPP, but only to the extent it was willing to embrace its operational principles. The lesson the White Paper seems to suggest that China learned was that the construction of a such an imperial trading order (in the sense that it was driven by a central authority in the form of an apex nation-state the way that a multinational enterprise is organized and led by an apex corporation) was possible within the broad principles of contemporary economic globalization, that the rhetoric of its creation and operation could be conformed (at least outwardly) to those of that system broadly construed, and that it could be used to embrace friendly states and contain competitors. All of that eventually contributed to the construction of the outer forms and objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative To understand the White Paper, and this section, then, it is necessary to understand the context of the bilateral negotiations in the shadow of the insights developed by the West in TPP and then taken up quite brilliantly by the Chinese in the construction of the Belt and Road.

It is in that context that the exposition of the "Three Disruptions" acquires its persuasive power. The three, (1) undermining the multilateral trade system; (2) threatening global economic growth; and (3) disrupting supply chains, are all placed at the feet of the tariff strategy. That objective is discursively necessary given the thrust of the White Paper and its core objectives (to pressure the United States into different negotiating tactics). At the same time it appears to set the stage for the victorious entry of the Belt and Road system (and Chinese principles for the organization of global trade) as the best way to salvage a system savaged by the Americans. A very neat trick; and a propaganda challenge for the Americans.

"II. The US has backtracked on its commitments in the China-US economic and trade consultations"

“In response to the economic and trade friction started by the US, China has been forced to take countermeasures, as bilateral trade and investment relations took a hit. For the well-being of the Chinese and American people and the economic development of the two countries, both sides deemed it necessary to come to the negotiating table to seek a solution through consultation. Since they were launched in February 2018, the economic and trade consultations have come a long way with the two sides agreeing on most parts of the deal. But the consultations have not been free of setbacks, each of
them being the result of a US breach of consensus and commitments, and backtracking.”

Commentary: This section deploys a very powerful tactic: it turns the very strong argument made by the Americans at the time that the negotiations broke down, that the Chinese side reneged on the agreement in principle on the basis of which an agreement had effectively been finalized, on its head. It has the benefit of causing doubt on the American argument. And it strengthens the claims of Chinese principles against American selfish aggression. "He-said-she-said" tactics are always powerful and this one is nicely developed. First, it excuses a very long period of negotiation that was reversed at the last minute by shifting the gaze elsewhere. Second, it advances the argument that principle can be deployed at any stage of a negotiation — and that the failure to invoke principle until the last minute is itself a useful negotiation tactic (and indeed it has proven to be quite useful in this case). Third, it suggests that consultation provides the modalities through which principle can be identified and (eventually) applied to cement a transaction. But most importantly, it is meant to provide the official Chinese response to what had appeared to be a Western consensus that the Chinese side was responsible for the break in negotiations by backtracking at the last minute. Fourth, it undertakes some blame in the form of excuse — that there was no backtracking in any case by either party because what is described as backtracking is merely the product of the give and take of complex negotiations ("It is common practice for both sides to make new proposals for adjustments to the text and language in ongoing consultations"). But the point is surrounded by reminders that such activities were essentially sourced in the US side. This makes for good reading within China, but its persuasive effect outside of China might be less assured. On the other hand, to the extent that the White Paper is merely meant to provide some basis for providing a "legitimacy cover for political arguments, then perhaps the White Paper serves its purpose. It does suggest, however, the value of a similar effort form the US side.

“(I) The first US backtracking”

“China had advocated resolving economic and trade friction through negotiation and consultation from the start. In early February 2018, the US government expressed the wish that China send a high-level delegation to the US to engage in economic and trade consultation. Demonstrating great goodwill and positive efforts, China held several rounds of high-level economic and trade consultations with the US, characterized by in-depth exchanges of views on trade imbalance among other major issues. The two sides made substantial progress as they reached preliminary consensus on expanding China’s imports of agricultural and energy products from the US. However, on March 22, 2018, the US government unveiled the so-called report on Section 301 investigation of China, falsely accusing China of “IP theft” and “forced technology transfer”, and subsequently announced an additional tariff of 25 percent on US$50 billion of Chinese exports to the US”
“(II) The second US backtracking”

“Taking a big-picture view of the bilateral relationship, the Chinese government sent a working team again to the US to engage in genuine consultations. On May 19, 2018, China and the US issued a joint statement, agreeing to refrain from fighting a trade war, to continue high-level communications, and to actively seek solutions to respective economic and trade concerns. The US publicly announced that it would suspend the plan for additional tariffs on Chinese goods. On May 29, 2018, despite the opposition of its domestic business community and the general public, the US administration tore up the consensus just ten days after the joint statement, gratuitously criticizing China’s economic system and trade policy, while announcing the resumption of the tariff program. Starting from early July 2018, in three steps, the US imposed additional tariffs of 25 percent on Chinese exports worth US$50 billion, and additional tariffs of 10 percent on US$200 billion of Chinese exports, which, according to the US, would be raised to 25 percent on January 1, 2019. In addition, the US threatened further tariffs on all remaining Chinese exports, leading to quick escalation of the economic and trade friction between the two countries. In defense of its national dignity and its people’s interests, China had to respond in kind and raised tariffs on imports worth US$110 billion from the US.”

“(III) The third US backtracking”

“On November 1, 2018, US President Donald Trump had a telephone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping and proposed a summit meeting. On December 1 the two presidents had a meeting on the margins of the G20 Summit in Argentina. In accordance with their important consensus on economic and trade issues, the two sides agreed to halt new additional tariffs for 90 days to allow for intensive talks geared toward the full elimination of all additional tariffs. In the ensuing 90 days, the working teams of China and the US held three rounds of high-level consultations in Beijing and Washington D.C., reaching preliminary consensus on many matters of principle for the China-US economic and trade deal. On February 25, 2019, the US announced the postponement of the additional tariffs scheduled for March 1 on US$200 billion of Chinese exports to the US. From late March to early April, the working teams of the two countries held another three rounds of high-level consultations and made substantial progress. Following numerous rounds of consultations, the two countries had agreed on most of the issues. Regarding the remaining issues, the Chinese government urged mutual understanding and compromise for solutions to be found.”

“But the more the US government is offered, the more it wants. Resorting to intimidation and coercion, it persisted with exorbitant demands, maintained...
the additional tariffs imposed since the friction began, and insisted on including mandatory requirements concerning China’s sovereign affairs in the deal, which only served to delay the resolution of remaining differences. On May 6, 2019, the US irresponsibly accused China of backtracking on its position to shift the blame for the inconclusive talks onto China. Despite China’s fierce opposition, the US raised the additional tariffs on US$200 billion of Chinese exports to the US from 10 percent to 25 percent, which represented a serious setback to the economic and trade consultations. On May 13 the US announced that it had launched procedures to slap additional tariffs on remaining Chinese goods, which are worth around US$300 billion. These acts contradicted the agreement reached by the two presidents to ease friction through consultation – and the expectations of people around the world – casting a shadow over the bilateral economic and trade consultations and world economic growth. In defense of its own interests, China had to take tariff measures in response."

"(IV) The US government should bear the sole and entire responsibility for this severe setback to the China-US economic and trade consultations "

"The US government accusation of Chinese backtracking is totally groundless. It is common practice for both sides to make new proposals for adjustments to the text and language in ongoing consultations. In the previous more than ten rounds of negotiations, the US administration kept changing its demands. It is reckless to accuse China of "backtracking" while the talks are still under way. Historical experience has proved that any attempt to force a deal through tactics such as smears, undermining and maximum pressure will only spoil the cooperative relationship. Historic opportunities will be missed.”

“A civilized country turns to forceful measures only when gentler approaches have failed. After the US issued the new tariff threat, the international community was widely concerned that China might cancel the consultation visit to the US. It kept a close watch on the future direction of the China-US trade negotiations. Bearing in mind the broader interests of trade and economic relations between the two countries, China remained cool-headed, exercised restraint, and sent a senior delegation to the US, as agreed, for the 11th round of economic and trade consultation from May 9 to 10. In doing so, China demonstrated the greatest sincerity and a strong sense of responsibility for resolving trade disputes through dialogue. In the following candid and constructive discussions, the two sides agreed to manage differences and continue consultations. China expressed strong opposition to the unilateral tariff increase by the US and stated its firm position that it would have to take necessary countermeasures. China emphasized once again that trade deals must be based on equality and mutual benefit. China will never compromise on major principles concerning China’s core interests. One prerequisite for a
trade deal is that the US should remove all additional tariffs imposed on Chinese exports and China's purchase of US goods should be realistic while ensuring that a proper balance in the text of the agreement is achieved to serve the common interests of both sides."

Commentary: The White Paper builds case for placing the blame for the backtracking on the US side. Yet it may have done too good a job. It reduces that case to three points and a set of related principles and judgments. The last point, of course, opens the door to the restatement of high principle with which the White Paper closes in Part III.

The first point references a six week period early in the negotiations when the Chinese had no intention of serious effort (given the uncertain status of the investigation against the US President). It argued that while the Chinese negotiated in good faith between February and March 2018, at that point the Americans acted scandalously by accusing the Chinese of criminal activity in ways that produced a loss of face impossible momentarily to overcome. Worse, it was an insult in the form of a negotiating tactic coupled with aggression — the first of the American tariff moves. The second point referenced the Chinese decision to send another team prepared for "genuine negotiation" in May 2018. This one is interesting for the White Paper's suggestion that the American position was wrong in part because it was criticized by an internal opposing American political and business faction and was characterized (again) by insults directed at China. These were almost but not quite too difficult to bear, at least until July 2018 when another round of tariffs made the situation untenable for the Chinese delegation. "In defense of its national dignity and its people’s interests, China had to respond in kind and raised tariffs on imports worth US$110 billion from the US." The third was the most important, because it provides an alternative reading of the American claim of Chinese backtracking. In this Chinese version of the "backtracking" claim, the problem arose after the meeting of December 2018 between the core leadership of China and the United States that took place in Argentina. Negotiations proceeded on the basis of the consensus reached. But then the White Paper suggested consensus turned to (American) greed — and it is here that the White Paper more fully develops the Chinese counter-story to that proffered by the Americans at the time of the breakdown of negotiations: "But the more the US government is offered, the more it wants. Resorting to intimidation and coercion, it persisted with exorbitant demands, maintained the additional tariffs imposed since the friction began, and insisted on including mandatory requirements concerning China's sovereign affairs in the deal, which only served to delay the resolution of remaining differences." The White Paper, then, develops the claim that the US crossed a line that the heretofore patient and compromising Chinese delegation could not cross without breaching the core premises of the CPC Basic Line. It was not that China backtracked as much as it was the US that pushed beyond the December 2018 consensus. And that, in turn, is explained by the charge of the innate selfish greed of the Americans (as part of their national character perhaps, but more likely as proof of the characteristics of bourgeois dictatorship referenced above).
The fourth point then puts all of this together, weaving these points into what is hoped to be a compelling story. First, the US charge of backtracking is false. Second, even if it were not entirely false, it seeks unfairly to characterize the normal give and take of complex negotiations. Third, even if that is not quite the case, then it was the Americans and not the Chinese that kept changing the terms of the deal. Fourth, the American proclivity for negotiating by insulting their counterparts proved not just counterproductive but ultimately could be blamed for the failure of the deal--one cannot insult people and expect to come to some sort of agreement. National sensibilities are both delicate and can override national interest, it seems, in some case ("will only spoil the cooperative relationship. Historic opportunities will be missed"). But even in describing it, the argument itself collapses.

But it is the second paragraph of the fourth point that is worth a careful read. Here the White Paper lays out the Chinese position with remarkable clarity. First that the roles of the 19th century have now been reversed — where once the West assumed China was not worthy of membership in the family of civilized states, it is now the US that is in that position — unworthy to remain in that family. As such it is China's duty not merely to engage in the negotiations but to assert a leading role in its shaping and final expression — in the way that the political vanguard asserts a leadership role in guiding the Chinese state toward the goals expressed in the CPC Basic Line. It is China, for example, that keeps in mind the role of a "civilized country." It is China (and not the Americans) who bears the burdens of "the broader interests of trade and economic relations." It is China that remains "cool-headed, exercised restraint [and] demonstrated (...) sincerity and a strong sense of responsibility." These are then followed by the terms of a proposed new consensus (one unlikely to be acceptable to the Americans given their current mood):

China emphasized once again that trade deals must be based on equality and mutual benefit. China will never compromise on major principles concerning China’s core interests. One prerequisite for a trade deal is that the US should remove all additional tariffs imposed on Chinese exports and China's purchase of US goods should be realistic while ensuring that a proper balance in the text of the agreement is achieved to serve the common interests of both sides.

