

WORKING PAPERS

COALITION FOR PEACE & ETHICS



NO. 3-1 (MARCH 2014)

Reframing Knowledge/Power – an Epistemological Investigation of Contemporary Social Movements

Keren Wang

Abstract: Social movement studies traditionally neglected knowledge and ideology, as scholars had few tools and reasons to analyze them. Indeed, the theoretical landscape of early social movement research was marked by the dichotomy between Marxist-influenced analysis on the one end, and collective-behaviorist model on the other. In recent decades, the increasing awareness on the significance of culture and its representations has persuaded many scholars to direct their attention toward the production and transaction of social knowledge. The introduction of frame theory into social movement research reflected this theoretical reorientation towards knowledge and culture. While frame theory provided social movement scholars with a readily-available theoretical lens to examine culture and knowledge transitions, it is not without its limitations. The instrumentalist presumptions of frame analysis often reduce knowledge and ideology into consciously-deployed strategic actions, while ignoring the important role of preexisting social relations and knowledge frameworks. Through the investigation on the epistemological dimensions of contemporary social movements, this paper seeks to address the theoretical constraints of frame analysis by reimagining the way which the framing dynamics of social movements are understood and analyzed. Grounded on the notion that power relations in modern society are both maintained and displaced through knowledge production, this paper explores the following two key questions: First, how do social movements produce and reframe social knowledge? Second, how do preexisting social knowledge influence and shape the frame dynamics of contemporary social movements? Drawing from recent scholarship on knowledge production, this conceptualizes “tacit knowledge base” as the embodiment of preexisting cultural norms, conventions, mores, habits, and ideologies—things that we simply *do* and seldom explicitly *think* or *talk* about. Conversely, for a social movement, all of its “explicit knowledge performances” (speaking, expressing, reacting, protesting etc.) would reflect the externalizations of its tacit social knowledge base. Given the intrinsic tension between the fluid collective experiences in modern societies against the relative inertia of preexisting power-relations, social movement can be understood as the organized collective effort to rewrite social knowledge in accordance with the renewed experience. In conclusion, this paper argues that rather than reducing knowledge into mere strategic actions, it is perhaps more helpful to see knowledge as the catalyst for the creative actions of social actors in face of the ossified social knowledge and structural preconditions. Social movement, therefore, would reframe social knowledge through the intersubjective cycle of *externalization* (articulate and disseminate new knowledge), *combination* (displace and modify existing social knowledge), *internalization* (learn and adopt new knowledge), and *self-regulation* (normalization of new social knowledge, reconfiguring social relations). This constant displacement of knowledge has led to the culture of self-reflectivity, where knowledge displacement and production became a continuous, rhizomatic, and decentered “spiral” process. **Keywords:** social movement, epistemology, frame theory, knowledge production, power relations.



COALITION FOR
PEACE AND ETHICS

Reframing Knowledge/Power – an Epistemological Investigation of Contemporary Social Movements (Working Title)

Keren Wang¹

Abstract: Social movement studies traditionally neglected knowledge and ideology, as scholars had few tools and reasons to analyze them. Indeed, the theoretical landscape of early social movement research was marked by the dichotomy between Marxist-influenced analysis on the one end, and collective-behaviorist model on the other. In recent decades, the increasing awareness on the significance of culture and its representations has persuaded many scholars to direct their attention toward the production and transaction of social knowledge. The introduction of frame theory into social movement research reflected this theoretical reorientation towards knowledge and culture. While frame theory provided social movement scholars with a readily-available theoretical lens to examine culture and knowledge transitions, it is not without its limitations. The instrumentalist presumptions of frame analysis often reduce knowledge and ideology into consciously-deployed strategic actions, while ignoring the important role of preexisting social relations and knowledge frameworks. Through the investigation on the epistemological dimensions of contemporary social movements, this paper seeks to address the theoretical constraints of frame analysis by reimagining the way which the framing dynamics of social movements are understood and analyzed. Grounded on the notion that power relations in modern society are both maintained and displaced through knowledge production, this paper explores the following two key questions: First, how do social movements produce and reframe social knowledge? Second, how do preexisting social knowledge influence and shape the frame dynamics of contemporary social movements? Drawing from recent scholarship on knowledge production, this conceptualizes “tacit knowledge base” as the embodiment of preexisting cultural norms, conventions, mores, habits, and ideologies—things that we simply *do* and seldom explicitly *think* or *talk* about. Conversely, for a social movement, all of its “explicit knowledge performances” (speaking, expressing, reacting, protesting etc.) would reflect the externalizations of its tacit social knowledge base. Given the intrinsic tension between the fluid collective experiences in modern societies against the relative inertia of preexisting power-relations, social movement can be understood as the organized collective effort to rewrite social knowledge in accordance with the renewed experience. In conclusion, this paper argues that rather than reducing knowledge into mere strategic actions, it is perhaps more helpful to see knowledge as the catalyst for the creative actions of social actors in face of the ossified social knowledge and structural preconditions. Social movement, therefore, would reframe social knowledge through the intersubjective cycle of *externalization* (articulate and disseminate new knowledge), *combination* (displace and modify existing social knowledge), *internalization* (learn and adopt new knowledge), and *self-regulation* (normalization of new social knowledge, reconfiguring social relations). This constant displacement of knowledge has led to the culture of self-reflectivity, where knowledge displacement and production became a continuous, rhizomatic, and decentered “spiral” process.

Keywords: social movement, epistemology, frame theory, knowledge production, power relations.

I. The Structure- Agency Problem

“In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will... It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.”¹

--- Karl Marx

¹ Keren Wang, Ph.D. Student, Communication Arts & Sciences / Social Thought, 316 Sparks, Penn State University (UP) kuw148@psu.edu February 24, 2014. Presented at the 2014 Social Thought Conference Pennsylvania State University April 5, 2014.