"III. China is committed to credible consultations based on equality and mutual benefit"

"The Chinese government rejects the idea that threats of a trade war and continuous tariff hikes can ever help resolve trade and economic issues. Guided by a spirit of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, the two countries should push forward consultations based on good faith and credibility in a bid to address issues, narrow differences, expand common interests, and jointly safeguard global economic stability and development."
Commentary: It is to that last point, about negotiations grounded in principles of credibility, equality and mutual benefit, that the last section, Part II is devoted. To that end it juxtaposes (again) the Chinese position with its opposite into which the American position (and their actions, especially the tariff strategy) have been transformed. The focus on tariff, by this point raises an interesting issue — and a perverse one. The almost single-minded focus on the tariff as objective and as trade negotiation strategy sits at the heart of the Chinese case against the United States. One wonders if this would be so had they been less effective in terms of their economic effect. On the other hand, the effect appears to have produced a perverse result — drawing the Chinese away from further talks and perhaps cementing a determination to disentangle the economic ties between the two states. It is of course too early to tell. But the sings are therein the confluence of the Belt and Road Initiative event in May and the timing of the breaking off of negotiations with the US.

“(I) Consultations should be based on mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit”

“It is only natural for China and the US, the two largest economies and trading nations in the world, to experience some differences over trade and economic cooperation. What truly matters is how to enhance mutual trust, promote cooperation and manage differences. For the good of the common interests of the two countries and global trade order, and in a strenuous effort to push forward the economic and trade consultations, China remains committed to resolving issues through dialogue and consultation, responding to US concerns with the greatest patience and sincerity, properly handling differences while seeking common ground, and overcoming obstacles to practical solutions. During the consultations, in accordance with the principle of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, China’s only intention is to reach a mutually acceptable deal.”

“Mutual respect means that each side should respect the other’s social institutions, economic system, development path and rights, core interests, and major concerns. It also means that one side should not cross the other’s “red lines”. The right to development cannot be sacrificed, still the less can sovereignty be undermined. As regards equality and mutual benefit, we must ensure that the two sides in the consultations operate on an equal footing, that results are mutually beneficial, and that any final agreement is a win-win one. Negotiations will get nowhere if one side tries to coerce the other or if only one party will benefit from the outcomes.”

Commentary: The first paragraph of this section repeats fundamental positions already laid out. But it is consistent with the discursive style of such reports with Chinese characteristics. The second paragraph is far more interesting. It defines "mutual
respect" as touching on each side's "institutions, economic system, development path and rights, core interests, and major concerns." All well and good. but as negotiations from the time of the Obama Administration around TPP had made clear both to the governmental apparatus of each state, mutual respect produced deadlock. It produced deadlock because the elements of mutual respect were at a fundamental level incompatible. And the nature of negotiation required both sides to compromise their own "self-respect." Read in this way, the Chinese articulation is either implausible or suggests that from the perspective of each party, such self-compromise is to be expected of the opposing side but not of one’s own side. That works as rhetorical trope, and it makes the respective masses of each side content in the knowledge of the great efforts of their core in protecting them and the like. But its ultimate logic is one of negotiation failure — and in this case of a consequential disentangling of the relationships it took a generation of Reform and Opening Up to build. Well, this is a new era--for both states. That is the point — "negotiations will get nowhere." And that is especially the case where, as here, the respective "red lines" of each state are mutually incompatible.

“(II) Consultation involves working toward the same goal in good faith”

“Consultation calls for mutual understanding and genuine effort from both sides. Consultation is a process where the parties concerned seek consensus or make compromise through discussion. Many factors are at play in consultation. It is perfectly normal during consultations for the parties to react differently to various changes at different stages based on their own interests.”

“The Chinese government believes that economic and trade consultation is an effective way to solve issues. None other than engagement with goodwill and a full understanding of the other’s position can contribute to success. Otherwise, it will be hard to reach a sustainable and enforceable deal as the parties will not find the ground for a long-term and effective agreement.”

“Good faith is the foundation of consultation. The Chinese government has engaged in these consultations with the US with the utmost credibility and the greatest sincerity. Attaching great importance to US concerns, China has worked hard to look for effective paths and find ways to address differences. The 11 rounds of high-level consultations have made significant progress. The outcomes of the consultations have not only served the interests of China, but also those of the US, as a result of both sides’ efforts to pull in the same direction. China has kept its word during the consultations. China has emphasized repeatedly that if a trade agreement is reached, it will honor its commitments sincerely and faithfully.”

Commentary: In light of the points made in subsection (I), the arguments of Subsection (II) appear implausible or consequential. Red lines are red lines, and incompatible red
lines become points of impossibility that only power can resolve. That is the actual state of things not so well hidden beneath the text of this section. And that, of course, has been the much more brutally put point the Americans have been making — to the irritation of virtually every other state. But the point is worth considering, as uncivilized as it might appear. No amount of consultation, off mutual understanding, of empathy and compromise can avoid the problem of the incompatible and conflicting red lines of the actors. If negotiation will inevitably require one of the parties to cross an uncrossable red line, then negotiation becomes merely a means of marking time until conditions change, or alternatives can be instituted — in this case perhaps a fully functioning and autonomous Belt and Road Initiative and America First. One finds oneself in a situation in which time is the only matter on which there can be agreement; in the meantime, absent decoupling, there can only be conflict, especially where, as here, the willingness of each state to tolerate the other’s incompatible red lines (state support of SOEs, intellectual property claims, access to markets and the like) declines precipitously. The rest are the sort of pieties one expects of states of the stature of China and the US.

“(III) China will not give ground on issues of principle”

“Every country has its own matters of principle. During consultations, a country’s sovereignty and dignity must be respected, and any agreement reached by the two sides must be based on equality and mutual benefit. On major issues of principle, China will not back down. Both China and the US should see and recognize their countries’ differences in national development and in stage of development, and respect each other’s development path and basic institutions. While no one expects to resolve all issues through one single agreement, it is necessary to ensure that any agreement will satisfy the needs of both sides and achieve a balance.”

“The recent US move to increase tariffs on Chinese exports does not help to solve bilateral trade issues. China strongly opposes this and has to respond to safeguard its lawful rights and interests. China has been consistent and clear on its position, that it hopes to resolve issues through dialogue rather than tariff measures. China will act rationally in the interests of the Chinese people, the American people, and all other peoples around the world. However, China will not bow under pressure and will rise to any challenge coming its way. China is open to negotiation, but will also fight to the end if needed.”

Commentary: The point made above, of course, is underlined explicitly in this section. Red lines, core principles, and sovereign dignity all suggest the limits of cooperation, “win-win” strategies, mutual respect and the like. That they appear in separate sections underscores the essential contradiction of the Chinese position. Or perhaps its politics
— for it may be meant to be applied in one direction — with the expectation of red line compromise by others. That makes sense in empire theory where the imperial center cannot compromise its core values and principles and sovereignty but its spokes and outer wheels are expected to do just that as necessity dictates. But if that is the case then a more interesting observation emerges. Underlying the White Paper is an important unstated premise (hinted at in the section that characterized the United States as a barbarian apparatus and the Chinese as civilized in the old fashioned sense of these terms) that as a fading power it is for the Americans to compromise in the face of Chinese superiority and to accept with as good grace as possible the reality that they are no longer in a position to extract compromise from inferiors but instead must now be prepared to make them. An interesting conclusion but one compatible with the arc of suppositions at the heart of new era thinking.

“(IV) No challenge will hold back China’s development”

“China remains committed to its own cause no matter how the external environment changes. The fundamental solution to economic and trade tensions is to grow stronger through reform and opening up. With the enormous demand from the domestic market, deeper supply-side structural reform will comprehensively enhance the competitiveness of Chinese products and companies. We still have sufficient room for fiscal and monetary policy maneuvers. China can maintain sound momentum for sustainable and healthy economic development, and its economic prospects are bright.”

“China will continue to deepen reform and opening up. China’s door will not be closed; it will only open even wider. President Xi Jinping announced in his keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation that China would adopt a number of major reform and opening-up measures, strengthen institutional and structural arrangements, and promote opening up at a higher level. Measures to be taken include expanding market access for foreign investment in broader areas, strengthening international cooperation on intellectual property protection, increasing imports of goods and services, implementing more effective international coordination on macro-economic policies, and putting more focus on the implementation of opening-up policies. A more open China will have more positive interactions with the world, which in turn will advance the development and prosperity of both China and the world.”

Commentary: And this paragraph then puts the icing on the cake. The references to the Second Belt and Road Forum, to the speech of the leadership core, to patience in the face of rising Chinese power, underline the points made in the earlier portions of the White Paper. This is an example of the application of Chinese political and economic ideology
at its best. But it is an application that might appear difficult to understand much less embrace by some of China’s partners. Yet here it is, self reflexive, logical, complete and quite certain of the realities of the arc of history and China’s place within it. Now if only other states can be brought to agree...

“Conclusion”

“Cooperation is the only correct choice for China and the US and win-win is the only path to a better future. As to where the China-US economic and trade consultations are heading, China is looking forward, not backward. Disputes and conflicts on the trade and economic front, at the end of the day, need to be solved through dialogue and consultation. Striking a mutually beneficial and win-win agreement serves the interests of China and the US and meets the expectations of the world. It is hoped that the US can pull in the same direction with China and, in a spirit of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, manage economic and trade differences, strengthen trade and economic cooperation, and jointly advance China-US relations based on coordination, cooperation and stability for the well-being of both nations and the world.”

Commentary: The United States is not without its principles fro engaging in trade talks. Thus, it is important to read the White Paper with the American position on principles in mind. These were nicely summarized in 2018 by the American Vice President Pence.9 In our National Security Strategy that the President Trump released last December, he described a new era of “great power competition”.10 Foreign nations have begun to, as we wrote, “reassert their influence regionally and globally”,11 and they are “contesting [America’s] geopolitical advantages and trying [in essence] to change the international order in their favor”.12 In this strategy, President Trump made clear that the United States of America has adopted a new approach to China. We seek a relationship grounded in fairness, reciprocity, and respect for sovereignty, and we have taken strong and swift action to achieve that goal. As the President said last year on his visit to China, in his words, “we have an opportunity to strengthen the relationship

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11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
between our two countries and improve the lives of our citizens”. 

As the White Paper suggests, the issues are much more profound than a tactically useful complaint about US negotiating tactics. The White Paper puts on the table, from the Chinese side, the fundamental issues about the ordering of trade that the United States had earlier advanced for the elaboration of its own interests. One reaches here the point of contradiction, and the choices it proffers to both China and the United States: deeper interconnection; conflict; or separation and disentanglement as the world divides into distinctive and imperial global trading orders in which states assume the role that multinational enterprises occupied at the head of production chains in the last century. The choice, given the words of the leadership cores of both sides, now appears clear.


CPE Working Group on Empire

The Preface to the White Paper sets out the three main premises of the argument the three remaining sections of the Paper then develop. Most of these premises have been already articulated in a series of editorials and commentaries the People’s Daily and the official news agency Xinhua published in late May and early June. The White Paper may be read as placing the final seal on the trade friction with the US, and as setting public controversy aside. At least for now. And at least from the side of the People’s Republic of China. The trade negotiation may or may not fail. To the broader goals of the Belt and Road Initiative, their failure might be more beneficial than their success. At least, this seems to be an implication of the White Paper.

The premises of the White Paper are however worthy of consideration:

(a) the bilateral relation between the PRC and the US is for the most part based on trade.

Trade is further qualified, in the rest of the White Paper, as free trade. The conception of free trade heralded by the White Paper is furthermore coherent with the ideas of certain early modern thinkers who inspired neoclassical economic theory.

A relationship where commerce is “the propeller and the ballast” may include components other than trade, insofar as these components serve the broader goal of trade. The argument that trade liberalization would induce a change in values is well-known. Exactly as other arguments postulating that any given factor ‘x’ would provoke a change in values, this argument might perhaps have been more useful to legitimize the changing orientations in the domestic policy towards China. But, practice has proved how this argument is correct. A change in values has indeed occurred. China has entered a New Era in the path of Reform and Opening Up to the Outside World. And the New Era requires new values.

In looking at existing bilateral treaties, one finds out how the place of honor is occupied by trade, and by investment. Trade therefore becomes the weapon of choice — from both sides — to compensate perceived imbalances in the ideal equilibrium of the relationship between great powers.

(b) such a relation – one where trade is “the ballast and the propeller”, involves not only the interests of Chinese and American people, but also the prosperity and the stability of “the rest”.

Here the White Paper provides a definition of the interest of the Chinese people, and presumably also the interest of the people of the United States. The interest of the Chinese people involves trade. But so does the interest of the people of the United States. As far as territories other than the United States and China are concerned, interest is not mentioned. For the European Union, Africa, Latin America and South East Asia, what might be important is not the interest of their people, but prosperity and stability. At least, so does the White Paper seem to imply.

(c) the bilateral relation between the PRC and the US should be read through the lens of the Belt and Road Initiative

The trade relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is described (or perhaps defined) as “a mutually beneficial and win-win relationship”.

From the perspective of the White Paper, taking a correct stance on the US-China relations means seeing this relation as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Little matters how the United States has not adhered to the BRI. The BRI is characterized by inclusiveness (among others). And a grand vision has sufficient space to accommodate also those who have not embraced the Belt and Road Initiative. Not as antagonists, but as equals of the People’s Republic of China.
For the White Paper, the only correct global economic order is the economic order provided by the Belt and Road Initiative.

For the White Paper, the only correct global economic order is the economic order provided by the Belt and Road Initiative.

In Chinese official documents, criticism by name is hard to find. And when it is found, such criticism carries a specific meaning. This was one of the rules followed by the older generation of Western academics. Whether this rule still applies today, and in all circumstances, it remains to be seen.