“In the theory of action the point of reference of all terms is the action of an individual actor... Action has an orientation when it is guided by the meaning which the actor attaches to it in its relationship to his goals and interests.”²

--- Talcott Parsons

Social movement studies traditionally neglected culture and ideology as scholars had few tools and reasons to analyze them.³ Early European social movement theorists were heavily influenced by the Marxist tradition,⁴ and saw social movements as inevitable consequences of social and historical factors,⁵ whereas the Anglo-American scholars traditionally operated within the “rationalist” and “behaviorist” frameworks, and treated social movements as products of rational self-interest.⁶ This disciplinary bifurcation of social movement scholarship in part reflects the larger debate concerning structure and agency,⁷ demonstrated by the pair of quotes by Marx and Parsons above. On the one end, classical Marxist analysis, with its historically deterministic presumptions, tends to see individuals as products of social conditions that are entirely subject to the inevitable constraints of social relations.⁸ On the other end of the spectrum, proponents of “rational actors”⁹ tend to embrace methodological individualism while downplay the significance of pre-existing social relations, cultures and ideologies.¹⁰

It is important to note, however, that the relationship between social structure and the individual actor does not necessarily need to conform to a subject-object dichotomy or a dialectical opposition. Let us briefly consider Foucault’s articulation of modern disciplinary structures, such as hospitals, prisons, psychiatric wards, schools and the like.¹¹ One can easily read Foucault as a “structural fatalistic”, as his account of the continuous, tacit, invisible and pervasive disciplinary powers from various modern institutions seem to leave little room for individual agency. Yet against this seemingly inescapable web of modern self-disciplinary

structures, Foucault during his later years reoriented his ruminations towards the care of the “self” instead,¹² searching ways to make “self” possible notwithstanding the invisible and yet pervasive presence of power. It is in this sense that Foucault’s conception of “*biopower*”¹³ displaces the traditional structure/agent dichotomy, by suggesting that an individual is both the subject and the object of the disciplinary structure when discipline is internalized as “knowledge”.¹⁴ Please note that the term “knowledge” here does not necessarily conform to the epistemological frameworks of Platonic metaphysical “Truth” or Cartesian representations of “nature”. For the purpose of this paper, “knowledge” is understood as our intersubjective understandings of our social world(s),¹⁵ which encompasses all socially and historically constructed rules, norms, values and systems of representations that shapes power relations and frames human symbolic interactions.¹⁶ Societal power structures not only exist in an individual’s exteriority, but can also become an integral part of an individual’s interior cultural identity, in the form of customs, values, habits and ideologies. Individual and collective actors, then, are not only passive depositories of knowledge-powers, but can also actively deploy, reinforce, shape, and even challenge the existing power-relations within the civil society framework. As the state-centered power configuration is being displaced by the emerging polycentric¹⁷ global *dispositif* in the post-industrial world,¹⁸ the focus of economic activity also began to shift from material production to knowledge creation.¹⁹ Likewise, as individuals become increasingly more aware of their socio-historical position, the dual-property of *transcending*²⁰ (unfolding oneself to the world) and *enframing*²¹ (folding-in the outside world into the self) emerges as the central feature of the contemporary culture of the self.

It is in this sense that social movements in the post-industrial society (e.g. feminist movements and struggles for indigenous rights) tend to focus on authenticating one’s own rights within the larger civil society rather than trying to seize state power.²² On the one hand, as

contours of cultural identities are getting increasingly fluid and fragmented, individuals are able to enjoy the luxury to self-construct their identities through self-expression. But the process of self-expression may run against various pre-existing social constraints (e.g., laws prohibits gay marriage) that produces conflict and possibility violence. This tension also led to the emergence of “identity politics” as a civil society framework that manages the limit of identity expression. Cultural expressions also induce social solidarities, form new social relationships that may ossify into power structures, which in turn make us self-regulate, and potentially turn back into those undesirable social restraints that we try to free ourselves from. It is in this sense that the modern culture of *self-expression* is also a culture of *self-under-siege*. While individuals are increasingly enjoying higher degrees of agency (having endless of choices in fashion, food, leisure, etc.), they’re also struggling with increasing pressures to conform and self-regulate.

It is in this sense that under the post-industrial “knowledge-power” configuration, the subsistence of “power” is no longer understood as the possession of means of physical coercion, but instead as the faculty to produce, articulate, deploy and displace social knowledge. Thus, rather than reducing the structure/agent relation into a “master-and-slave” dialectic, it is perhaps more helpful to see the intrinsic tension between structural preconditions and the creative actions of actors as a co-constructing process that enables individual and collective actors to exercise their agency through the continuous intersubjective process of *externalization* (displace and articulate knowledge), *combination* (modifying knowledge), *internalization* (“learning knowledge”), and *self-regulation* (normalized knowledge).

II. Framing and Persuasion

*"I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principals of organization which govern events, and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify."*²³

--- Erving Goffman

*"Insofar as the individual is involved in conflict with other individuals or groups, the study of this same individual would fall under the head of Rhetoric."*²⁴

--- Kenneth Burke

Given the intrinsic constraints of classical Marxist and collective behaviorist frameworks, from the 1960s and onwards, both European and Anglo-American scholars began to gradually move beyond their respective theoretical traditions. The increasing awareness on the significance of knowledge production and transaction has persuaded many social movement scholars to direct their attention towards culture and its representations. Gradually, the theoretical perspectives of European and Anglo-American social movement scholars began to converge: the former proceeded to give more credit to the capacity of social actors to engage in autonomous actions notwithstanding various objective social forces,²⁵ whereas the latter became more cognizant of the need to treat cultural and discursive elements more seriously.²⁶

As scholars became more interested in finding out what social movements *DO* and *SAY* instead of what social movements *ARE*, many of them began to see movement as an organized body of actors that engages in "sustained campaigns of claim making."²⁷ Drawing from Erving Goffman's work on symbolic interactions, the introduction of frame theory in the study of social movements in part reflected this theoretical reorientation towards culture, and has brought both new opportunities and challenges to the field.²⁸ The concept of the "frame" originally proposed by Goffman did not imply any intentionality. He merely defined it as a basic cognitive structure that shapes our perception of reality.²⁹ Ironically, when the concept was appropriated by social

movement scholars, frame theory itself was *reframed* into the narratives collective action.³⁰ Thus “frame” is no longer a hard-wired behavioral structure that is “simply there”, but instead a consciously crafted narrative that seeks to reach a larger audience³¹--a deployed tool by the movement for the purposes of mobilizing support and gaining access to political opportunities.³²

While frame analysis provided scholars with a readily-available theoretical lens to look into culture and knowledge transitions, it is not without its limitations. First of all, the instrumentalist conception of framing often reduces culture and ideology into strategic actions. Of course, in contemporary public discourse, political goals are often articulated by strategically drawing upon larger cultural values and societal norms, and social movement groups certainly do make conscious efforts to provide compelling accounts for themselves for the purpose advancing and legitimizing their efforts. However, even within the context of social movements, culture and ideology are much more than simply strategic devices in the movement organizer’s “framing tool-kit”. This instrumentalist conception of the framing process ignores the important role of preexisting social relations. Social actors not only explicitly *deploy* knowledge to connect and influence others, but also tacitly *self-regulate* in accordance with the preexisting social knowledge they have internalized. Likewise, given the preexisting social relationships of different movement actors, a movement both deploys and is constrained by their cultural resources. It is in this sense that when a movement group explicitly frames something, their strategic action in itself already operates in a larger tacit “Frame” from which the movement group operates within. Secondly, frame analysis tends to fix the framing tactics of a social movement with their corresponding rational “goals”, and the movement’s frame is considered “irrational” if the narrative means does not strive towards any concrete “ends”. Not only would the tacit or implicit side of framing render the notions goals and intent problematic, but even if

the social actor consciously frames its narrative towards a specific “goal”, this goal may not fit the expectations of a “rationalist” scholar.

The question of “who frames?” further complicates the notions of goals and intentionality. Traditional frame analysis often concretizes a social movement into a singular, rational *corpus* that “speaks” through its leaders and recruiters. Under this notion, framing is restricted to the “conscious efforts by groups or recruiters to craft their rhetoric and issues in such a way that they appeal to potential recruits.”³³ However, once a narrative slips into the intersubjective consciousness of many, the singular fragments into “narratives”--- stories that are repeated, replicated, augmented, translated, reframed, externalized and internalized many times over. Simply put, a shared narrative is a narrative with many speakers (*framers*) and listeners (*framees*), with multitudes of tacit and implicit goals, intentions and interpretations (see figure 1 below). A social movement in this sense is not an entity that “speaks” to the world, instead, a movement unfolds itself to the world through various narratives that shapes the dynamic relationships between actors and systems both inside and outside of the movement.



Figure 1: one photo, multiple frames (source: <http://weblog.bio-natur.at/2012/01/28/how-the-media-can-manipulate-our-viewpoint/>)

In some measure, the criticisms listed above are equally applicable to traditional rhetorical studies on social movements. Similar to frame analysis, traditional notions of rhetoric also assume a rationalist position, perceiving human symbolic interactions as consciously-chosen strategic performances enacted by an easily identified orator to a relatively stable and passive body of audience. In Aristotle's words, "rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of *persuasion*."³⁴ The role of rhetoric as framed by Aristotle is a purely instrumental one—it is an orator's ability to utilize available means of *persuasion* in a deliberative situation in service of his or her *goals*. It is in this sense that earlier works on movement rhetoric mostly focused on the study of "great orators" and speeches through predetermined genres and devices.³⁵ Whereas more recent studies on social movement rhetoric have moved beyond the Aristotelian orthodoxy, the analysis nonetheless remained mostly focusing on the rhetorical *tactics* of the movements.³⁶

The unwillingness for many rhetoric scholars to tackle “non-traditional” discursive elements of social movements perhaps has more to do with ethical rather than technical concerns. The violent street confrontations of the 1960s and 70s posed significant challenge to the long-held Western ideal of the public sphere, a space where collective problems are solved through civil discourse. Many public address scholars³⁷ during this era voiced their concerns over the confrontational tactics associated with the rhetoric of the streets.³⁸ Some made explicit effort to distinguish “proper” rhetoric from the “street rhetoric” performed by those new social movement groups—arguing that the former presupposes the good of order, decorum, civility, and reason, whereas the latter serves to “invite physical violence.”³⁹ It is in this sense that both frame and rhetorical analyses traditionally tend to examine social movement through their own “rationalist frames”. For instance, in the aftermath of the 1967 Columbia University protest, where student activists violently clashed with police officers, James Andrews opined on the unjustifiable nature of what he calls “coercive rhetoric”.⁴⁰ Andrews recognized the fact that sometimes coercion is the only viable option to achieve social justice; nonetheless, he argued that violent coercion is unwarranted when the “ends can be effectively achieved through persuasion.”⁴¹ Furthermore, coercion is always unjustifiable when there are “no ends, but only coercive means.”⁴² The problem, however, is that when rhetoric and persuasion presupposes symbolic representations in public space must entail “rationally” deployed tactics with “justifiable” ends, the role movement rhetoric analysis is reduced to divining whether or not a movement is “legitimate and proper” or “irrational and ineffective”.

Thus far, social movement studies have been dominated by a few discrete theoretical paradigms, often tied to particular academic disciplines, with their respective conceptual vocabularies or nomenclatures. Rigid divisions of knowledge do function well for the

maintenance of order and hierarchy through the systematic organization of knowledge and practices. However, fixed disciplinary barriers may petrify and become disjointed with the functional reality. Broadly speaking, concepts such as “framing” and “persuasion” may be a universal feature of human language;⁴³ but the way these concepts actually *work* would depend on specific historical and social contexts. While all theoretical perspectives operate within their cultural/knowledge frames, it is perhaps more helpful to expand our scope-of-view when we simply acknowledge the otherness of other cultures and rationalities. For rhetoric “*must lead us through the Scramble, the Wrangle of the Market Place, the flurries and flare-ups of the Human Barnyard, the Give and Take, the wavering line of pressure and counterpressure, the Logomachy, the onus of ownership, the War of Nerves, the War.*”⁴⁴ When studying contemporary social movements, if we limit our understanding of rhetoric only to those *conscious tactics by groups or recruiters to craft their messages in such a way that they appeal to potential recruits*⁴⁵, it would be difficult for us to look into social movement rhetoric when the traditional conceptions of orator, audience, intent and goal no longer hold.

III. Identification, Intersubjectivity and the Speaking “I”⁴⁶

*“Human beings who do not want to belong to the mass need only to stop being comfortable; follow their conscience, which cries out: ‘Be yourself! All that you are now doing, thinking, and desiring is not really yourself.’”*⁴⁷

--- Friedrich Nietzsche

*“[W]e can be on the alert always to see how such temptations to strife are implicit in the institutions that condition human relationships; yet we can at the same time always look beyond this order, to the principle of identification...”*⁴⁸

--- Kenneth Burke

On January 18, 1892, American women’s rights activist Elizabeth Stanton spoke before the members of the U.S. Congress and delivered what became known as the “Solitude of Self”

speech.⁴⁹ Stanton have made clear in the very beginning of her speech she is not there to present any arguments or to persuade the congress to take any particular action: *“for the last twenty years, and we have gone over all the arguments ...which are familiar to all you gentlemen; therefore, it will not be necessary that I should repeat them again.”*⁵⁰ How “irrational”! Aristotle once declared, that “the argumentative modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art--everything else is merely accessory.”⁵¹ But persuasive or not, we do speak for ourselves—we speak out of self-preservation, self-creation, and self-reflection.