Just as there cannot be two suns in the sky...

China’s claim for equality with the United States has been made starting from a position of economic, technological, and military strength. Facts are never sufficient to make a credible claim, unless they are supported by a philosophy. China’s claim that the country is now an equal to the United States rests upon an indigenous understanding of *laissez-faire* philosophies, conveyed through the linguistic codes of the One Belt One Road, and Xi Jinping’s ideology on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era.

No one would disagree that rationality is good and worthwhile. According to the White Paper, in the matrimony between the US and China, China is the only party who is behaving rationally, and coherent with *laissez-faire* economic philosophies.

But the claim to equality is not only based on rationality. The White Paper has no doubt portrayed China as the sole legitimate interpreter of *laissez-faire* economic philosophies. And it has done so by speaking the language of the Belt and Road (and of other mechanisms of a transnational governance that is becoming increasingly centred on China). The United States has been rhetorically encircled on the terrain of its very own values – free markets. Rhetoric doesn’t need sound arguments, but the power of persuasion. Persuasion cannot occur in the absence of a common worldview.

One would expect this worldview to go beyond notions of rationality, and the *laissez-faire* economic philosophies informed by these notions. One would expect the White Paper to invoke facts as part of the worldview the US and China should agree too. Instead, historical records are invoked. Practice – understood as hard facts – has proved how China has achieved a position of economic, technological and military strength in an exceptionally short time-span. So it would be only logical if practice provided the deeper roots of the argument. After all the engine of China’s economic development was started when it became clear how practice was the sole criterion of truth. That realization came when China had

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already disentangled its economy from the Soviet Union. A separation of the economy of China from the economy of the Soviet Union made China solely responsible for its own economic development and the well-being of the Chinese people. The “regional” division of labor that existed within the Communist Bloc, where national interests were essentially subordinated to the needs of the Soviet economy, came to an end. China became self-reliant.

Instead, the White Paper invoked history. Historical records confirm China’s achievements in science and technology. China was the first country to invent the compass, and to discover gunpowder. Practice, alternatively understood as facts, has been a powerful motive in inducing the majority of countries in the world to adhere to the Belt and Road Initiative. In the context of the White Paper, history may play a different role.

It is not our intention to perform historically accurate comparisons. But, a key text historians may be useful, 30 years from now, to place the White Paper in a broader historical perspective is The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us. Palmiro Togliatti held a firm belief that different paths towards the ultimate goal of social and human evolution were possible. Togliatti was a Communist, and so he believed that the end of history was the final abolition of the State, and the creation of a Communist society. Togliatti, however, also believed that each distinct country could and should forge its own path towards the final abolition of the State and the realization of a Communist society. Therefore, to Togliatti different interpretations of Marxist-Leninist ideology were possible and legitimate.

If this observation is true for Marxism-Leninism, as practice has amply proved, then it is also true for what has been portrayed as the seeming opposite of Marxism-Leninism – the evolving body of laissez-faire philosophies.

In The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us, China offered its own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. That interpretation was not compatible with the orthodoxy created by the Soviet Union. Both the Soviet Union and China, however, shared the same worldview. And the existence of this common interest allowed the two countries to communicate. Much later, in early June 2019, the White Paper presents an alternative interpretation of laissez-faire philosophies. One different from how markets and regulation are understood in the United States and elsewhere. In interpreting laissez-faire philosophies according to historical and national circumstances, one needs not be faithful to academic interpretations of Adam Smith. Or even to engage in a deep reading of the Wealth of Nations, or to have a philosophically correct understanding of Adam Smith. This is not how ideologies become popular and usable. Today as in the 1960s, the key question is whether laissez-faire philosophies admit of different interpretations by different global powers. The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us provided an opportunity, for the PRC, to make a claim for equality with the Soviet Union. With the White Paper, the PRC is claiming equality with the United States.
The Sino-Soviet split involved a reorientation of the industrial and supply chains that made the countries of the Warsaw Pact mutually dependent. In retrospect, that reorientation may have contributed to the dusk of the older global equilibrium, marking the beginning of a new phase of globalization. Closer in time to us, the decision to decouple the economy of the United Kingdom from the economy of the European continent has seen MNCs stockpiling consumer goods in the hope to avoid future tariffs.

In the meantime, we are witnessing how tariffs are becoming delinked from modern economic theories of trade, to take on functions beyond the raising of revenues and the protection of domestic industries.

Here comes the question of whom the White Paper speaks to. The White Paper speaks to the domestic elites of the PRC. Its opening sections present the main themes that have already appeared in a series of commentaries published by the People’s Daily, in Chinese.

The White Paper speaks to the United States of America, and it does so as the construction of the Belt and Road Initiative quietly goes on, amidst the usual criticism seeing ‘failures’, ‘resistance’, ‘lack of blueprints’, and ‘inconsistencies’ throughout Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. But, after all, a duty of the press in liberal democratic countries is to provide a critical view of reality. And that duty remains extremely important, even in the face of the occasional inaccurate reporting. Errare humanum est...

Does the White Paper speak to the European Union, to Latin America, to South-East Asia, and to Africa? The overwhelming majority of partners in the Belt and Road Initiatives are located in these continents or areas. Yet, “China and the US are both key links in global industrial and supply chains”. Any interpretation that understood the claim that production chains run from China to the United States as advocating for a bipolar equilibrium would perhaps not be correct. The White Paper speaks not just to the United States, but to each one of the more than 150 countries adhering to the Belt and Road Initiative, and to all those who are willing to listen. But, it does so indirectly, because the issue at stake is not the relation between China and its one of its partners along the economic corridors of the emerging order of global trade. The issue at stake is the reciprocal role of the United States and the People’s Republic of China.

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The final section of the White Paper portrays the remaining countries of the world as watching – as being spectators in the trade war. Rather than as participants in the construction of a new global economic order; as countries that have been indirectly harmed by the reciprocal imposition of tariffs, or even as potential arbiters in the friction between China and the US.

Having set the rhetorical terrain and developed its argument, the White Paper can conclude that only one correct choice exist to ease the friction between China and the United States. The United States (the one that has been portrayed as the irrational, aggressive and eventually hegemonic side of the China-US partnership) could cooperate with China in a spirit of win-win, tolerate the emerging normative and power structure of the Belt and Road Initiative, if not deciding to join it. The White Paper presents the Belt and Road Initiative as the only viable path to globalization — at least for the moment, and provided that the separation of China’s economy from the economy of the US does not produce an entirely different and unforeseeable equilibrium.

**Part 4: The U.S. Trade Representative Response to the Chinese State Council White Paper**

CPE Working Group on Empire

The CPE WGE has suggested that the White Paper, along with Chinese positions on its Belt and Road Initiative, traced the outlines of an all around strategy first to marginalize, then to encircle, and then to make less relevant, the United States, at least as driving force for global trade and production. While the object was not to "defeat" the US, a relationship is still quite useful, a great strategic role was to help China achieve a measure of independence from the ideologies and initiatives of other states and at last, in the "new era" to finally undo the period of "unequal treaties" whose spectre continues to haunt the Chinese leadership and to frame the way they approach their strategic calculations. To that end, Chinese leaders have advanced multiple strategic initiatives to ensure Chinese preeminence at least within the boundaries of its global production — some ideological, some quite practical, and many fundamentally systemic.

A consequence of these strategies appeared to be a choice to undo initiatives that had their origins in the "Reform and Opening Up Era" that sought to more tightly integrate the US and Chinese economies. This was the sort of "win-win" strategy that leaders in both China and the US embraced with some force after the end of the 1980s and was founded on a fundamental premise that the main objective was to develop the nation’s productive forces (an objective easy to translate into Western market ideology terms). That redirection of the Chinese-US economic engagement now required recasting to make it more compatible with
Chinese "New Era" ideology and its contemporary fundamental political contradiction (the distribution of wealth) which had as a consequence the object of putting the Party first, and of greater direction in the development of productive forces (the holdover from the prior political era). This realignment, of course, took place just as the United States also entered its 'New Era' under the leadership of Donald Trump, a new era that appeared to have some surprising resonances with the movement towards a New Era in China. This was particularly so with respect to the role of the state in fostering a goal of national development that required a strong re-evaluation of economic and political arrangements that now appeared one sided (the America First project). America First, like Chinese foreign initiatives was now to be based on a "win-win" strategy rather than a leadership strategy (that marked the earlier period) in which US leadership required it to undertake a more fiduciary role for the construction of global economic orders in which it might be strategically but not formally “first”.

The practical consequence of the undoing strategies, for which there was some appetite on both sides, would require decoupling economic interrelationships. And as our prior essays suggested, this appeared to be the effect of the strategic moves around the trade talks. On the US side, market based strategies pushed tariff initiatives to create decoupling strategies among private enterprises. On the Chinese side, taking a relaxed view about trade talks while using the time to strengthen Belt and Road Initiative, Yuan internationalization, infrastructure aid projects through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and sovereign investing through Chinese sovereign wealth funds, appeared to have the same strategic goals.

It is also apparent in the Chinese-Russian strategies (pursued by each for their own ends, but ends that converge for the moment) and memorialized in the Development of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation: Joint Statement of the New Era Comprehensive Strategic Collaboration Partnership, signed in Moscow on exactly the day that the Americans and their allies celebrated the great battle that made possible eventually the construction of the post 1945 global order. The Joint Statement is reproduced in English and Chinese below. That statement served many purposes. Most relevant here is its use to reiterate the emerging Chinese global "Basic Line" now expressed in a more complete form, and its exposition in a pro-active rather than a reactive (White Paper) form.

And yet, one ought not to think that the de-coupling is meant to be complete. rather, the idea appears to be to create a larger area of "breathing space" within which China can develop its own sphere of global production, the United States can be left to what it can retain, and that there would be a sharing of the rest. Even as President Xi was celebrating the Sino-Russian Joint Statement, he was careful to suggest that China was seeking a comprehensive decoupling of the US and Chinese economies at this time. The statements, widely quoted, were also tinged with irony, a large dollop of poking fun, and a bit of reaction:

When asked if he thought China’s relationship with the US should be adjusted as globalisation has come under pressure, Xi said: “More than 10,000 people fly between China and the US on a daily basis, which is about 4 million [people] a year.” “I can hardly imagine a complete decoupling between China and the US. This is not the case that I would like to see, and I don’t think our American friends want to see it, and my friend [Donald] Trump wouldn’t want to see it either.” It was the first time Xi had openly referred to the US president as a “friend”, while Trump has used the word repeatedly about the Chinese leader as evidence of his success in dealing with Beijing, despite the ongoing trade war (...) “I want to be a constructor, not a destroyer, and we should respect the things that already exist and do our best to improve them, instead of tearing them down,” he said. “I don’t want to be a wall builder or a ditch digger, and all I have been doing is to expand my circle of friends.”

Still, there are all sorts of levels of dis-engagement short of complete decoupling, as both the US Trade Representative response to the Chinese State Council White Paper and the Sino-Russian Joint Statement suggest. The Trade Representative focused on unfairness and sought to make a US style case against Chinese activities that justified the self help remedial measures that the US will continue to take. Where the State Council White Paper emphasized ideology and principles, the Trade Representative assumed a counter ideology against which Chinese activity was measured and found wanting. But that measurement was not taken in the Trade Representative’s response. Rather it was made in the 2018 Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices on the basis of which the United States had been focusing its trade strategies. But here, again, the two states speak past each other. The United States wants a precise administrative ordering of relations grounded in conduct norms against which remedies may be asserted. Its approach is grounded in the ideologies and discursive styles of the common law and the judge. The Chinese want a US version of its Sino-Russian Joint Statement--principles based, diffuse and ambiguous enough to permit more opaque resolution of specific disputes out of the limelight of the global press. Its discursive style is grounded on the management of administrative discretion within fluid relaxations in which specific and real time solutions can be negotiated to mutual advantage, as long as the relationship itself remains mutually advantageous.

Taken together one can begin to see the contours of new era global orders in imperial form. This new era imperial project is precisely what distinguishes globalization post-2016 from that which global leaders worked so hard to build on the principles of the post-1945 world

17 Ibid.
18 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (MARCH 22, 2018), AVAILABLE AT HTTPS://USTR.GOV/SITES/DEFAULT/FILES/SECTION%20301%20FINAL.PDF
order. It is imperial in the sense of its organization — not de-centered as was the anti-imperial post-1945 model (at least in theory, which was embedded in the organizing principles of the United Nations system) — but rather centered on an organizing apex point from out of which roads, spikes, and other arrangements are routed. This new era imperialism is possible only because of the long detoxification of imperial organization made possible by the post-1945 order, which stripped the organizational premises of “Empire” of its European territorial and racist overlay acquired from the 15th century and the colonization of the Western Hemisphere.
“U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Department of Treasury respond to the “White Paper” issued by China on June 2, 2019”

“06/03/2019”

“The United States is disappointed that the Chinese have chosen in the “White Paper” issued yesterday and recent public statements to pursue a blame game misrepresenting the nature and history of trade negotiations between the two countries. To understand where the parties are and where they can go, it is necessary to understand the history that has led to the current impasse.”

Commentary: The opening paragraph is both direct and ironic. The irony arises because the American justification for its position was itself the product of an elaborate construction of blame that then served to structure talks from 2018 on. But for the Americans there is a huge difference between constructing a case of breaches of agreements, rules and norms, on the one hand, and post-facto justifications for negotiating positions which is effectively how the US reduces the State Council White Paper. The clash of a quasi-investigatory style of the Americans versus a historical narrative style of the Chinese already becomes central to the construction of arguments.

“President Trump is committed to taking action to address the unfair trade practices that China has engaged in for decades, which have contributed to persistent and unsustainable trade deficits, almost $420 billion last year, and have caused severe harm to American workers, farmers, ranchers, and businesses. In August 2017, at the President’s instruction, the United States Trade Representative conducted an investigation of China’s practices relating to intellectual property rights, innovation, and technology development. After receiving and considering extensive hearing testimony and other evidence over an investigation that lasted seven months, the United States issued a 200-page report in March 2018 documenting how China had engaged in unfair trade practices, including forced technology transfer, failed to protect American intellectual property rights, and conducted and supported cyber theft from American companies, robbing them of sensitive commercial information and trade secrets. These unfair trade practices and other actions by China have cost the United States and its businesses hundreds of billions of dollars every year.”

Commentary: The Americans here strongly embrace a rhetorical and ideological style that has marked American thinking and that frames fundamental approaches to the taking of important political decisions ever since the time of the Declaration of
Independence in 1776.\textsuperscript{19} US officials have long adhered to this quasi-juridical style, one that is contingent on the ability to "build a case" to which a specific remedial position can be taken, in the political and economic spheres. That case building in turn assumes the ideological (principles or rule of law) foundations which can be applied to the "facts" developed to reach a "conclusion" from which a remedial objective can be framed. Americans remain substantially blind to the strength of this discursive ideological style, as powerful as the style has proven especially after 1945. That is the case here. The Trade Representative responds to the State Council White Paper with a loud sigh — and refers his Chinese "friends" to the March 2018 Report, a response to which would have been the only matter that would have counted with the Americans. Thus, while the Chinese argue the imperatives of history, the Americans view this in the form of a quasi-common law proceeding in which the law (negotiations over which are central to the Chinese side) are taken as given and not subject to challenge.

"Based on these findings, the President directed his Administration to take effective action to address China’s harmful and distortive actions under both US law and any applicable international agreements. The President directed USTR to challenge China’s unfair trade practices at the World Trade Organization but also to impose tariffs on China to offset the damage to US industry caused by China’s conduct. In response, rather than working constructively to address our concerns, China doubled down and retaliated by imposing unjustified tariffs on American exports, and the United States responded with additional tariffs."

Commentary: The application of the American ideological approach follows naturally from the Report. And the Trade Representative tells us, the Chinese side has failed to produce facts that contradict or weaken the American effort to make a case for unfairness in Chinese practices. As a consequence, remedial measures could legitimately be taken — in this case the tariffs. Taken within the quasi-judicial model, the move from fact finding, to application of law to facts, to final determination and then to remedy seems logical and seamless.

"After Presidents Trump and Xi agreed to launch the current negotiations in Buenos Aires in December 2018, President Trump postponed for 90 days the increase in tariffs on Chinese imports that was scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 2019. The President extended the deadline again in March because the parties appeared to be making progress in their talks. Following months of

hard work and candid and constructive discussions, the parties had reached agreement on a number of important matters. In wrapping up the final important issues, however, the Chinese moved away from previously agreed-upon provisions. In response to this Chinese backtracking, the United States moved forward with the previously-announced rate increase on Chinese imports and announced tariffs on additional Chinese imports.”

**Commentary:** Here the Trade Representative makes the case for unilateral measures. The basis is a sort of breach of promise claim. Again, the rhetoric of law and of the judicial model drive the analysis. There is a twist here — one moves from the fact finding of the March 2018 Report, to the discursive tropes of bad faith contract negotiation.

“It is important to note that the impetus for the discussions was China’s long history of unfair trade practices. Our negotiating positions have been consistent throughout these talks, and China back-pedaled on important elements of what the parties had agreed to. One such position was the need for enforceability, a position necessitated by China's history of making commitments that it fails to keep. But our insistence on detailed and enforceable commitments from the Chinese in no way constitutes a threat to Chinese sovereignty. Rather, the issues discussed are common to trade agreements and are necessary to address the systemic issues that have contributed to persistent and unsustainable trade deficits.”

**Commentary:** And, as is usual in American legal discourse, the Trade Representative ends with an appeal to the American style judicial concept of equity. The American position is taken as of right — the Chinese side cannot appeal to fairness because they have acted in bad faith, and have unclean hands. Given that the Chancellor of equity courts of public opinion ought to side with the Americans. But here one ought to ask — to whom is the response directed. It makes a strong case for domestic (US) consumption — as did the State Council White Paper but it is not clear that its discursive (and persuasive) power can migrate across political cultures and ideological divides.


[中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于发展
新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系的联合声明]
The CPE-Working Group on Empire offers English version of the Joint Statement as a contrast to the discursive approaches that have marked the evolving positions of the Chinese and US governments. At the same time, it offers another perspective on the core principles of new Empire—that horizontal relationships are contentious and vertical or unequal relations are framed as friendly. If the “new” understanding of Empire as a sorting and organizing device for inter-state relationships, and more importantly, in the construction and protection of state-networks around a core (imperial) state, then this Joint Statement provides a framework for understanding the way in which, from the Chinese side, such dependent relationships are constructed. What makes this most interesting (and worthy of contrast to similar Joint Statements with states that are deemed inferior to a greater degree) is the way that Empire is constructed between state nearly but not entirely equal. Here there is room for ambiguity. Certainly, from the Russian side the unequal relations favor it slightly; but from the Chinese side the opposite is true. The resolution of that difference is embedded in the ambiguity of obligation and critical relations. But the marker of inequality is the way this Joint Statement is most effectively read in the shadow of the primary division statements that now mark the battle lines between the US and China.

**Development of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation**

**Joint Statement of the New Era Comprehensive Strategic Collaboration Partnership**

At the invitation of President Putin of the Russian Federation, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Russia from June 5 to 7, 2019 and attended the 23rd St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. The two heads of state held talks in Moscow. President Xi Jinping met with the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, De A. Medvedev.

The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as "the two parties") declare the following:

One

The 2019 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries was celebrated by both China and Russia. Over the past 70 years, relations between the two countries have gone through an extraordinary process. The two sides draw on historical experience, base
themselves on the interests of the two countries and the two peoples, commit
themselves to achieving peaceful development, win-win cooperation, push
China-Russia relations to the best level in history, and establish a model of
good-neighborliness, cooperation and mutual benefit. Sino-Russian relations
are firm and stable, and are not affected by external environmental
disturbances. They have enormous endogenous power and broad
development prospects.

The two sides believe that the main features of current Sino-Russian relations are:

- a high degree of political mutual trust;
- complete high-level exchanges and cooperation mechanisms in various fields;
- rich and strategic practical cooperation;
- a solid generation of friendly and public opinion;
- Close and effective international coordination.

The two sides have established the following basic principles guiding the relationship between the two countries:

- mutual respect, equal trust;
- Help each other, good neighborliness and friendship;
- mutual support, strategic collaboration;
— Mutual understanding and mutual benefit, cooperation and win-win;
- Non-aligned, non-confrontation, not targeting third parties.

The two sides will continue to adhere to the above principles and continue to
uphold the spirit of the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendship
between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and the
spirit of other bilateral relations documents to guide the long-term
development of bilateral relations.

Two

Sino-Russian relations have entered a new era and ushered in new opportunities for greater development. Focusing on changes in the world
situation, conforming to the common aspirations of the two peoples and achieving greater development of bilateral relations under the new situation, the two sides announced that they will work to develop a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between China and Russia in the new era. Its connotation includes the following goals and directions:

-- Watching each other, giving each other more firm and strong strategic support, supporting each other to follow their own development path and safeguard their core interests, and safeguarding their respective security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. To this end, the two sides will further develop mutual trust and cooperation in related fields.

——In-depth integration, close coordination and strategic cooperation on national development strategy docking, expand mutually beneficial cooperation in economy, trade and investment, the people's hearts are more friendly, and the culture is more harmonious;

-- Pioneering and innovating, continuously enriching and perfecting the cooperation concepts and mechanisms of the two sides, opening up new fields, projects and technologies, and further tapping the potential and development momentum of bilateral relations;

-- Praise and win-win, further unite other countries with unanimous views, safeguard the international order and international system centered on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and promote the building of new international relations of mutual respect, fairness, justice, cooperation and win-win, and promote the construction. The community of human destiny, based on the equal participation of all countries in global governance, following international law, guaranteeing equality and indivisible security, mutual respect and consideration of mutual interests, abandoning confrontation and conflict, upholding the principles of multilateralism and solving international and regional issues at the international level. In the affairs of the government, we will promote the formation of a more just and reasonable multi-polar world, benefit the people of the world, and achieve win-win cooperation.

three

The Russian side supports the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, and China supports the promotion of the integration process within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union. The two sides have strengthened coordination actions in promoting the construction of the "Belt and Road" and the European-European Economic Union.
China supports the establishment of the Greater Europe and Asia Partnership Initiative. The two sides believe that the "One Belt, One Road" initiative and the Greater Europe and Asia partnership can go hand in hand, coordinate development, and jointly promote the process of regional organizations and dual multilateral integration for the benefit of the Eurasian people.

Four

The two sides agreed to regard political cooperation, security cooperation, pragmatic cooperation, humanities exchanges and international cooperation as the key areas of China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership. In order to achieve the above objectives, the two sides will jointly plan the principles, directions and specific measures for cooperation in various fields to further enrich the content of China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership.

Political cooperation

Sino-Russian relations will continue to be based on solid political trust and play a leading role in the strategy of the two heads of state. The two sides will focus on the following aspects:

(1) Maintaining close contacts between the two heads of state through annual exchange of visits, holding bilateral meetings on important multilateral occasions, hotline of heads of state, and mutual exchange of letters, and conducting top-level design and strategic guidance for the development of bilateral relations.

(2) Give full play to the coordination and promotion of the regular meeting mechanism between the Chinese and Russian prime ministers, and maintain the efficient operation of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee in the fields of economy, trade, investment, energy, humanities and localities.

(3) Maintain the momentum of high-level exchanges between the legislative bodies of the two countries, and make good use of the inter-parliament exchange mechanism and the dialogue platform of friendly groups to carry out multi-level, wide-area and all-round exchanges.

(4) Supporting the unique channels of the CPC Central Office and the Office of the President of the Russian Federation as bilateral exchanges, and playing a greater role in safeguarding the exchanges between the two heads of state and promoting the implementation of the consensus of the two heads of state. Strengthen the comprehensive cooperation between the two offices and relevant departments.
Supporting the Communist Party of China to maintain institutionalized friendly exchanges with major Russian political parties, and strive to establish a new type of political party relationship that seeks common ground while reserving differences, mutual respect, mutual learning and mutual learning.

Security cooperation

The goal of Sino-Russian security cooperation is to ensure the national security of the two countries, create favorable conditions for the stable development of their respective countries, and effectively respond to various traditional and new security threats and challenges.

Both parties will take the following measures:

(1) Give full play to the role of the strategic security consultation mechanism, consolidate trust in the national security field, and never allow any force to use its territory to engage in activities against each other; maintain close communication and coordination between the two sides on major national security issues; continue to develop the road Dialogue with the concept, the experience of governing the country, and the building of the ability to govern.

(2) Continue to strengthen the strategic communication between the two defense departments and the military, deepen military mutual trust, strengthen cooperation in the field of military technology, carry out joint military exercises, improve pragmatic cooperation mechanisms at all levels and promote the relationship between the two militaries to a new level.

(3) Improve Sino-Russian law enforcement security cooperation mechanism, coordinate and comprehensively promote cooperation in various fields of law enforcement and security in the two countries.

(4) Supporting each other's efforts in combating terrorism and extremism, strengthening cooperation in combating the spread and promotion of terrorism, extremist ideas and personnel recruitment, cutting off terrorist organizations' materials, funds, etc., and eliminating incitement to terrorist acts, Detecting various terrorist activities that threaten the national security of both countries. Strengthen policy coordination and constructive cooperation in the multilateral counter-terrorism field, promote the international community to establish a global anti-terrorism united front centered on the UN, oppose "double standards" in combating terrorism and extremism, condemn the use of terror and extremist organizations, and crack down on International terrorism and extremism achieve geopolitical objectives and interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.
(5) Strengthen coordination of positions in the field of drug control, exchange of experience and pragmatic cooperation, consolidate bilateral anti-drug cooperation mechanisms, and deepen exchanges and cooperation in the areas of drug demand reduction and supply reduction, and joint law enforcement. We will firmly safeguard the existing international anti-drug system based on the UN’s three major anti-drug conventions, promote the pragmatic cooperation and sustainable development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s anti-drug cooperation, and promote anti-drug cooperation among BRICS countries.