The quality of one’s self-identity is manifested in part by its determinedness—the distinguishableness of one’s existence from others.⁵² The speaking “I” desires to be free from unwanted constraints, yet “I” does not speak in complete autonomy. The moment Stanton speaks, her narrative is already pre-framed by the various social relations she already finds herself in. The individuality in her narrative is a culturally and historically specific version of self-identity—*“the individuality of each human soul; our Protestant idea, the right of individual conscience and judgment-our republican idea, individual citizenship.”*⁵³

Speaking for oneself does not preclude identification with others. The narratives of the speaking “I” is not a closed self-rumination— by evoking shared cultural meanings, it possesses a transcending quality that invites all potential “You”, inviting “Us” to reflect about our position in the world, and see the strange from the most ordinary. Likewise, Stanton’s acute awareness of “individuality” as a “Protestant and republican idea” is not exactly the result of her spontaneous self-contemplation; rather, she was *propelled* to contemplate the meaning of her identity through the encounter with certain outside phenomena that displaced her pre-existing assumptions (internalized knowledge):

“Machinery has taken the labors of woman as well as man on its tireless shoulders; the loom and the spinning wheel are but dreams of the past; the pen, the brush, the easel, the chisel, have taken their places, while the hopes and ambitions of women are essentially changed.”

On the surface, the above excerpt reads like a simple reference to women’s changing labor roles in the age of industrial capitalism. However, when juxtaposing the explicit narrative and its underlying tacit cultural anxiety (the need to rethink “self”) with the external socio-historical milieu, we can see that Stanton’s narrative reflects a much more profound kind of “change”—the change in the culture of self.

Stanton’s narrative unfolds itself by displacing “past dreams” with “machinery of the present”—which reflects the external anxieties during a period of rapid social transformation for the Western world, marked by the rapid industrialization and rationalization of society. This historical process of “great disenchantment”⁵⁴ could be seen as liberating—it precipitated the “emancipation from all forms of bondage, of custom, dependence, superstition... [and] fear”.⁵⁵ “Identity” is no longer something that’s culturally-given for all, instead, individuals became agents that actively create their own identities.

At the same time, the task of accounting for oneself is as burdensome as it is liberating: *“In hours like these we realize the awful solitude of individual life, its pains, its penalties, its responsibilities; hours in which the youngest and most helpless are thrown on their own resources for guidance and consolation.”* God, once the totalizing foundation of the Western cultural identity, had “died” for the sake of the new secular modern world. The rupture of God as a cultural totality left many to directly face the infinitude of possibilities and uncertainties of the human world.⁵⁶ Estranged individuals must face the burden of creating a renewed experience of the “I” in order to fill the gaping chasm left in their cultural identity by the missing God. Such

cataclysmic “knowledge rupture” thus gave rise to a new culture of self—a culture of “individuality” where each “I” must provide a narrative that provides and sustains its self-identity.

When cultural identity is no longer taken for granted, and when the internally oriented human subject is no more,⁵⁷ the modern individual would seek to *transcend*⁵⁸ the frame of their preexisting physical and social situations by “speaking for myself!”; yet at the same time, that individual also unwittingly finds herself completely subsumed within a matrix of social conditions and institutions and *enframes* variously exterior disciplines into her interiority. This continuous process of *transcendence* and *enframing* allows the individual to exercise its agency by escaping, but by negotiating herself among various differentiated and overlapping systems of power.

The right and need to speak for ourselves, however, does not make us independent actors. The speaking “I” does not speak from an empty shell, it speaks from a socially constructed frame of self that already embodies various pieces of social knowledge from the outside world that are also shared by many – notions of “freedom”, “citizenship”, “sexuality”, “nationality” and so on. Thus the “I” does not speak through its singular subjectivity, but speaks through its intersubjective culture/knowledge frame that is shared by many. The speaking “I” *qua* self is always concurrently (implicitly or explicitly) the speaking “I” *qua* others. These shared cultural frames make identification with others possible, but also forms fixed power structures that we seek to escape.

For a speaking individual or group of individuals, all explicit knowledge performances (speaking, reading, expressing, reacting, thinking etc.) reflect the externalization of the tacit

knowledge base; and the tacit knowledge base is socially constructed through the process of internalization – folding in knowledge in the exterior world to our interior. The discursive process of self-identity construction can be understood in terms of the dynamic relationship between the *explicit knowledge performance* and the *tacit knowledge base* of an individual, as well as their relationship to the outside world (see Figure 2 below).




Figure 2: Explicit knowledge performance and tacit knowledge base⁵⁹

The tacit knowledge base is the embodiment of cultural norms, conventions, mores, habits, and ideologies—things that we simply *do* and seldom explicitly *think* or *talk* about. In Freudian terms, the consciously speaking and interacting “I” can be understood as the “*ego*”. Beneath the ego is where the tacit social knowledge base lies—the “*super-ego*” that regulates and stabilizes our social relationships, and provides us with the ideal models or spiritual goals that we strive toward (ideology).⁶⁰

At the same time, it is important to note that the construction of self-identity is also a *deconstructive* process. We are often unaware of our own underlying cultural and ideological presumptions, because we rarely think about the definition of an idea that we have already internalized as tacit knowledge. Even when we encounter an event that challenges or contradicts our own accepted idea, we can still seek authoritative sources (experts, books, doctors, etc.) to fill what Schiappa referred to as our “*definitional gap*”.⁶¹ But when we encounter an unusual “knowledge rupture” that causes us to question the very fundamental nature of an idea framework, we will be forced to make sense of everything with our own imagination and reflection.⁶²

Phenomenologically speaking, when humans encounter problematic situations, we sense the difference (or definitional gap) between our tacit knowledge and the functional reality, and thereby propelling us to resort to communicative endeavors to cope, reflect and adapt. The challenge arises, however, when each time we encounter a phenomenon from the outside world that displaces our cultural and ideological presumptions, we can only make sense of such an encounter by *enframing* or translating the phenomenon into immanent narratives that we can identify and reflect upon. Reflection exposes tacit knowledge into conscious thoughts, and signifies one’s face-to-face with her habitual self, and gives rise to the speaking “I” that seeks to *transcend* the preexisting social conditions through symbolic performances that externalizes the immanent narrative to the outside world. Thus the immanent language of the self would be framed and translated again into transcendent narratives that can be identified and shared by others.