(6) Expanding exchanges in the field of cyber security. Further measures are taken to maintain the security and stability of the critical information infrastructure of both parties. Strengthen exchanges in the field of cyberspace legislation and jointly promote the principles of Internet governance in accordance with international law and domestic regulations. Opposing national security as an excuse to unnecessarily restrict market access for ICT products and unnecessarily restrict the export of high-tech products. Maintain cyberspace peace and security on the basis of equal participation of all countries, and promote the construction of a global information network space governance order. Work continues to further develop the Code of Conduct for Responsible Cyberspace States within the UN framework and promote the development of legally binding legal documents to combat the use of ICTs for criminal purposes.

(7) Carry out border cooperation and cooperation between border defense departments, and further strengthen the pragmatic cooperation between the border authorities of the two countries on the basis of uninterrupted situation monitoring, information exchange and the practice of pragmatic joint operations in the border areas, and jointly fight against transnational crimes and illegalities. Immigration to ensure the stability of the national border. At the same time, they respect the principles of international law inviolable by the territories and borders and respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Practical cooperation

The goal of Sino-Russian pragmatic cooperation is to lay a solid material foundation for bilateral relations. The two sides will broaden their thinking and innovative models, promote the comprehensive improvement of pragmatic cooperation between the two countries, and achieve deep integration of interests and mutual benefit.

The two sides agreed to implement the following tasks:
Implementing the Memorandum on Promoting the High-quality Development of Bilateral Trade between the two sides, continuously improving the scale of bilateral trade and optimizing the trade structure. Deepen cooperation in e-commerce and service trade, expand investment and economic and technological cooperation, promote the implementation of strategic large-scale projects, improve the level of trade and investment facilitation, and create favorable conditions for bilateral economic and trade cooperation. The two sides support small and medium-sized enterprises to expand cooperation and inject new impetus into bilateral economic and trade cooperation.

Continue to deepen all-round integrated energy cooperation in the upper, middle and lower reaches, and promote exchanges and cooperation between the two sides in energy-saving technologies, standards, talents and information. Support the launching ceremony of gas production and gas supply for the Sino-Russian East Line natural gas pipeline project during the year. Support the Sino-Russian Energy Business Forum to become a mechanismal activity.

Implement the package of cooperation projects in the nuclear field reached on June 8, 2018. Based on the principle of mutual benefit and win-win, on the basis of the "Joint Statement of the Chinese and Russian Government Heads on Deepening Strategic Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy" signed on November 7, 2016, we will continue to deepen and expand cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy and explore feasible Cooperation projects.

Continue to deepen the investment cooperation between the two countries, give full play to the overall coordination role of the China-Russia Investment Cooperation Committee, further improve the mechanism, and strengthen the development strategy, planning and policy docking between the two countries' economic sectors. In accordance with the principles of "corporate body, market orientation, business operation, and international practices", we will jointly promote more investment cooperation projects. Strengthen the guidance of bilateral cooperation funds such as Sino-Russian investment funds and Sino-Russian cooperation and development investment funds to enhance financial support and service levels. Strengthen the protection of the legitimate rights and interests of investors in both sides and create a fairer, more friendly and stable business environment.

Carrying out cooperation between the government departments of the two countries and the financial supervision department within the framework of the Subcommittee on Financial Cooperation of the China-Russia Prime
Minister's Regular Meeting Committee. The Chinese and Russian financial regulatory authorities will take measures to increase the use of local currency settlement in foreign trade contracts, carry out cooperation in the payment system, bank card and insurance, and promote mutual investment. The issuers of both countries are welcome to issue bonds in the financial markets of both countries. Support the efforts of commercial banks of the two countries in the establishment of institutions, expand the network of correspondent banks and innovation of financial products, and encourage financial institutions of both sides to actively participate in the trading of bond markets in the two countries.

(V) Deepen the accounting and auditing standards and audit supervision cooperation, actively promote mutual recognition of accounting and auditing standards, and provide institutional guarantee for cross-border issuance of Chinese and Russian enterprises and the interconnection of financial markets between the two countries.

(VI) Expanding the depth and breadth of cooperation in science and technology innovation, and deciding to organize the “Sino-Russian Science and Technology Innovation Year” in 2020 and 2021. Continue to hold regular Sino-Russian innovation dialogues, promote the construction of Sino-Russian joint science and technology innovation fund, promote Sino-Russian scientific cooperation, promote China’s participation in the implementation of ion-collector device projects based on superconducting heavy ion accelerators, and strengthen the exchange of scientific and technological innovation talents between the two countries. Cooperation.

(7) Expanding and deepening the long-term mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries in the aerospace field on the basis of the implementation of the China-Russia 2018-2022 space cooperation program, including launch vehicles and engines, lunar and deep space exploration, Earth observation, aerospace electronic components, Cooperation in key areas such as space debris monitoring and low-orbit satellite communications systems.

(8) Strengthen cooperation in the fields of information and communication technology, digital economy, and radio frequency resource management, and carry out in-depth exchange and cooperation between the Beidou navigation system and the Russian GLONASS system in terms of orbital and frequency.

Actively implement cooperation projects in the fields of civil aviation, raw materials, equipment, radio electronics, etc., and promote the practical cooperation between Chinese and Russian industrial enterprises to a new level.
(9) Expand and enhance the level of agricultural cooperation and deepen agricultural investment cooperation. Take measures to optimize the business environment, support the enterprises of the two countries to carry out the whole industrial chain cooperation of soybean production and processing, logistics and trade, and implement the "Agricultural Development Plan for Northeast China and Russia’s Far East and Baikal Region" and "Expanding Soybean for Russia" Cooperation plan for the export of soybean products to China. Actively carry out mutual market access cooperation between agricultural products and food products of the two countries, and expand the trade of high-quality agricultural products and foods between the two sides.

(10) Deepen cooperation in the field of transportation. Adhere to the principle of mutual benefit and win-win, build and renovate existing cross-border transportation infrastructure, and promote the implementation of landmark major cooperation projects in railways, border rivers and bridges. Strengthen cross-border transportation cooperation between the two countries, promote the facilitation of transport customs clearance, and improve the quality and efficiency of transportation services.

(11) Strengthen all-round pragmatic cooperation between customs inspection and quarantine and port operations, continuously improve the level of synchronized infrastructure construction of port infrastructure, optimize the customs clearance environment for ports, and carry out necessary information exchange for customs.

(12) Promote the sustainable development cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic, and expand cooperation in the development and utilization of Arctic waterways and infrastructure, resource development, tourism, and environmental protection in the Arctic region on the basis of adhering to the rights and interests of coastal countries. Support the continuation of polar scientific research cooperation and promote the implementation of the Arctic Joint Scientific Research Voyage and Arctic Joint Research Project. Continue to carry out Sino-Russian collaboration in the Arctic-Dialogue Region International Arctic Forum.

(13) Enhance the level and quality of cooperation in the field of natural disaster prevention and emergency relief, including natural disasters and production safety accidents, and promote international cooperation in this field. Strengthen cooperation in the areas of transboundary water protection, environmental disaster emergency liaison, biodiversity conservation, climate change response, and solid waste treatment.

(14) In the spirit of good-neighborly friendship and cooperation, continue to develop pragmatic cooperation in the Sino-Russian border area, strengthen
coordination, and promote economic and social development in the border areas of the two countries.

(15) Expanding local exchanges between China and Russia, continuing to deepen regional economic and trade cooperation, and implementing the "Sino-Russian Cooperation and Development Plan for the Far East Region of Russia (2018-2024)" to enrich the achievements of the Sino-Russian local cooperation and exchange year. Research establishes and operates a new local cooperation platform. We will promote the expansion of cooperation with the China International Import Expo, the China-Russia Expo, the China-Northeast Asia Expo, the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, and the Oriental Economic Forum.

(16) Actively promote the construction of the "Belt and Road" and the European-European Economic Union. Promote an effective dialogue mechanism between the government of the People's Republic of China and the Economic Commission for Europe and Asia. Practically promote priority projects that are in line with the interests of China, the Eurasian Economic Union and its member states.

Ensuring that the Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Eurasian Economic Union signed on May 17, 2018 will enter into force at an early date and be implemented. The two sides advocated the initiation of negotiations on the Sino-Russian Economic Partnership Agreement.

The two sides spoke highly of the second "Belt and Road" international cooperation summit forum held in Beijing from April 25 to 27, 2019. During the forum, the parties reached an important consensus on further strengthening the constructive cooperation in the Eurasian region on the basis of docking existing national and regional integration strategies and projects.

(17) Continue to deepen bilateral consular cooperation, strengthen exchanges in this field, and actively promote the further facilitation of Sino-Russian personnel exchanges.

Cultural exchanges

The goal of Sino-Russian cultural exchanges is to inherit friendships from generation to generation, consolidate friendly exchanges between the people, and promote mutual learning and mutual learning. In order to further develop humanities exchanges, the two sides will take the following measures:
(1) To play the coordinating role of the China-Russia Humanities Cooperation Committee and implement the "China-Russia Humanities Cooperation Action Plan."

(2) Accelerate breakthroughs in the following areas of humanities exchange and cooperation: academic exchanges between teachers and students; use of distance education technology to conduct teaching in Chinese and Russian; and jointly organize activities in the fields of basic education, secondary and supplementary education, and youth exchanges. According to the principle of quantity equivalence, they are provided to each other's universities to study abroad. Exchange outstanding students to the other countries to study the dominant profession, achieve the goal of mutual exchange of 100,000 students in 2020; improve the operation mode of Chinese learning centers such as the Russian Center in China and the Confucius Institute in Russia.

Create a youth exchange brand. In the framework of the 100-China Youth Exchange Program, the two sides will continue to carry out exchanges and practices, promote the international youth movement, increase the number of exchanges and projects between Chinese and Russian youth organizations, and implement the "China-Russia Youth Generation Friendship Declaration."

(3) Accelerate the construction of Moscow University in Beijing, and support the joint research institutions of universities and university alliances in the two countries to carry out joint research on scientific research, quality resources sharing and high-level talents. Continue to support and promote the "Sino-Russian Youth Business Incubator" exchange program, promote the implementation of the youth entrepreneurship plan of the two countries, and train young and innovative entrepreneurs.

(4) Active cooperation in the field of health, including continuing to strengthen cooperation in the areas of responding to emergencies in the natural, man-made, epidemic prevention and health fields and eliminating medical consequences. Achieve the basic goals of human health, expand coverage of health services, and collaborate in the field of noncommunicable diseases and social health. Under the framework of the China-Russia Medical University Alliance and the Professional Medical Association, strengthen scientific research cooperation and encourage direct exchanges and cooperation between the two countries' counterpart medical organizations.

Continue to expand cooperation in the field of diagnosis, treatment and prevention of infectious diseases. Improve the level of academic collaboration between relevant Chinese and Russian organizations in the research and monitoring of dangerous viral diseases and natural epidemic infectious diseases, and risk assessment of human health environmental factors.
(5) Supporting and promoting the establishment of direct links and deepening cooperation between cultural institutions of the two countries, such as professional art academies, theaters, libraries, museums, etc., further supporting the activities of the Moscow China Cultural Center and the Beijing Russian Cultural Center, strengthening local cultural exchanges and cooperation, and promoting two In-depth training on the training and exchange of talents in the field of culture and art in the country.

(6) Deepen sports exchanges and cooperation, and organize sports exchange activities such as the China-Russia Summer Youth Games and Winter Youth Games, the Silk Road International Rally, and the Silk Road Cup Hockey League. Strengthen cooperation in preparing for the Winter Olympics and jointly improve the level of winter sports. The Russian side supports the Chinese side to host the 24th Winter Olympics in 2022. The Chinese side will provide good conditions for the Russian athletes to stay in China on the eve of the Winter Olympics and during the period.

(7) Promote cooperation between media organizations of the two countries and objectively and comprehensively report on major international events. Support the media of the two countries to carry out professional dialogues and exchanges and hold related thematic activities. We will strengthen all-round and multi-form cooperation between the new media (web media) of both sides, promote the understanding of the outstanding achievements of the Chinese and Russian cultures, and create a good social atmosphere for the development of Sino-Russian cooperation and partnership.

(8) Promoting the cooperation between the national tourism departments of the two countries, taking measures to simplify travel procedures, promoting measures to expand two-way tourism exchange, improving the quality and safety of tourism services, and encouraging the development of new forms of tourism, including Arctic tourism, automobile tourism, theme tourism, etc. Focus on promoting cooperation between the competent authorities of the two countries, coordinate management of the tourism market, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of tourists.

(9) Promote cooperation between the forestry and nature protection departments of the two countries, and continue to deepen the cooperation and cooperation between rare and endangered wildlife and migratory migratory birds such as the Northeast Tiger and the Northeast Leopard. Strengthen cooperation in nature reserves, especially the cooperation of the Northeast Tiger and Leopard Cross-border Nature Reserve, jointly carry out patrol and monitoring of the Northeast Tiger Leopard, jointly carry out ecological corridor construction, and ensure the free migration of the Northeast Tiger
and Leopard on the Sino-Russian border. In order to enhance the friendship between the two peoples, the Chinese side will provide a pair of giant pandas to Russia. The two sides will conduct cooperation and joint research on the protection and breeding of giant pandas.

(10) Strengthen communication, expand cooperation, and deepen the work of repairing and protecting the martyrs' memorial facilities in each other's territory.