This transcending process makes group solidarity possible, and may also disrupt preexisting social relationships. Once the immanent narrative of the agent transcends into the

exterior public space, the narrative will be reframed and combined with others' social knowledge, which in turn will be repeated, retranslated, disseminated, and transformed into other forms of symbolic representation. The transcendent narrative, therefore, is not a unified narrative, nor does it imply any particular speaker, audience, goal, or intentionality. The transcendent narrative transforms into a series of fragmented and heterogeneous cloud of intersubjective metaphors. And through the seemingly chaotic and rhizomatic⁶³ social interactions, the narratives may be legitimized and delegitimized by voices of authority, produce and influence various collective performances, and organically lead to the synthesis of new social knowledge—a heterogeneous new reality. The new social knowledge will turn be identified and embodied by individuals, internalized into new sets of power relations, and closes the previous knowledge gap. In time, the new social knowledge will subside into the subconscious social domain and solidify into tacit knowledge, which will turn be displaced again. This discursive cycle of knowledge-displacement and knowledge-creation can be understood as a spiral process that continuously shifts social dynamics without returning back to the same point—it is in this sense that social “progress” is possible even without revolutionary systematic shifts.




Figure 3

IV. Transgressive and Augmentative Functions of Social Movements

Social movement epistemology can be understood in terms of its productive and reproductive capacity, as a form of knowledge-producing and/or reproducing collective action in response to an underlying exigence. It is no secret that history and society tend to preserve those knowledge and memories that are found desirable, and eliminate those ideas that are disliked. Specifically, the social movement can be defined as the collective effort in response to the tension between societal knowledge and collective lived experiences, in order to rewrite social knowledge in accordance with the new lived experience, or to reshape lived experience in accordance with the new knowledge.

Social movements generally embody variable degrees of “*transgressive*” and “*augmentative*” collective actions. Transgressive movement responds to knowledge-rupture, and

seeks to break existing knowledge frameworks. Exemplified by segmented, large-scale historical movements such as the French Revolution and the Arab Spring movement, transgressive collective actions are typically characterized by the antagonistic display of “dialectical oppositions.” The term “dialectic” in here refers to a process of history-making through mutual opposition of grand narratives or knowledge systems. The rhetoric of transgressive movements is often marked by the presumption of non-negotiability and incompatibility between knowledge frameworks, as well as the tendency to view the other side as fundamentally illegitimate.

The dialectical antagonism intrinsic to transgressive movements can function in constructive as well as destructive capacities. Antagonism might function constructively through the sublation of mutually oppositional knowledge frameworks, uplifting a dysfunctional civilization from impending *anomie* through the rewriting of its ossified social knowledge. The constructive aspect of antagonism (e.g. the end of slavery in the American South after the Civil War) brings a renewed sense of natality for the rebirth of society and civilization, made possible by the imposition of new social knowledge and corresponding new collective lived experience. The updated memory framework might serve to bring the people closer to their substantive/material social conditions, which in turn restores a sense of natality among the people, allowing them to create and preserve things for the generations to come, so that they did not simply come-into-the-world to die.⁶⁴

Conversely, the tragedies of the Khmer Rouge, the Rwandan Genocide, and the like also remind us the destructive aspect of antagonism. The presuppositions of non-negotiability and incompatibility between oppositional historical grand narratives at times lead to the violent oppression and annihilation of the radically “incompatible” Other. Of course, the constructive and destructive functions of transgressive movements do not necessarily imply a binary

category—a transgressive movement could unfold itself through an amalgamation of destructive to constructive forms of antagonism (e.g.: the French Revolution destroys aristocratic framework and simultaneously constructs popular sovereignty; the American civil war and the subsequent Reconstruction).

As opposed to the transgressive “history-making” movement, *augmentative* movements primarily respond to encounters with knowledge gap, and seek to repair and expand the existing knowledge horizon through collective actions. Unlike the dialectical antagonism that characterizes transgressive movements, augmentative movements mostly operate in the form of “contained opposition” or advocacy. “Contained” acts of opposition operate within the boundary of existing social knowledge frameworks, and seek to address exigence through negotiations and managed or institutionalized oppositional performances (or civic advocacy). Contained oppositional actions may function in “productive” as well as “reproductive” capacities. The “reproductive” function of contained opposition reproduces existing social knowledge and social relations through acts of repetition. For instance, the ongoing collective effort in the U.S. for gay marriage legalization reproduces and reinforces the U.S. legal framework, as well as the nuclear family framework through the repetition of civic legal advocacy. The productive function of contained opposition, on the other hand, expands the horizon of existing social knowledge frameworks. Going back to the previous example, the battle for gay marriage legalization not only reproduces the nuclear family framework, but also expands the horizon of our social and legal definition of family and marriage without radically altering the meaning of those terms.

When preexisting social knowledge frameworks and corresponding social relations are ossified, and when contained knowledge production and reproduction are no longer able to address underlying substantive exigence or problems experienced by the people, this may lead to

the intensification of the tension between social knowledge and collective lived experience. The radical disconnect between social knowledge and lived experience may render augmentative movements ineffective and in turn invite transgressive movements. Of course, this is not to suggest a fixed causal relationship between augmentative and transgressive collective actions, given the presence of various degrees of ambivalence and ambiguity guiding our social actions, nor would this paper suggest that we can accurately predict the conditions that will give rise to any particular form of social movement. We humans have the capacity to get used to almost anything, considering the abject material condition most North Koreans live under and yet the high apparent legitimacy of their leadership to their people.

Social movement rhetoric, then, is deeply embedded within our collective social knowledge, and the framing of our social knowledge both passively enables us to reflect upon the displacing encounters we experience, as well as actively helps us to share our reflections with each other. Therefore, it is through rhetoric that intersubjective experiences are made possible. When a displacing social phenomenon transpires, such as the public self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in 2010,⁶⁵ the event produced many subjective experiences among the immediate witnesses of the event. But each individual eyewitness' subjective experience of the public self-immolation is likely to be ephemeral—the *polysubjective* experiences of the many witnesses will be framed by their pre-existing social knowledge, and then externalized into various symbolic representations that will be identified and reframed by many others (cellphone videos, Twitter messages, eyewitness accounts, etc.). The polysubjective experiences therefore quickly converge into a heterogeneous intersubjective experience, given the shared cultural frames that enable us to identify (*see* Figure 4 below).




Figure 4: escaping/converging toward intersubjectivity

This intersubjective experience is what makes social movements possible. A social movement unfolds through the multitudes of narratives that are being identified and shared, framed and reframed, and propels individuals and groups to struggle, react and negotiate the displacement of their social knowledge, and results in the production of new social knowledge and shift in social relationships. Humans, as Dewey suggested, being social animals, tend to associate with one another and form collectives bound by common interest.⁶⁶ Each form of the collective is organized by its own particular knowledge and rules, resulting in collective actions or knowledge performances. While association and collective action are perhaps universal human traits, associated actions produce various consequences. These consequences may serve the common good, or become the *bête noire* of the society.⁶⁷

Civil society, therefore, is a product of growing social awareness when individuals are becoming increasingly aware of their relative social and historical position, as well as indirect consequences of the actions of others. The management of social consequences does not imply physically eliminating other individuals, but to reform and manage their actions through the production of knowledge. Thus arise various institutions, plans, techniques and mechanisms to secure *consequences* which are liked and eliminate those which are found undesirable. On the

other hand, institutions of power are also trapped in a contradiction: given the globalization process and the pervasive sustained gaze of the public, one's own culture is being continuously brought to visible light with rapid and frequent encounters with others. This constant displacement of knowledge has led to the culture of self-reflectivity, where knowledge displacement and production became a continuous, rhizomatic, and decentered "spiral" process.

References:

- Arendt, Hannah. *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
- Aristotle, *Rhetorics*, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, (Boston, MA: The Internet Classics Archive, 1994—007): Book I, Part 2. <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.1.i.html>
- Artaud, Antonin. "To Have Done with the Judgment of God" in *Selected Writings*. Susan Sontag (ed). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976, p. 571.
- Backer, Larry C. and Keren Wang and Tomonori Teraoka. "Democratizing International Business and Human Rights by Catalyzing Strategic Litigation: The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the U.N. Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights from the Bottom Up" (September 14, 2013). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325994>
- Beitz, Charles R. *The idea of human rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2009)
- Berger, Peter L., and Luckmann, Thomas. "The Social Construction of Reality," in *Contemporary Sociological Theory 2nd Edition*, ed. Craig Calhoun et.al. (MA: Blackwell, 2007) pp.43-51.
- Blecker, Thorsten and Neumann, Robert (1999). "International Knowledge Management: Some Perspectives for Knowledge Oriented Strategic Management in Virtual Organizations" in

Knowledge management and virtual organizations, ed. Yogesh Malhotra, 2000. Hershey, PA, USA: Idea Group Publishing, pp. 63-83.

Brummett, Barry. "Presidential Substance: The Address of August 15, 1973." *Western Speech Communication Journal* 39 (1975): 249-259.

Burke, Kenneth. 1962. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Burke, Kenneth. 1966. *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method*. Berkeley: University of California Press,

Charland, Maurice. "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the *Peuple Quebecois*" in Thomas Benson (ed.), *Landmark Essays on Rhetorical Criticism*. (California: Hermagoras Press, 1993) at pp. 213-234.

Cox, Robert and Christina Foust. 2009. "Social Movement Rhetoric", in *The SAGE Handbook of Rhetorical Studies*, ed. Andrea Lunsford, Kirt Wilson, and Rosa Eberly. USA: SAGE Publications, 606-607.

Cruz, Christine Zuni. *Toward a Pedagogy and Ethic of Law/Lawyering for Indigenous Peoples*, 82 N.D. L. Rev. 863 (2006)

Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. 1980. *A Thousand Plateaus*. Trans. Brian Massumi. London and New York: Continuum, 2004

Deleuze, Gilles. 1992 "What is a dispositif?" pp. 159–68 in T. J. Armstrong (ed.), Michel Foucault, *Philosopher*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Dewey, John. 1927. *The public & its problems*. New York : H. Holt, 1927

Dewey, John. *Experience and Nature* (Courier Dover Publications, 1958)

Dutta, Mohan J. *Voices of Resistance Communication and Social Change*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2012.

Espinoza, Leslie G. *Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and Omnipresence of Race and Gender*, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 901 (1997)

Fisher, Walter *Human Communication as Narration: Towards a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987

Foucault, Michel. 1988. *Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason*. New York: Vintage Books.

Foucault, Michel. 1994. *The birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical perception*. New York: Vintage Books.

Foucault, Michel. 1977. *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, Michel. 2003. *Society Must be Defended*", trans. David Macey. New York: Picador.

Freud, Sigmund. 1963. *General psychological theory: papers on metapsychology*. New York: Collier Books.

Gamson, William and Meyer, David. "Framing political opportunity." in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (Ed.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 275-290.

Giddens, Anthony (1984). *The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1974. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. New York, NY et al.: Harper & Row.

Griffin, Leland M. "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 38 (1952): 184-188.

Haynes, Dina Francesca. *Client-Centered Human Rights Advocacy*, 13 Clinical L. Rev. 379 (2006)

Heidegger, Martin "The Question Concerning Technology", translated by W. Lovitt with revisions by D. F. Krell, in D. F. Krell (ed.) *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, revised and expanded edition, London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 311–41.

Hegel, G. Wilhelm Friedrich. *Phenomenology of spirit*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).

Hyde, Michael J. 2001. *The call of conscience: Heidegger and levinas, rhetoric and the euthanasia debate*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Jasper, James M. *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999

Levinas, Immanuel. *On Escape / De l'évasion*. Trans. Bettina G. Bergo, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003

Levinas, Immanuel. *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969.

Lyotard, Jean-François. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report On Knowledge* (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 2004)

Marx, Karl. 1859. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. Trans. S.W. S.W. Ryazanskaya. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1993. Available: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/>

McAdam, Doug. "The framing function of movement tactics: Strategic dramaturgy in the American civil rights movement" in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (Ed.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 275-290.

Melucci, Alberto. "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach." *Social Science Information* 19 (1980): 199-226.

Melucci, Alberto. *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Morris, Charles E, and Stephen H Browne. *Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest*. 2 ed. State College, PA: Strata Pub, 2006.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1974. *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books.

Nonaka, Ikujiro and Nishiguchi, Toshihiro. *Knowledge emergence: Social, technical, and evolutionary dimensions of knowledge creation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Parsons, Talcott. 1968. *The structure of social action: A study in theory and special reference to a group of recent european writers [with a new introd.]*. Vol. 92424, 92425. New York: Free Press

Reinalda, Bob. "Private in Form, Public in Purpose: International Relations Theory" in *Non-State Actors in International Relations* (Ashgate: 2001) pp. 11-40.

Schiappa, Edward. 2003. *Defining reality: Definitions and the politics of meaning*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Scott, Robert and Donald Smith. 2006. "The Rhetoric of Confrontation", in *Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest*", ed. Stephen Browne and Charles Morris III. State College, Pa.: Strata, 28-35.

Shultz, Alfred. "The Phenomenology of the Social World" in *Contemporary Sociological Theory 2nd Edition*, ed. Craig Calhoun et.al. (MA: Blackwell, 2007) pp.32-12.