(11) To continue to play the role of the China-Russia Friendship, Peace and Development Committee as the main channel for non-governmental exchanges between the two countries. We will actively promote more non-governmental exchange activities and consolidate the social and social activities of the two countries, focusing on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Russia. The basis of public opinion.

International collaboration

The purpose of Sino-Russian international collaboration is to reflect the mission and responsibility of the two countries as world powers and permanent members of the Security Council. They are committed to safeguarding world peace and stability and international fairness, promoting respect for international law, promoting the democratization of international relations, and promoting a more just and rational international order. Direction development. The two sides will cooperate in the following areas:

(1) In the spirit of multilateralism, we must firmly uphold the international system based on the United Nations and the international order based on international law. Adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, including sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs, relying on extensive international cooperation, promoting global governance reform, supporting the multilateral trading system, and promoting a new, more equitable, balanced and stable international structure for the nations and people of the world. Further development provides opportunities. The contribution of the BRICS countries to the formation of a multi-polar world and the building of a more just, multilateral, democratic and equal international system has become increasingly prominent. It is necessary to effectively play the role of the BRICS, including representatives of BRICS members to the United Nations and other major multilateral platforms. Hold regular conversations.

(2) Committed to improving the efficiency of the operation of the United Nations and its Security Council, and supporting the necessary and reasonable
reform of the United Nations and its Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to fully implement the Charter of the United Nations. The reform of the Security Council should give priority to increasing the representation and voice of developing countries, so that the majority of small and medium-sized countries have more opportunities to take turns to enter the Security Council and participate in decision-making. All parties should continue to explore the issue of reform of the UN and its Security Council through extensive and democratic consultations. They should not set time limits, push for immature reform programs, and seek a “package” solution that balances interests and concerns.

(3) Committed to fully implementing the 2030 sustainable development agenda, balancing and promoting fair, inclusive, open, comprehensive, innovative and sustainable development in the three major areas of economy, society and environment. Supporting the important role of the United Nations in coordinating the global implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the need to strengthen the capacity of Member States to implement the 2030 Agenda through reforms such as the United Nations development system.

(4) Strengthen international cooperation to jointly address global environmental issues such as climate change and biodiversity. The two sides welcomed the fact that the 24th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has reached the implementation rules of the Paris Agreement as scheduled, which will further strengthen climate action. China welcomes Russia’s active participation in and support for the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which China will host in 2020.

(5) Promoting the equal treatment of all kinds of human rights by the UN human rights mechanisms and increasing investment in the economic, social and cultural rights and development rights that developing countries attach importance to. Continue to work together to oppose the politicization of the international human rights agenda, oppose the adoption of a "double standard" policy, oppose the use of human rights as an excuse to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states, oppose the attempt to downplay the nature of UN human rights institutions as intergovernmental institutions, oppose the distortion of tampering history, and subvert the current International relations and the system of international law.

(6) Firmly upholding the relevant principles of international humanitarian law and the basic principles of providing humanitarian relief in crisis situations as stipulated in General Assembly resolution 46/182.
(7) Take joint measures to prevent an arms race in outer space and prevent outer space from evolving into a military conflict territory. In this context, the two sides emphasized that the ban on the deployment of any weapons in outer space would help prevent international peace and security from being seriously threatened. Emphasize that we should first strictly abide by the existing international agreements on the peaceful use of outer space, safeguard world peace and security, develop international cooperation, and expand consensus.

Develop a legally binding multilateral instrument to ensure that no types of weapons are deployed in outer space. The two sides emphasized that the Conference on Disarmament is the only venue for multilateral disarmament negotiations and plays a key role in the negotiation of an international agreement on the comprehensive prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Promote the establishment of a multilateral mechanism at the United Nations to ensure the long-term stability of outer space activities and the security of outer space operations.

Take joint measures to promote an international initiative on the political commitment to “not deploy weapons first in outer space”. The two sides believe that the transparency and confidence measures in practice will help prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space, but they cannot replace the negotiation of international legal instruments in outer space.

Comply with and strengthen the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Convention), including by means of a protocol containing an effective verification mechanism, to eliminate incidents of violations of the Convention. At the same time, any decision on the Convention can only be discussed, formulated and adopted with the participation of all parties.

Promote the Conference on Disarmament as soon as possible to begin multilateral negotiations through the International Convention for the Suppression of Biochemical Terrorism.

Strengthen cooperation in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. Jointly safeguard the validity and authority of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the basis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

(8) Strengthening international governance against corruption and supporting international cooperation in preventing and combating corruption in accordance with the United Nations Convention against Corruption.
(9) Oppose any form of protectionism, including unilateral trade sanctions, and maintain and consolidate an open, transparent, inclusive and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system based on the core functions and rules of the World Trade Organization. Actively participate in the work within the framework of the WTO, explore and improve existing rules in the fields of agriculture, investment facilitation, domestic rules in services, small and medium-sized enterprises activities, e-commerce and trade remedy measures, and study and formulate new non-discriminatory multilateral trade rules in the WTO. In the negotiations, the issue of meeting the interests of all parties will form a joint force. In order to consolidate the role of the WTO, adapt it to the current economic situation and challenges, and promote the necessary reforms of the WTO to improve the efficiency of the three key functions of supervision, negotiation and dispute resolution. The core values and basic principles of the WTO should be safeguarded in the process of reform.

(10) Opposing political monopoly and currency blackmail in international economic and trade cooperation, condemning the necessity and scale of individual countries in trying to control other countries to carry out legitimate cooperation, as well as manipulating the global non-proliferation regime and exerting pressure on countries that do not care for them.

(11) Cooperate to maintain the reform momentum of the international monetary and financial system, promote the completion of the 15th round of the IMF’s total inspection in accordance with the established timetable, and enhance the representation and voice of emerging markets and developing countries.

(12) Continue to work together with the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to further develop the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an influential participant in the modern international relations system and to promote regional security, sustainable development, and efficient regional cooperation. The formation of a highly balanced world maintains equal, indivisible, comprehensive and sustainable security and stability.

Adhering to the mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations, and seeking common development advocated by the "Shanghai Spirit", we will further deepen the cooperation of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the fields of politics, economy, security and humanities exchanges.

During Russia’s presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization from 2019 to 2020, it will focus on solving the above tasks.
(13) Promote the deepening of the BRICS strategic partnership from the three major aspects of economic and trade finance, political security, and humanities exchanges. We will continue to consolidate the important position of the BRICS countries in world political and economic affairs, and ensure the continuity and stability of cooperation among BRICS countries by implementing the consensus reached by successive BRICS leaders. Strengthen collaboration among multilateral development agencies such as the New Development Bank to support sustainable development and infrastructure development. Continue to implement the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy and the Economic and Trade Cooperation Action Plan. Deepen innovation and technology cooperation through the construction of the BRICS New Industrial Revolution Partnership. Actively use the BRICS Dialogue and the “BRIC+” model to expand cooperation between the BRICS countries and other developing countries, emerging market countries and related organizations. We will jointly support Brazil's eleventh meeting of leaders of the BRICS countries.

(14) To consolidate the multilateral basis for the operation of the national relations mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region, deepen cooperation in platforms such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Expansion Conference, and strengthen the ASEM, Asia Cooperation Dialogue, AsialInfo, and Big Picture. We advocated cooperation within the framework of other regional mechanisms to promote the development of the "China-Russia-India" mechanism.

Based on the strict observance of the norms of international law and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force or threat of force, promote the construction of a common, integrated, cooperative, sustainable and equitable indivisible security and open and inclusive transparent Asia-Pacific Summit within the framework of the East Asia Summit. Regional security architecture.

(15) Supporting the G20 to play a leading role in global economic governance and international economic cooperation. Committed to implementing the achievements of the G20 summits, adhering to multilateralism, building an open world economy, safeguarding and promoting the WTO-based, rule-based multilateral trading system, and opposing unilateral including unilateral trade sanctions. And protectionism, promoting structural cooperation, digital economy, new technology applications, e-commerce, sustainable development, climate change, infrastructure connectivity, reform of the international financial system, support for small and medium-sized enterprises, and consolidation of global value chains, and other international cooperation. Promote a strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth of the world
economy. Promote the BRICS countries to further strengthen coordination and cooperation in the G20 affairs.

(16) Adhere to the general direction of building an open Asia-Pacific economy, promote positive and pragmatic achievements in the cooperation of APEC in various fields, and promote the free trade of countries in the Asia-Pacific region and the development of cooperation on major regional integration platforms based on WTO guidelines and principles. Full implementation of the interconnection blueprint, promote the development of the digital economy, build an Asia-Pacific free trade zone, and jointly plan a vision for cooperation after 2020.

(17) Adhere to the goal of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and emphasize that dialogue and consultation are the only effective ways to solve the peninsula problem. The two sides welcomed the major positive changes in the situation on the Korean Peninsula since 2018 and positively evaluated the efforts made by all parties concerned. It is believed that the political solution to the peninsula problem should adhere to the goal of non-nuclearization for security and development, comprehensively balance the concerns of all parties, and promote the denuclearization of the peninsula and the establishment of a peninsula peace mechanism. Support the DPRK and the United States to maintain dialogue, move in the opposite direction, and promote continuous progress in dialogue. Support the DPRK and the ROK to improve relations and continue to promote reconciliation and cooperation. China and Russia will continue to make constructive efforts to promote a political solution to the peninsula problem and establish a peace and security mechanism in the region. They are willing to jointly promote the Council to play its due role.

(18) Stress that the Syrian issue can only be resolved through political and diplomatic means. According to Security Council Resolution 2254, it reiterates its support for Syria’s sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity. We will start the work of the Constitutional Council as soon as possible, and seek a political solution that takes into account the legitimate concerns of all parties through the inclusive political process of “narrator-led, narrative-owned” promoted by the United Nations. China and Russia welcome the efforts of the sponsoring countries of Astana in improving the situation in Syria. They reiterated that they should crack down on all terrorist organizations in Syria, including terrorist organizations listed by the UN Security Council, and emphasize the urgency of Syria’s reconstruction. Assistance and willing to strengthen communication and coordination in this regard, emphasizing the importance of returning refugees as soon as possible and returning internally displaced persons to their homes.
(19) The comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue is of great significance and irreplaceable. According to UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and Article 25 of the UN Charter, it firmly supports the steady and comprehensive implementation of relevant agreements. The two sides spoke highly of Iran’s strict implementation of all relevant requirements of the comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue and have been repeatedly confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is expected that the participants in the comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue will also treat their obligations in a serious and responsible manner, in order to achieve the lofty goal of comprehensive agreement as scheduled. The two sides emphasized that it is necessary to maintain mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation with Iraq and reiterate its firm opposition to the implementation of unilateral sanctions and "long arm jurisdiction" by any country on the grounds of its own laws.

(20) Continue to work closely in bilateral and multilateral frameworks to promote national reconciliation and stability in Afghanistan.

(21) Maintain consultations on Latin American affairs, attach importance to strengthening communication and cooperation in the process of developing relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries, and make further joint efforts to promote stability and prosperity in the region. Pay close attention to the development of the situation in Venezuela, call on all parties to abide by the UN Charter, the principles of international law and international relations, adhere to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, promote the peaceful resolution of relevant issues through inclusive political dialogue, and oppose military intervention in Venezuela.

(22) Strengthen communication and coordination on African affairs, maintain a positive and healthy atmosphere for international cooperation in Africa, and jointly make greater contributions to peace and development in Africa. On the basis of full respect for the will of the African countries and gradual and orderly progress, continue to explore non-tripartite cooperation.

(23) Stressing that the question of Palestine is the root of many problems in the Middle East and supports the establishment of a completely independent, independent and promising Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Call on all parties concerned to refrain from taking actions that are detrimental to the prospects of the "two-state plan" and promote the early resumption of negotiations and the realization of the Middle East issue through political and diplomatic channels on the basis of existing international laws such as the relevant UN resolutions, the Madrid Principles, and the "Arab Peace Initiative". Comprehensive, fair and lasting solution.
President of the people's president

Xi Jinping (signed) F. Fu Putin (signed)

Moscow, June 5, 2009

中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于发展
新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系的联合声明

应俄罗斯联邦总统普京邀请，中华人民共和国主席习近平于2019年6月5日至7日对俄罗斯进行国事访问并出席第二十三届圣彼得堡国际经济论坛。两国元首在莫斯科举行会谈，习近平主席会见俄罗斯联邦政府总理德·阿·梅德韦杰夫。

中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦（以下简称“双方”），声明如下：

一

2019年是两国建交70周年，中俄双方均予以隆重庆祝。70年来，两国关系走过不平凡的历程。双方汲取历史经验，立足两国和两国人民利益，致力于实现和平发展、合作共赢，推动中俄关系达到历史最好水平，树立了睦邻相处、合作共赢的典范。中俄关系牢固、稳定，不受外部环境干扰而改变，具有巨大的内生动力和广阔发展前景。

双方认为，当前中俄关系的主要特征是：

——高度的政治互信；
——完备的高层交往和各领域合作机制；
——内容丰富、具有战略意义的务实合作；
——坚实的世代友好民意基础；
——密切有效的国际协调。

双方确定了以下一系列指导两国关系的基本原则：

——相互尊重，平等信任；
——互帮互助，睦邻友好；
——相互支持，战略协作；
——互谅互让，合作共赢；
不结盟、不对抗、不针对第三方。

双方将继续坚持上述原则，继续秉持 2001 年《中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦睦邻友好合作条约》宗旨以及其他双边关系文件精神，指导两国关系长远发展。

二

中俄关系进入新时代，迎来更大发展的新机遇。着眼世界形势变化，顺应两国人民共同愿望，为新形势下的两国关系取得更大发展，双方宣布，将致力于发展中俄新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系。其内涵包括以下目标和方向：

——守望相助，相互给予更加坚定有力的战略支持，支持对方走自身发展道路和维护本国核心利益，保障两国各自安全、主权和领土完整。为此双方将进一步开展相关领域互信合作。

——深度融通，就国家发展战略对接进行密切协调和战略协作，拓展经贸和投资互利合作，民心更加友好相通，文化更加互鉴相融；

——开拓创新，不断丰富、完善双方合作理念、机制，开拓新的领域、项目、技术，更加全面挖掘两国关系潜力和发展动能；

——普惠共赢，进一步团结其他观点一致国家，维护以《联合国宪章》宗旨和原则为核心的国际秩序和国际体系，推动构建人类命运共同体，推动建设相互尊重、公平正义、合作共赢的新型国际关系，推动构建人类命运共同体，在各国平等参与全球治理、遵循国际法、保障平等和不可分割的安全、相互尊重和考虑彼此利益、摒弃对抗和冲突的基础上，秉持多边主义原则，解决国际和地区问题，在国际事务中主持公道，促进更加公正合理的多极世界的形成，惠及世界人民，实现合作共赢。

三

俄方支持“一带一路”倡议，中方支持在欧亚经济联盟框架内推动一体化进程。双方在推进“一带一路”建设与欧亚经济联盟对接方面加强协调行动。

中方支持建设大欧亚伙伴关系倡议。双方认为，“一带一路”倡议同大欧亚伙伴关系可以并行不悖，协调发展，共同促进区域组织、多边一体化进程，造福欧亚大陆人民。

四

双方一致同意，将政治合作、安全合作、务实合作、人文交流、国际协作作为中俄全面战略协作伙伴关系的重点领域。为实现以上目标，双方将共同规划各领域合作原则、方向和具体举措，进一步充实中俄全面战略协作伙伴关系内涵。

政治合作
中俄关系将继续以牢固的政治信任为基石，发挥两国元首战略引领作用。双方将聚焦以下方面：

（一）通过年度互访、在重要多边场合举行双边会晤、元首热线、互致信函等方式，保持两国元首密切交往，对双边关系发展进行顶层设计和战略引领。

（二）充分发挥中俄总理定期会晤机制统筹和推动作用，保持经贸、投资、能源、人文、地方等领域政府间合作委员会高效运转。

（三）保持两国立法机构高层交往势头，用好议会间交流机制和友好小组对话平台，开展多层次、宽领域、全方位交往。

（四）支持中共中央办公厅与俄罗斯联邦总统办公厅作为双边交往的独特渠道，为保障两国元首交往、推动落实两国元首共识发挥更大作用。加强两办及相关部门全面合作。

（五）支持中国共产党与俄罗斯主要政党保持机制化友好往来，努力建立求同存异、相互尊重、互学互鉴的新型政党关系。

安全合作

中俄安全合作的目标是确保两国国家安全，为各自国家稳定发展创造有利条件，有效应对各类传统和新型安全威胁与挑战。

双方将采取以下措施：

（一）充分发挥战略安全磋商机制作用，巩固国家安全领域信任，绝不允许任何势力利用本国领土从事反对对方的活动；保持双方在重大国家安全问题上的密切沟通和协调配合；继续就发展道路和理念、治国理政经验、加强执政能力建设等开展对话。

（二）继续加强两国防务部门和军队战略沟通，深化军事互信，加强军技领域合作，开展联合军事演习，完善各层级各领域务实合作机制，推动两军关系提升至新水平。

（三）完善中俄执法安全合作机制，统筹协调、整体推进两国执法安全各领域合作。

（四）相互支持对方打击恐怖主义和极端主义的努力，加强在打击传播和宣传恐怖主义、极端主义思想及人员招募，切断恐怖组织物资、资金等来源等方面的合作，消除煽动恐怖主义行为、侦破各类威胁两国国家安全的恐怖活动。加强多边反恐领域政策协调与建设性合作，推动国际社会建立以联合国为核心的全球反恐统一战线，反对在打击恐怖主义和极端主义问题上奉行“双重标准”，谴责利用恐怖和极端组织以及打击国际恐怖主义和极端主义实现地缘政治目的干涉别国内政。
（五）加强禁毒领域立场协调、经验交流和务实合作，巩固双边禁毒合作机制，深化毒品需求减供情报交换、联合执法等领域交流合作。坚定维护基于联合国三大禁毒公约的现行国际禁毒体制，促进上海合作组织禁毒合作务实、可持续发展，推动金砖国家禁毒合作。

（六）扩大网络安全领域交流。进一步采取措施维护双方关键信息基础设施的安全和稳定。加强网络空间立法领域交流，共同推动遵照国际法和国内法规进行互联网治理的原则。反对以国家安全为借口，不必要地限制信息通信技术产品的市场准入，不必要地限制高新技术产品出口。在各国平等参与基础上维护网络空间和平与安全，推动构建全球信息网络空间治理秩序。继续开展工作，进一步推动在联合国框架下制定网络空间国家责任行为准则，并推动制定具有普遍法律约束力的法律文件，打击将信息通信技术用于犯罪目的的行为。

（七）开展边境合作及边防部门协作，在进行不间断形势管控、信息交流以及开展边境地区务实联合行动实践的基础上，进一步强化两国边境主管部门间的务实合作，合力打击跨国犯罪和非法移民，保障国家边境稳定。同时遵守领土和边境不可侵犯的国际法原则，相互尊重主权和领土完整。

务实合作

中俄务实合作的目标是为双边关系奠定坚实的物质基础。双方将拓宽思路，创新模式，推动两国务实合作全面提质升级，实现利益深度交融、互利共赢。

双方商定落实下列任务：

（一）落实好双方《关于促进双边贸易高质量发展的备忘录》，持续提升双边贸易规模，优化贸易结构。深化电子商务、服务贸易领域合作，扩大投资和经济技术合作，推进战略性大项目实施，提高贸易和投资便利化水平，为双方经贸合作创造良好条件。双方支持中小企业扩大合作，为双边经贸合作注入新动力。

（二）继续深化上中下游全方位一体化能源合作，促进双方在节能技术、标准、人才、信息等方面交流与合作。支持中俄东线天然气管道项目年内举行投产及供气启动仪式。支持中俄能源商务论坛成为机制化活动。

（三）持续深化两国投资合作，充分发挥中俄投资合作委员会统筹协调作用，进一步完善机制，加强两国经济发展战略、规划和政策对接。按照“企业主体、市场导向、商业运作、国际惯例”的原则共同推动更多投资合作项目落地。加强对中俄投资基金、中俄地区合作发展投资基金等双边合作基金的引导，提升金融支持和服务水平。加强对双方投资者合法权益的保护，营造更加公平、友好和稳定的营商环境。
（四）在中俄总理定期会晤委员会金融合作分委会框架内等开展两国政府部门和金融监管部门的合作。中俄金融监管部门将采取措施，提高外贸合同中使用本币结算的份额，开展支付系统、银行卡和保险领域合作，促进相互投资，欢迎两国发行人在双方金融市场发行债券。支持两国商业银行在机构互设、扩大代理行网络及金融产品创新方面的努力，鼓励双方金融机构积极参与两国债券市场交易。

（五）深化会计审计标准和审计监管合作，积极推进会计审计标准互认，为中俄企业跨境发债和两国金融市场互联互通提供制度保障。

（六）扩大科技创新合作深度和广度，决定 2020 年、2021 年互办“中俄科技创新年”。继续定期举行中俄创新对话，推进中俄联合科技创新基金建设和，推动中俄大科学合作，推动中国参与基于超导重离子加速器的离子对撞机装置项目实施，加强两国科技创新人才交流与合作。

（七）在实施中俄 2018—2022 年航天合作大纲的基础上拓展并深化两国航天领域长期互利合作，包括在运载火箭及发动机、月球与深空探测、对地观测、航天电子元器件、空间碎片监测、低轨卫星通信系统等重点领域的合作。

（八）加强信息通信技术、数字经济、无线电频率资源管理等领域合作，深入开展北斗导航系统与俄罗斯格洛纳斯系统在轨位、频率方面的互换和合作。

积极落实民用航空、原材料、装备、无线电电子等领域合作项目，推动中俄工业务实合作再上新台阶。

（九）扩大并提升农业合作水平，深化农业投资合作。采取措施优化营商环境，支持两国企业开展大豆等农作物生产、加工、物流与贸易全链条合作，落实好双方《中国东北地区和俄罗斯远东及贝加尔地区农业发展规划》、《关于俄扩大大豆和豆制品输华的合作规划》。积极开展两国农产品食品相互市场准入合作，扩大双方优质农产品食品贸易。

（十）深化交通运输领域合作。坚持互利共赢原则，新建和改造现有跨境交通基础设施，推动铁路、界河桥梁等领域标志性重大合作项目落地实施。加强两国间跨境运输合作，推动运输通关便利化，提高运输服务质量效率。

（十一）加强海关检验检疫、口岸运行全方位务实合作，不断提升口岸基础设施同步配套建设水平，优化口岸通关环境，开展海关必要信息交换。

（十二）推动中俄北极可持续发展合作，在遵循沿岸国家权益基础上扩大北极航道开发利用以及北极地区基础设施、资源开发、旅游、生态环保等领域合作。支持继续开展极地科研合作，推动实施北极联合科考航次和北极联合研究项目。继续开展中俄在“北极——对话区域”国际北极论坛内的协作。

（十三）提升在自然灾害防治和紧急救灾领域，包括自然灾害和生产安全事故后续处理方面合作的水平和质量，促进在该领域的国际合作。加强跨界水体保护、环境灾害应急联络、生物多样性保护、应对气候变化、固废处理等领域合作。
（十四）本着睦邻友好合作精神继续发展中俄边界领域务实合作，加强协调，促进两国边境地区的经济社会发展。

（十五）扩大中俄地方交流，持续深化地方间经贸合作，落实好《中俄在俄罗斯远东地区合作发展规划（2018—2024年）》，丰富中俄地方合作交流年成果。建立并运行新的地方合作平台。用好中国国际进口博览会、中俄博览会、中国—东北亚博览会、圣彼得堡国际经济论坛、东方经济论坛等重点展会平台，推动扩大合作。

（十六）积极推进“一带一路”建设与欧亚经济联盟对接。推动在中华人民共和国政府同欧亚经济委员会间建立有效对话机制。切实推动符合中国、欧亚经济联盟及其成员国利益的优先项目。

确保2018年5月17日签署的《中华人民共和国与欧亚经济联盟经贸合作协定》早日生效并启动实施。双方主张启动中俄《欧亚经济伙伴关系协定》谈判。

双方高度评价2019年4月25日至27日在北京举办的第二届“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛。论坛期间各方就在对接现有国家及地区一体化战略和项目基础上进一步加强欧亚地区建设性合作达成重要共识。

（十七）继续深化双边领事合作，加强在该领域交流，积极推动中俄人员往来进一步便利化。

人文交流

中俄人文交流的目标是传承世代友好，巩固民间友好往来，促进文明互学互鉴。为进一步发展人文交流，双方将采取以下措施：

（一）发挥中俄人文合作委员会统筹作用，落实《中俄人文合作行动计划》。

（二）在以下人文交流合作领域加快实现突破：师生学术交流；利用远程教育技术等开展汉语、俄语教学；在基础教育、中等职业及补充教育、青少年交流领域共同举办活动。依据数量对等原则相互提供到对方国家高校公费留学的名额。互派优秀学生到对方国家就读优势专业，实现2020年相互留学交流10万人目标；完善在华俄语中心和在俄孔子学院等汉语学习中心运行模式。

打造青少年交流品牌。在中俄百名青年互访项目框架下继续开展双方交流实践，促进国际青少年运动，增加中俄青少年组织间交流活动及项目数量，落实《中俄青少年世代友好宣言》。

（三）加快推进深圳北理莫斯科大学建设，支持两国高校、大学联盟联合研究机构在科技优先领域开展科研联合攻关、优质资源共享和高水平人才联合培养。持续支持和推广“中俄青年创业孵化器”交流项目，促进落实两国青年创业计划，培养两国青年创新创业人才。
（四）在卫生领域积极协作，包括继续在应对自然、人为、防疫卫生领域突发情况及医疗后果消除等领域加强合作。实现人类健康基本目标，扩大卫生服务覆盖范围，在非传染性疾病和社会卫生领域开展协作。在中俄医科大学联盟和专业医学协会框架下加强科研合作，鼓励两国对口医学组织间的直接交流与合作。

继续拓展双方在传染性疾病诊治和防控领域合作。提高中俄相关组织机构在危险病毒性疾病和自然疫源性疾病研究监控、人类健康环境因素影响风险评估方面的学术协作水平。

（五）支持并促进两国专业艺术院团、剧院、图书馆、博物馆等文化机构建立直接联系并深化合作，进一步支持莫斯科中国文化中心和北京俄罗斯文化中心活动，加强地方文化交流合作，推动两国文化艺术领域人才培训和交流，就开展文化产业领域合作进行深入研究。