Slaughter, Anne Marie. *A New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005)

Stanton, Elizabeth Cady. 2001. *Solitude of Self*. Ashfield, MA: Paris Press. Also available: <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5315/>

Stewart, Charles J., Craig Allen Smith, and Denton, Robert E., Jr. *Persuasion and Social Movements*. 6 ed. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2012.

Tilly, Charles. 2007. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder, Co.: Paradigm.

Touraine, Alain. "The Importance of Socimnal Movements." *Social Movement Studies* 1 (2002): 89-95.

Weber, Max. 1963. *The Sociology of Religion*, trans. Ephraim Fischhoff,. Boston, MA: Beacon.

Zald, Mayer. "Culture, ideology and strategic framing" in Doug McAdam, John Mccarthy and Mayer Zald (Ed.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 261-274.

NOTES:

¹ Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. S.W. S.W. Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1859) in *Preface*. Available: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm>

² Talcott Parsons, *The structure of social action*. (New York: Free Press, 1968): p.4

³ Mayer Zald, "Culture, ideology and strategic framing" in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (Ed.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at p.266.

⁴ Alberto Melucci, "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach," *Social Science Information* 19 (1980): 199-226;

⁵ See Alain Touraine, "The Importance of Social Movements," *Social Movement Studies* 1 (2002) at 91: "we must distinguish social movements from ... historical movements. One thing is to study movements or collective actions within a societal type. Something else is to study forms of actions or reactions as parts of a process of historical change."

⁶ For some examples of the earlier "collective behaviorist" works on social movements, see: Allport, Floyd. 1924. *Social Psychology*. Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin; Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, *Collective Behavior*, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1957 1st ed. For examples of the later "resource mobilization" works of American social movement scholarship, see: McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1973. *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization*, Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press; Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From mobilization to revolution*. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co

⁷ For a more detailed description of the structure/agency debate, see Anthony Giddens, (1984). *The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.213-214: "Conceptions of distinctively 'structural explanation' in sociology have long had a natural enemy in methodological individualism. The debate between the two positions is in some part the methodological counterpart to the dualism of subject and social object that has characterized the ontology of social sciences..."

⁸ See Melucci, 1980 at pp.199-200.

⁹ Rational choice theory has the tendency to see to explain "rational" human behavior in terms of atomic, self-aware agents seeking the most cost-effective means to achieve their pre-determined goals.

¹⁰ See, Giddens supra note 6.

¹¹ See, for example, Michel Foucault, *Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason*, (New York: Vintage Books 1988); Michel Foucault, *The birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical perception*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1991); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).

¹² See, for example, Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: The care of the self* (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1988).

¹³ In Foucault's narrative on the evolution of state power, where the inefficient method of using coercive violence by the state is being replaced with more efficient, nonviolent means of exercising "biopower". This is done through the transaction of knowledge, where organized values are internalized and normalized within individuals in order to shape their behavior. Michel Foucault, *Society Must be Defended*", trans. David Macey, (New York: Picador, 2003): pp. 239-263.

¹⁴ *Please note that "knowledge" understood as such encompasses all socially acquired rules, norms, values and systems of representations that shapes power relations and frames human

symbolic interactions; and **for the purpose of this paper “knowledge” and “culture” will be used interchangeably as functional synonyms.**

¹⁵ Shultz, Alfred. “The Phenomenology of the Social World” in *Contemporary Sociological Theory 2nd Edition*, ed. Craig Calhoun et.al. (MA: Blackwell, 2007) pp.32-12.

¹⁶ Berger, Peter L., and Luckmann, Thomas. “The Social Construction of Reality,” in *Contemporary Sociological Theory 2nd Edition*, ed. Craig Calhoun et.al. (MA: Blackwell, 2007) pp.43-51.

¹⁷ The concept of polycentricity will be discussed in detail in Section V.

¹⁸ The term “*dispositif*” here draws from Deleuze’s notion of a social apparatus that institutionalizes and connects the disciplinary mechanics of power-knowledge that provides internal and external coherence to institutions and social relations. These disciplinary forces, the lines of force understood as *dispositifs*, can be seen as the power-knowledge relations of constitutions as social apparatus. See Deleuze, Gilles (1992) “What is a *dispositif*?” pp. 159–68 in T. J. Armstrong (ed.), Michel Foucault, *Philosopher*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

¹⁹ James Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999): pp. 69-71.

²⁰ The term used here borrows from Emmanuel Levinas’s notion of *transcendence*, where he developed the notion in light of modern humans “irreducible urge” to get past the limits of their physical and social situations. See, Immanuel Levinas, *On Escape / De l'évasion*. Trans. Bettina G. Bergo, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003 at pp. 51-71

²¹ Refers to Martin Heidegger’s notion of *enframing*, where he argues the modern technological world eliminate the autonomous capacity of human beings through the “clearing of out” our inner dwelling and “drives out every other possibility of revealing”. See Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”, translated by W. Lovitt with revisions by D. F. Krell, in D. F. Krell (ed.) *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, revised and expanded edition, London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 311–41.

²² Ibid., at 70-71.

²³ Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1974) at 10.

²⁴ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1950) at p.23

²⁵ See, e.g., Alain Touraine, “The Importance of Social Movements,” *Social Movement Studies* 1 (2002); Alberto Melucci, “The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach,” *Social Science Information* 19 (1980): 199-226.

²⁶ See Jasper, *supra* note 13 at pp.74-77.

²⁷ See Charles Tilly, *Contentious Politics*, (Boulder, Co., Paradigm, 2007) at p.8:
“Social movements combine: (1) Sustained campaigns of claim making; (2) an array of public performances including marches, rallies, demonstrations, creation of specialized associations, public meetings, public statements, petitions, letter writing, and lobbying; (3) repeated public displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment by such means as wearing colors, marching in disciplined ranks, sporting badges that advertise the cause, displaying signs, chanting slogans, and picketing public buildings. They draw on (4) the organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities.”

²⁸ See, e.g., Mayer Zald, “Culture, ideology and strategic framing” in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (Ed.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 261-274; William Gamson and, David Meyer, “Framing political opportunity.” in Doug McAdam, et al. (Ed.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 275-290.

²⁹ See Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1974)

³⁰ See Zald *supra* note 19, at p.262: “...frames are specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action.”

³¹ See Jasper *supra* note 16, at p. 77.

³² See Jasper, pp. 74-80; *see also supra* note 19.

³³ Jasper, at p.77

³⁴ See Aristotle, *Rhetorics*, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, (Boston, MA: The Internet Classics Archive, 1994—007): Book I, Part 2. <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.1.i.html>

³⁵ Leland M. Griffin, (1952) “The Rhetoric of Historical Movements” in Charles Morris and Stephen Browne (ed.), *Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest, 2nd Edition*, (State College, Pa.: Strata, 2006) at pp. 9-14.

³⁶ See Charles Morris and Stephen Browne (ed.), *Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest, 2nd Edition*, (State College, Pa.: Strata, 2006): Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6.

³⁷ E.g. Franklin Haiman, Robert Scott, and Donald Smith.

³⁸ Robert Cox and Christina Foust, “Social Movement Rhetoric”, in *The SAGE Handbook of Rhetorical Studies*, ed. Andrea Lunsford, Kirt Wilson, and Rosa Eberly (USA: SAGE Publications, 2009), 606-608.

³⁹ Robert Scott and Donald Smith, “The Rhetoric of Confrontation”, in *Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest*, ed. Stephen Browne and Charles Morris III. (State College, Pa.: Strata, 2006), 28-35.

⁴⁰ James Andrews, “Confrontation at Columbia: A Case Study in Coercive Rhetoric”, in *Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest*, ed. Stephen Browne and Charles Morris III. (State College, Pa.: Strata, 2006), 165-171.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., at 170.

⁴³ Walter Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action*. (Columbia, Sc.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989) at 18: Fisher made reference to Kenneth Burke's broad definition of rhetoric as an attribute of all symbolic expression and action. For Burke, rhetoric is intrinsic to human language because "wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric, and wherever there is meaning, there is persuasion."

⁴⁴ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1950) at p.23

⁴⁵ This is a playful modification of Jasper's definition of framing: where he critically defines framing as "conscious efforts by groups or recruiters to craft their rhetoric and issues in such a way that they appeal to potential recruits." See Jasper, *supra* at p.77

⁴⁶ The use of "I" here borrows from Emmanuel Levinas's philosophical work, where Levinas differentiated the Heideggerian notion of "Being" into the "self" and "I". "I" signifies the active, present-oriented and conscious Being-in-the-world that accounts for itself and gives an account to another. Whereas the "self" signifies the passive, subconscious and continuous base that supports "I". The Levinasian "I" and "self" roughly correlates the Freudian "ego" and "super-ego" respectively. See, Immanuel Levinas, *On Escape / De l'évasion*. Trans. Bettina G. Bergo, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003 at pp. 51-73; see also, Levinas, Immanuel. *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969.

⁴⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 239.

⁴⁸ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1950) at p.20

⁴⁹ See Stanton, Elizabeth Cady. *Solitude of Self*. Paris Press; Ashfield, MA, 2001. Also available: <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5315/>

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ See, Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I, Ch.1

⁵² This notion of identity was first proposed in Western philosophy by Hegel, see G. W. G. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p.30-45: "The subsistence or substance of anything that exists is its self-identity; for a failure of self-identity would be its self-dissolution." This conception of self-identity was subsequently echoed by many other modern thinkers. For instance, Sigmund Freud also claimed that our sense of being arise from our initial separation from "the Mother (can be actual biology mother or equivalent mother figures)" as an infant, where the traumatic separation from the previously all-inclusive mother gives rise to the duo structure of ego (symbolic conscious structure for us cope and redirect our underlying separation anxiety) and the super-ego (the gaping chiasm formed by the total absence of the Mother, waiting to be filled with rules and disciplines of the Father).

⁵³ See Stanton, Elizabeth Cady. *Solitude of Self*. Paris Press; Ashfield, MA, 2001. Also available: <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5315/>

⁵⁴ Max Weber referred to the advent of secular modernity as the “process of disenchantment” fueled by the Protestant ideology. See Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, trans. Ephraim Fischhoff, (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1963): 173-175

⁵⁵ See Stanton, *supra* note 43: “The strongest reason for giving woman all the opportunities for higher education, for the full development of her faculties, her forces of mind and body; for giving her the most enlarged freedom of thought and action; a complete emancipation from all forms of bondage, of custom, dependence, superstition; from all the crippling influences of fear—is the solitude and personal responsibility of her own individual life.”

⁵⁷ The concept of human subject touches on the Kantian assumption that notion that we cannot know things in themselves but through our faculties of representation (naming). Therefore, abstractions themselves such as “God” and “democracy” do not have correlating objects and can be understood only through the referencing of other abstractions. Some modern scholars, such as Jean-Francois Lyotard argue that the expansive and sustained intersubjective experience renders continuous subjectivity impossible, thus rendering the human as subject no longer possible.

⁵⁸ See, Backer, Larry C. and Keren Wang and Tomonori Teraoka. “Democratizing International Business and Human Rights by Catalyzing Strategic Litigation: The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the U.N. Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights from the Bottom Up” (September 14, 2013). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325994>

⁶⁰ Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and the Id”, *General psychological theory: papers on metapsychology*. (New York: Collier Books, 1963)

⁶¹ Edward Schiappa, *Defining reality: Definitions and the politics of meaning*. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003)

⁶² Edward Schiappa, *Defining reality: Definitions and the politics of meaning*. *Supra*.

⁶³ Deleuze and Guattari also used the concept of “rhizome” as a metaphor for the seemingly chaotic and organic (but managed) subconscious social interactions which gives rise to the coherent visible structure. See, Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. 1980. *A Thousand Plateaus*. Trans. Brian Massumi. London and New York: Continuum, 2004, 7-8, where they argue rhizome “ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles.” Furthermore, rhizome is a decentered series of symbolic interactions, a “semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive: there is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized languages. There is no ideal speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogeneous linguistic community.” Language is, in Weinreich's words, “an essentially heterogeneous reality.”¹ There is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant

language within a political multiplicity. Language stabilizes around a parish, a bishopric, a capital. It forms a bulb. It evolves by subterranean stems and flows, along river valleys or train tracks; it spreads like a patch of oil.² It is always possible to break a language.

⁶⁴ On the concept of “natality,” see generally, Arendt, Hannah. *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.

⁶⁵ Mohammed Bouazizi a young Tunisian street vendor whom, by setting himself on fire in public, sparked massive protests which in part led to the 2010 Tunisian Revolution. See, Rania Abouzeid, “Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire” *TIME Magazine (online)*, Jan. 21, 2011, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html>; Yasmine Ryan, “How Tunisia’s revolution began”, *AlJazeera*, Last Modified: 26 Jan 2011 14:39. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html>

⁶⁶ John Dewey, *The public & its problems*, (New York : H. Holt, 1927): 34-35.

⁶⁷ Dewey, *The public & its problems*, at 34-35.