（六）深化体育交流合作，办好中俄夏季青少年运动会和冬季青少年运动会、“丝绸之路”国际汽车拉力赛、“丝路杯”冰球联赛等品牌体育交流活动。在冬奥会备战方面加强合作，共同提高冬季运动水平。俄方支持中方举办 2022 年第二十四届冬奥会。中方将为俄罗斯运动员冬奥会前夕及举办期间在华停留提供良好条件。

（七）推动两国媒体机构合作，客观全面报道重大国际事件。支持两国媒体开展专业对话交流，举办相关主题活动。加强双方新媒体（网媒）之间的全方位、多形式合作，促进两国人民对中俄文化杰出成果认知，为发展中俄协作及伙伴关系营造良好社会氛围。

（八）促进两国国家旅游部门协作，采取措施简化旅行手续，推动落实扩大双向旅游交流的措施，提升旅游服务质量和安全性，鼓励拓展旅游创新形式，包括北极旅游、汽车旅游、主题旅游等。重点推动两国主管部门合作，协调管理旅游市场，保护游客合法权益。

（九）推动两国林业和自然保护部门合作，继续深化东北虎、东北豹等珍稀濒危野生动植物和迁徙候鸟保护合作。加强自然保护区合作，特别是东北虎豹跨境自然保护区合作，联合开展巡护和东北虎豹监测，共同开展生态廊道建设，保障东北虎豹在中俄边界实现自由迁徙。为增进两国人民友谊，中方向俄方提供一对大熊猫，双方将在大熊猫保护、繁育等方面开展合作与联合研究。

（十）加强沟通，扩大合作，深入推进双方在彼此境内的烈士纪念设施修缮保护工作。

（十一）继续发挥中俄友好、和平与发展委员会作为两国民间交往主渠道的作用。今年庆祝中俄建交 70 周年为中心，积极推动开展更多民间交流活动，巩固好两国社会和民意基础。

国际协作
中俄国际协作的宗旨是体现双方作为世界大国和安理会常任理事国的使命和担当，致力于维护世界和平稳定和国际公平，促进尊重国际法，推动国际关系民主化，推动国际秩序朝更加公正合理的方向发展。双方将在以下方面开展合作：

（一）本着多边主义的理念，坚定维护以联合国为核心的国际体系、以国际法为基础的国际秩序。坚持《联合国宪章》宗旨和原则，包括主权平等和不干涉内政，以广泛国际合作为依托，推进全球治理改革，支持多边贸易体制，推动构建更加公平平衡稳定的新型国际格局，为世界各国和人民进一步发展提供机遇。金砖国家对形成多极世界格局，构建更加公正、多边、民主、平等的国际体系所作的贡献日益凸显，要有效发挥金砖国家作用，包括金砖国家成员国驻联合国和其他主要多边平台代表举行定期对话。

（二）致力于提高联合国及其安理会运转效率，根据《联合国宪章》，支持对联合国及其安理会进行必要、合理的改革，以全面履行《联合国宪章》。安理会改革应优先增加发展中国家的代表性和发言权，使广大中小国家有更多机会轮流进入安理会并参与决策。各方应通过广泛、民主协商，继续就联合国及其安理会改革问题开展探讨，不人为设置时限，不推崇不成熟的发展方案，寻求兼顾各方利益和关切的“一揽子”解决方案。

（三）致力于全面落实 2030 年可持续发展议程，平衡协调推进经济、社会和环境三大领域的公平、包容、开放、全面、创新和可持续发展。支持联合国在协调评估全球落实 2030 年议程方面发挥重要作用，认为有必要通过改革联合国发展系统等方式增强支持会员国落实 2030 年议程的能力。

（四）加强国际合作共同应对气候变化、生物多样性等全球性环境问题。双方欢迎《联合国气候变化框架公约》第 24 次缔约方会议如期达成《巴黎协定》实施细则，将进一步加强气候行动。中方欢迎俄方积极参与并支持中国将于 2020 年承办的《生物多样性公约》第 15 次缔约方大会。

（五）推动联合国人权机制平等对待各类人权，在发展中国家重视的经社文权利和发展权方面加大投入。继续共同致力于反对将国际人权议程政治化，反对采取“双重标准”政策，反对以人权为借口干涉主权国家内政，反对企图淡化联合国人权机构为政府间机构的属性，反对歪曲篡改历史，颠覆现行国际关系和国际法体系。

（六）坚定维护遵守国际人道法有关准则，以及联大第 46/182 号决议规定的危机情况下提供人道主义救援的基本原则。

（七）采取共同措施防止外空军备竞赛，防止外空演变成军事冲突疆域。在此背景下双方强调，禁止在太空部署任何武器有助于防止国际和平与安全受到严重威胁。强调首先应严格遵守关于和平利用外空的现行国际协定，维护世界和平与安全，发展国际合作，扩大共识。

制定具有法律约束力的多边文书，确保不在外空部署任何类型武器。双方强调，裁军谈判会议是举行多边裁军谈判的唯一场所，在全面防止外空军备竞赛国际协定谈判中发挥关键作用。
推动在联合国构建保障外空活动长期稳定和外空行动安全的多边机制。

采取共同措施推动作出关于“不首先在外空部署武器”政治承诺的国际倡议。双方相信，正在实践中的透明和信任措施有助于防止在外空部署武器，但不能取代外空国际法律文书谈判。

遵守并强化《禁止发展、生产及储存细菌（生物）及毒素武器和销毁此种武器公约》（《公约》），包括通过达成含有有效核查机制的议定书等方式，共同杜绝违反《公约》活动。同时，任何针对《公约》的决定只能在各方普遍参与的情况下进行讨论、制定并通过。

推动裁军谈判会议尽快通过“制止生化恐怖主义行为国际公约”开始多边谈判。

加强核不扩散领域合作。共同维护《不扩散核武器条约》作为核不扩散体系基础的有效性和权威性。

（八）加强反腐败国际治理，支持根据《联合国反腐败公约》开展预防和打击腐败方面的国际合作。

（九）反对包括单边贸易制裁在内的任何形式的保护主义，维护并巩固以世界贸易组织核心作用和规则为基础的开放、透明、包容、非歧视的多边贸易体制。积极参与世贸组织框架内工作，探索完善农业、投资便利化、服务领域国内规则、中小微企业活动、电子商务和贸易救济措施等领域现行规则并研究制定新的非歧视多边贸易规则，在世贸组织谈判中就符合各方利益的问题形成合力。为巩固世贸组织作用，使其适应当代经济现状和挑战，推动世贸组织进行必要改革，提高监督、谈判和争端解决三项关键职能的工作效率。改革过程中应着眼维护世贸组织核心价值和基本原则。

（十）反对国际经贸合作中的政治垄断和货币讹诈，谴责个别国家企图掌控别国开展正当合作的必要性和尺度，以及操纵全球不扩散制度，向不合其心意的国家施压。

（十一）合作保持国际货币金融体系改革动力，推动按照既定时间表完成国际货币基金组织第15轮份额总检查，提升新兴市场和发展中国家的代表性和发言权。

（十二）同上海合作组织各成员国继续共同努力，进一步发挥上海合作组织作为有影响力的现代国际关系体系参与者和保障地区安全、可持续发展、高效地区协作的积极因素作用，促进多极平衡世界的形成，维护平等、不可分割、综合、可持续的安全与稳定。

秉持“上海精神”所倡导的互信、互利、平等、协商、尊重多样文明、谋求共同发展，进一步深化上海合作组织成员国在政治、经济、安全和人文交流领域的合作。

在2019—2020年俄罗斯担任上海合作组织主席国期间重点协作解决上述任务。
(十三)从经贸财金、政治安全、人文交流三大相互联系的方面，推动深化金砖伙伴关系。不断巩固金砖国家在世界政治和经济事务中的重要地位，通过落实历届金砖国家领导人会晤达成的各项目标，保障金砖国家合作延续性和稳定性。加强在新开发银行等多边开发机构中的协作，为可持续发展和基础设施建设提供支持。继续落实金砖国家经济伙伴关系和经贸合作行动计划纲领。通过建立金砖国家新工业革命伙伴关系等方式深化技术创新合作。积极运用金砖对话会和“金砖+”模式，扩大金砖国家与其他发展中国家、新兴市场国家及相关组织的合作。共同支持巴西办好金砖国家领导人第十一次会晤。

(十四)为巩固亚太地区国家关系机制运行的多边基础，深化在东亚峰会、东盟地区论坛、东盟防长扩大会等平台中的合作，加强在亚欧会议、亚洲合作对话、亚信、大图们倡议及其他地区机制框架内的合作，推动“中俄印”机制发展。

以严格遵守国际法准则为基础，以和平解决争端、不使用武力或以武力相威胁为原则，在东亚峰会框架内推动构建共同、综合、合作、可持续、平等不可分割安全以及开放包容透明的亚太地区安全架构。

(十五)支持二十国集团在全球经济治理和国际经济合作中发挥引领作用。致力于落实二十国集团历届峰会成果，坚持多边主义，构建开放型世界经济，维护并推动以世贸组织为核心、以规则为基础的多边贸易体制，反对包括单边贸易制裁在内的单边主义和保护主义，以可持续发展、气候变化、基础设施互联互通、国际金融体系改革、支持中小企业、巩固全球价值链等新领域国际合作，推动世界经济强劲、可持续、平衡、包容增长。推动金砖国家进一步加强在二十国集团事务中的协调合作。

(十六)坚持构建开放型亚太经济的大方向，推动亚太经合组织各领域合作取得积极务实成果，以世贸组织准则和原则为基础，促进亚太地区国家开展自由贸易，发展主要区域一体化平台协作，全面实施互联互通蓝图，促进数字经济、建设亚太自由贸易区，共同规划好 2020 年后合作愿景。

(十七)坚持朝鲜半岛无核化目标，强调对话协商是解决半岛问题的唯一有效途径。双方欢迎 2018 年以来朝鲜半岛形势发生的重大积极变化，积极评价有关各方为此作出的努力。认为政治解决半岛问题应坚持无核化与安全与发展的目标，综合平衡解决各方关切，推动构建半岛无核化和建立半岛和平机制。支持朝美保持对话，相向而行，推动对话不断取得进展。支持朝韩改善关系，继续推进和解合作。中俄将继续为推动政治解决半岛问题及建立本地区和平与安全机制作出建设性努力，愿共同推动安理会发挥应有积极作用。

(十八)强调叙利亚问题只能通过政治和外交手段解决，根据安理会第 2254 号决议，重申支持叙利亚主权、独立、统一和领土完整。尽快启动宪法委员会工作，通过联合国推动的“叙人主导、叙人所有”的包容性政治进程，寻求兼顾各方合理关切的政治解决方案。中俄欢迎阿斯塔纳担保国在改善叙利亚局势方面所作努力，重申应打击叙利亚境内包括被联合国安理会列名恐怖组织在内的所有恐怖组织，强调叙利亚重建的迫切性，就排雷等向叙提供协助，并愿就此加强沟通协调，强调难民尽快回国和境内流离失所者重返家园的重要性。
（十九）伊朗核问题全面协议的意义重大、不可替代，根据联合国安理会第2231号决议和《联合国宪章》第25条规定，坚定支持稳步、全面落实有关协议。双方高度评价伊朗严格执行伊核问题全面协议所有相关要求并得到国际原子能机构多次确认，期待伊朗核问题全面协议参与方同样认真负责地对待自身义务，以如期全面达成协议的崇高目标。双方强调，必须维护对伊互利经贸合作，重申坚决反对任何国家以本国法律为由实施单边制裁和“长臂管辖”。

（二十）继续在双边和多边框架内密切协作，推动阿富汗民族和解与局势稳定。

（二十一）就拉美事务保持磋商，在各自发展同拉美和加勒比国家关系过程中重视加强沟通协作，进一步作出共同努力，促进该地区稳定繁荣。密切关注委内瑞拉局势发展，呼吁各方恪守《联合国宪章》、国际法和国际关系准则，坚持不干涉内政原则，推动有关问题通过包容政治对话和平解决，反对对委内瑞拉进行军事干涉。

（二十二）就非洲事务加强沟通协调，维护国际对非合作的积极、健康氛围，共同为非洲和平与发展作出更大贡献。在充分尊重非洲国家意愿和循序渐进基础上，继续探讨开展在非三方合作。

（二十三）强调巴勒斯坦问题是中东地区诸多问题的根源，支持建立1967年边界为基础、以东耶路撒冷为首都、拥有完全主权的、独立、具有发展前景的巴勒斯坦国。呼吁有关各方避免采取有损“两国方案”前景的行动，在联合国有关决议、马德里原则、“阿拉伯和平倡议”等现行国际法基础上，通过政治和外交途径，推动早日恢复谈判，实现中东问题的全面、公正、持久解决。

中华人民共和国主席
俄罗斯联邦总统

习近平（签字）

弗·弗·普京（签字）

二〇一九年六月五日于莫斯科

（新华社莫斯科6月5日电）